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Introduction
Life is full of uncertainties. Legal rules should have a clear intention, motivation and
purpose in order to diminish daily uncertainties. However, practice shows that their
consequences are complex and hard to predict. For instance, tort law has the gen-
eral objectives of deterring future negligent behavior and compensating the victims of
someone else’s negligence. Achieving these goals are particularly difficult in medical
malpractice cases. To start with, when patients search for medical care they are typi-
cally sick in the first place. In case harm materializes during the treatment, it might be
very hard to assess if it was due to substandard medical care or to the patient’s poor
health conditions. Moreover, the practice of medicine has a positive externality on the
society, meaning that the design of legal rules is crucial: for instance, it should not re-
sult in physicians avoiding practicing their activity just because they are afraid of being
sued even when they acted according to the standard level of care.
The empirical literature on medical malpractice has been developing substantially
in the past two decades, with the American case being the most studied one. Evidence
from civil law tradition countries is more difficult to find. The aim of this thesis is
to contribute to the empirical literature on medical malpractice, using two civil law
countries as a case-study: Spain and Italy.
The goal of this thesis is to investigate, in the first place, some of the consequences
of having two separate sub-systems (administrative and civil) coexisting within the
same legal system, which is common in civil law tradition countries with a public na-
tional health system (such as Spain, France and Portugal). When this holds, different
procedures might apply depending on the type of hospital where the injury took place
(essentially whether it is a public hospital or a private hospital). Therefore, a patient
injured in a public hospital should file a claim in administrative courts while a patient
suffering an identical medical accident should file a claim in civil courts. A natural
question that the reader might pose is why should both administrative and civil courts
decide medical malpractice cases? Moreover, can this specialization of courts influence
how judges decide medical malpractice cases?
In the past few years, there was a general concern with patient safety, which is
currently on the agenda of several national governments. Some initiatives have been
taken at the international level, with the aim of preventing harm to patients during
treatment and care. A negligently injured patient might present a claim against the
health care provider with the aim of being compensated for the economic loss and for
xiii
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pain and suffering. In several European countries, health care is mainly provided by a
public national health system, which means that if a patient harmed in a public hospi-
tal succeeds in a claim against the hospital, public expenditures increase because the
State takes part in the litigation process. This poses a problem in a context of increas-
ing national health expenditures and public debt. In Italy, with the aim of increasing
patient safety, some regions implemented a monitoring system on medical malpractice
claims. However, if properly implemented, this reform shall also allow for a reduction
in medical malpractice insurance costs.
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 1 provides a review of the empirical lit-
erature on medical malpractice, where studies on outcomes and merit of claims, costs
and defensive medicine are presented. Chapter 2 presents an empirical analysis of med-
ical malpractice claims arriving to the Spanish Supreme Court. The focus is on reversal
rates for civil and administrative decisions. Administrative decisions appealed by the
plaintiff have the highest reversal rates. The results show a bias in lower administra-
tive courts, which tend to focus on the State side. We provide a detailed explanation
for these results, which can rely on the organization of administrative judges career.
Chapter 3 assesses predictors of compensation in medical malpractice cases appealed
to the Spanish Supreme Court and investigates the amount of damages attributed to
patients. The results show horizontal equity between administrative and civil decisions
(controlling for observable case characteristics) and vertical inequity (patients suffering
more severe injuries tend to receive higher payouts). In order to execute these anal-
yses, a database of medical malpractice decisions appealed to the Administrative and
Civil Chambers of the Spanish Supreme Court from 2006 until 2009 (designated by the
Spanish Supreme Court Medical Malpractice Dataset (SSCMMD)) has been created. A
description of how the SSCMMD was built and of the Spanish legal system is presented
as well.
Chapter 4 includes an empirical investigation of the effect of a monitoring system
for medical malpractice claims on insurance premiums. In Italy, some regions adopted
this policy in different years, while others did not. The study uses data on insurance
premiums from Italian public hospitals for the years 2001-2008. This is a significant
difference as most of the studies use the insurance company as unit of analysis. Al-
though insurance premiums have risen from 2001 to 2008, the increase was lower for
regions adopting a monitoring system for medical claims. Possible implications of this
system are also provided.
Finally, Chapter 5 discusses the main findings, describes possible future research
and concludes.
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Chapter 1
Medical Malpractice: Review of the
Empirical Literature
1.1 Introduction
Two of the main objectives of tort law consist in deterring future negligent behavior
and compensating victims of someone else’s negligence.1 The same applies to cases
of medical malpractice, where the tort system should deter physicians’ negligence and
compensate victims who suffered harm due to medical malpractice. In reality, the med-
ical liability system based on fault should be designed in such a way that doctors have
the correct incentives to provide standard level of care. However, some advocates of
tort reform argue that the system performs those functions imperfectly and at a high
cost.2 Others go further, and state that when it comes to compensation, the results
obtained in the system can be considered random.3
Where it seems to be more agreement is on the statement that the tort system is un-
able to compensate victims of medical negligence, since only a small proportion is able
to receive some form of compensation. Nevertheless, the current system based on fault
also has some benefits, namely if we compare it with the most cited alternative option,
the no-fault system. Under a no-fault system, injured patients receive compensation
independently of the physician’s level of care, as long as there is an injury involved.
This can be considered essentially an administrative system with no involvement from
courts. Some costs are naturally reduced under this system, such as the costs of litiga-
tion. However, physicians’ incentives to provide due care can now be diminished, since
1See, for instance, Trebilcock and Dewees (1992).
2See Danzon (1994a).
3U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2002).
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the level of care is not a variable to be taken into account when deciding to attribute
compensation. Actually, physicians will not bear the consequences of their substandard
level of care. Moreover, although there are more people being compensated they are
not necessarily being better compensated. In other words, there are cases involving
permanent and/or serious injuries which can receive approximately the same amount
of compensation4 as other cases that involve a much lower severity level or shorter
injury length.5
With the aim of providing estimations and results closer to reality instead of anec-
dotal evidence, empirical literature on medical malpractice has developed substantially
in the past two decades. Researchers might have different backgrounds of expertise,
such as law and economics, health economics, legal medicine, medicine and statistics.
Empirical studies about medical negligence have focused on several topics: the impact
of liability reforms (namely on the supply of physicians6 and insurance premiums), the
capacity of the tort system to deliver outcomes consistent with claims merit, the costs
of medical malpractice, the evaluation of defensive medicine, the medical malpractice
’crisis’,7 to name only a few.
The U.S. has been by far the most studied case in the empirical law and economics
literature. One possible explanation for the discrepancy in the number of studies be-
tween the U.S. and other countries might be the requirement, from the American Na-
tional Practitioner Data Bank,8 to submit a report every time a health care provider
pays for a medical malpractice case. Therefore, gathering information in some cases is,
under some limitations, possible and easier. Still, obtaining complete and comparable
data can be a problem, which translates into an obstacle for many empirical works. For
this reason, research tends to be focused on small samples, such as a few hospitals,
insurance companies or a country’s region. Additionally, it is sometimes possible to ob-
tain information about the cases that arrive to court only, meaning that information on
those cases that involve negligence but that were settled is lost.9 Nevertheless, it is not
4Notice that in case of no-fault, the interval range between the highest and lowest amount of compen-
sation becomes smaller.
5Recently Kessler (2011) points to the benefits and disadvantages of alternative options to the tort
system, namely a no-fault system.
6Klick and Stratmann (2007), Matsa (2007), Mello, Studdert, Schumi, Brennan and Sage (2007), Klick
and Stratmann (2005), Kessler et al. 2005, Helland and Showalter (2006), Encinosa and Hellinger (2005).
7Black et al. (2005) describe that the medical malpractice crises of the 1970s, 1980s and 2000s have
involved sharp spikes in insurance premiums, and all lead to the “same political effect: demands by doctors
and hospitals for liability-reducing reforms”, p. 208. To refute the evidence of such a crisis, see Vidmar
et al. (2005) or Black et al. (2005).
8For more information, see http://www.npdb-hipdb.hrsa.gov, last access August 30, 2011.
9See, for instance, Priest and Klein (1984), Gertner (1993), Clermont and Eisenberg (1998), on the
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only a problem of data that scholars face when they want to make empirical studies in
medical malpractice. Specificities of the subject, namely on assessing causality, make
the analysis sometimes difficult.
1.2 Outcomes and merit of claims
It is frequently claimed that tort litigation produces outcomes that do not match merit
when it comes to negligence of health care providers. This means that the tort system
attributes compensation to cases in which there was no fault of the health care provider
or refuses to pay when there was negligence or substandard care involved. In line with
this view is the claim that there are too many frivolous cases that receive compensation
and that are putting the medical system into a crisis, which makes some people believe
that other options should be considered, such as a change to a no-fault system.10
To clarify this debate, empirical studies try to assess the capacity of the legal system
to provide correct decisions. One way of doing this is by comparing correct outcomes
(meritorious cases that receive payment and nonmeritorious cases to which compensa-
tion is denied) with wrong outcomes (meritorious cases that do not receive payment and
nonmeritorious cases that receive payments). Having correct outcomes is particularly
important: if negligence11 is a necessary condition for making the injurer liable and it
is assessed correctly, health care providers will have the incentives to provide optimal
medical care, and to prevent substandard care. Nonetheless, this does not imply that
incentives for providing the efficient quality level will be given, since it is enough for
American case. We will study Supreme Court cases in Spain in the next chapter, and provide explanations
for legal differences that make this analysis interesting and less biased (namely the fact that the State
cannot settle).
10Virginia approved a close to a no-fault program for severe neurological birth injuries only,
named Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act (Code of Virginia, §§38.2-
5000 to 38.2-5021 (LEXIS 2003)). The Code is available on-line at http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-
bin/legp504.exe?000+cod+TOC (last access August 30, 2011). Florida also adopted a similar program,
designated by Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan (Florida Chapter 88-1, §§60-
75). Freeman and Freeman (1989) refer that none is a truly no-fault, in the sense that both "require a
determination of whether the cause of CP [cerebral palsy] was anoxia or mechanical injury". See Dute et al.
(2004), Studdert and Brennan (2001), among others. For a discussion of four alternatives to conventional
common-law tort systems (i.e., guidelines-based systems, enterprise liability, binding alternative dispute
resolution and no-fault), see Kessler (2007).
11When analyzing different countries, Schwartz (1992) notices that "it is revealing to realize that negli-
gence - rather than no liability or strict liability - is just about the universal liability standard in suits against
doctors. That is, negligence seems to be the liability criterion currently relied on by almost every tort system",
p. 52.
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the health care provider to set the quality care at the minimum level that allows her to
escape from being liable.12
1.2.1 The Evaluation Process
A natural question is how to find an indicator to evaluate the tort system. One pos-
sible way is to compare the tort system outcome with some other indicator: if both
give the same results, then the system is likely to be correct. The common practice in
several studies (see Figure 1.1) is to ask reviewers to examine claim files, which can
be the hospital record13 or the entire process that the insurance company collects.14
The reviewer, normally a physician,15 must attribute a "score" according to her level of
confidence on the existence of an adverse event. Therefore, the first step is to realize
if there is an adverse event, i.e., "an injury resulting from a medical intervention, or in
other words, it is not due to the underlying condition of the patient," (Kohn et al. (2000))
and this is the process that allows checking for causation.16 In case there is no evidence
of an adverse event, the claim file will not be considered further in the analysis and
the review stops here. However, if there is evidence of an adverse event, this is a nec-
essary but not a sufficient condition for liability. Consequently, the reviewer will then
have to check if that adverse event was due to medical negligence or error, which can
be defined as "the failure of a planned action to be completed as intended or the use of
a wrong plan to achieve an aim".17 Determining the existence of substandard care in
medical malpractice cases is different than in other cases of accidents. According to the
U.S. standard, the idea is that it should be determined if the "physician’s treatment of
the patient comported with the standards of professional practice followed by other physi-
cians in the same field of medical practice in that community at the time that the injury
12See Shavell (1978), Shavell (1987) and Danzon (1985).
13Baker (2005a) points out some of the advantages of the research on the medical malpractice epidemic
that is based on reviewing hospital records. The first is that "researchers can easily preserve the anonymity
of the hospitals", and therefore hospitals are more likely to participate. The second is that "researchers can
look at records from many hospitals", p. 24. One drawback of this method is that not all mistakes will
appear in the record. Moreover, medical mistakes also happen outside hospitals.
14We can expect incomplete or biased results due to the reliance on these records.
15In several studies there is also a previous step: trained nurses check for evidence that the patient was
injured from medical treatment. In order to help them, a list of criteria associated with adverse events is
normally provided.
16Causation in medicine is particularly difficult to assess. Patients normally seek medical care because
they have some medical condition. Therefore, it is not always straightforward to conclude if the patient
suffered a mishap or if it is the result of his medical condition. See Khoury (2006) and Young et al. (2004).
17Kohn et al. (2000). Notice that, as the authors state, "errors can happen in all stages in the process of
care, from diagnosis, to treatment, to preventive care", p. 4.
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occurred".18 Not every adverse event is a result of a substandard care, in the same way
that the absence of adverse events does not imply that good quality care was provided
to the patient. Brennan et al. (1991a) present a good example of the difference. A drug
reaction occurring in a patient to whom the drug was appropriately prescribed for the
first time is an adverse event. Nevertheless, it is unavoidable and no negligence should
be found. But if "on the other hand, the drug reaction occurs in a patient who is given
the drug despite a known sensitivity to it, the adverse event is properly judged to be due to
negligence".19
Ideally, the reviewer should not have access to the final outcome, so that an in-
dependent judgment can be made. This judgment will be finally confronted with the
result delivered by the tort system. A correct outcome should be that the health care
provider is liable if both causation and negligence are present. In fact, just like Sloan
and Hsieh (1990) state, "[t]o prove liability, a plaintiff must prove (1) that the plain-
tiff was injured (2) because of the acts or omissions of the defendant (causation) and (3)
that the defendant’s acts or omissions failed to meet a standard of care maintained by
reasonably competent health care providers in the community (negligence)".20 Reviewers
frequently check for the degree of disability21 that the negligent adverse event caused
to the patient, due to the fact that while the quality of care is important to the determi-
nation of liability, the severity of the harm is crucial for the amount of damages to be
awarded to the victim.
Obviously, each study might provide different designs, but this is, broadly speaking,
the most common procedure in the field. The main limitations of this method are the
possible disagreement between different reviewers and the so-called ’close-calls’. Given
that it is possible to find substantial variation in the judgments of the reviewers, kappa
statistic is often calculated. This is an indicator of how much observers agree beyond
18In Vidmar (1995), p. 124. While referring to the U.S., the author provides a clear example: "under the
law, a general practitioner living in a rural community might be held to a less rigorous standard of treatment
than a neurosurgeon practicing in an urban teaching hospital. The latter has access to more technology and
updates in medical developments and through training should know more than the general practitioner. The
standard of care also varies according to the health provider’s specialty. For example, podiatrists or osteopaths
will be held to the standards of their particular field and not the standards of general medicine". Other
jurisdictions might adopt a different definition.
19Brennan et al. (1991a), p. 373.
20Sloan and Hsieh (1990), p. 1009.
21When referring to the Florida case, Vidmar et al. (2005) point out one drawback of the attribution
of a disability rate, since "A patient who suffered a severe psychological trauma or even psychosis might be
classified as suffering "emotional trauma only" and receive a rating of 1, but in reality the medical and income
losses may be very high", p. 328.
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an expected agreement due to chance.22 The closer it is to one (or 100%), the higher
the degree of agreement among reviewers.23 In the ’close-call range’ stand those cases
in which the reviewers have a confidence in causation of just under or just over 50-50.
For example, in the Harvard Medical Practice Study (HMPS) that we will analyze next,
"close-call adverse events are cases with scores of 3.0 to 4.0 in a six-point scale".24 But to
be considered an adverse event in this study, there must be a composite adverse event
score greater than 3.5. The problem with these cases is that a small difference in the
scoring could change (sometimes dramatically) the results. With these methods, the
most popular questions that several studies tried to assess were "what is the incidence
of adverse events?", "what is the proportion of injured patients that file a claim?", and
"what is the proportion of correct decisions delivered by the tort system?".
1.2.2 The Harvard Medical Practice Study
Although it was not the first study in the area,25 the Harvard Medical Practice Study26
is one of the most cited studies27 in medical malpractice and probably the one with
the highest impact in the literature, having the State of New York as case-study. Even
though it was published in 1990, it keeps being highly cited, criticized and it serves as
basis for debate even today,28 and several countries use essentially the same methods
(sometimes with some improvements) to assess the epidemiology of medical malprac-
tice. The idea of the HMPS was to make estimates for New York based on a random
22McGinn et al. (2004).
23See also Landis and Koch (1977).
24For definitions, see the glossary in "Patients, Doctors and Lawyers: Medical Injury and Patient Com-
pensation in New York - The Report of the Harvard Medical Practice Study on the State of New York",
(1990), best known as the Harvard Medical Practice Study.
25For previous examples of studies, see for instance Danzon (1985) and references herein, namely on
the pioneering study made jointly by the California Medical Association and the California Hospital As-
sociation, the "Report on the Medical Insurance Feasibility Study" (1977). Baker (2005a) argues that the
reason why the California study was not highly publicly or used for lobbying for a new no-fault medical
injury compensation fund was because its results showed that there was not only an "epidemic of medical
injuries" but also an "epidemic of medical malpractice", and "by far the largest share of medical malpractice
costs fall on injured patients and their families, not on doctors and hospitals", p. 27.
26See "Patients, Doctors and Lawyers: Medical Injury and Patient Compensation in New York - The
Report of the Harvard Medical Practice Study on the State of New York", (1990).
27When referring to the study, Studdert and Mello (2007) state that it is "the best-known study of the
epidemiology of medical injury and malpractice claiming".
28Studdert, Thomas, Burstin, Zbar, Orav and Brennan (2000) call attention to changes and specificities
of New York that would require a validation of the study in case we want to make use of its results
nowadays.
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sample of hospitalizations. From these results the authors estimated that,29 in New
York in 1984, 3.7% of hospitalizations resulted in adverse events, of which 27.6% were
due to negligence30 from the health care providers (or 1% of all hospital discharges),31
as it can be seen in Table 1.2.
When it comes to the ability of the tort system to deliver correct results, and having
in mind the frequency of malpractice claims that patients file per year, the authors "es-
timate that eight times as many patients suffer an injury from medical negligence as there
are malpractice claims" and "[b]ecause only about half of the claimants receive compen-
sation, there are sixteen times as many patients who suffer an injury from negligence as
there are persons who receive compensation through the tort system". Therefore, most of
the injured patients due to a failure in medical care do not make a claim. In fact, after
matching all the medical malpractice claims in New York with the hospitalizations, the
HMPS found that the number of claims coming from those hospitalizations was only
47. Going further, there had been 8 claims out of those 47 in which there has been a
negligent medical management injury involved.
1.2.3 Empirical Studies after the HMPS
Instead of looking at the high number of negligent adverse events or at the low propor-
tion of injured patients that received compensation that the HMPS estimated, it seems
that what attracted attention was the high quantity of frivolous cases in medical mal-
practice. We think caution should be taken when assuming that there are too many
frivolous cases, essentially for three reasons. First, just like the authors mention, no
conclusions should be made in this respect because the legal system had not resolved
many of the cases by the time the study took place. Medical malpractice cases take nor-
29Studdert, Thomas, Burstin, Zbar, Orav and Brennan (2000) refer that the HMPS was standing as the
"sole population-based study in this area", which can be explained by the high costs of developing a study of
this kind (in year 2000 dollars, the total cost was approximately $4.7 million - p. 1647, footnote 20). The
advantage of population based studies is that they allow drawing inferences about the population from
the sample, just like the HMPS allowed.
30Additionally, the HMPS found that the severity of the negligent injuries was quite worrying since "Neg-
ligent adverse events resulted, overall, in greater disability than did non-negligent events and were associated
with 51% of all deaths from medical injury". McDonald et al. (2000) are quite critical about the estimations
that refer to deaths in high-severity patients and for whom an adverse event was found. The idea is that
since there is no control group for those patients or information on their risk of death, it can not be claimed
that "there would be no deaths in a group with similar baseline risks who avoided all adverse events".
31See HMPS (1990), p. 6-10. Baker (2005a) mentions that the approaches used produced low estimates.
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mally some years32 to be decided. Second, health care service is a typical example of a
credence good: to start with, patients do not know which service quality they need;33
furthermore, they can verify ex post if the problem still exists or not, but they might not
be able to confirm if the suggested quality of treatment was actually provided.34 This
credence good problem would probably not exist if patients could perform a diagnostic
test themselves, which proves to be difficult. Besides, there is a high level of asymmet-
ric information and expertise35 that physicians have in their relationship with patients,
which means that sometimes patients must first file a lawsuit if they want to gather
more information about the received care. Finally, at least for the American case, plain-
tiff’s lawyers are supposed to function as gatekeepers36 when deciding if they accept
medical malpractice cases and if they take them ahead during the discovery process.
The high costs of pursing a medical lawsuit, together with the contingent fee that at-
tributes money to lawyers only in case there is a pro-plaintiff outcome, seem to be good
reasons to believe that lawyers are not interested in taking frivolous cases to court.37
Despite of all these remarks, what perhaps turned out to be more discussed were
some conclusions in studies by several of the authors of the HMPS a few years later on
the validity of paid claims by the American medical liability system. The 1993 study
refers that "[m]edical litigation appears, then, to be sending as confusing a signal as would
our traffic laws if the police regularly gave out more tickets to drivers who go through
green lights than to those who go through red lights".38 Three years after, Brennan et
al.39 conducted a 10 year follow up study of the medical malpractice claims identified
in the HMPS as arising from the hospitalizations. The result of the multivariate analysis
was that the only predictor of payment to the injured patient was the presence of a
permanent disability,40 and not the evidence of negligent care.
32Vidmar et al. (2005) find that 46% of cases in Florida filed between 1990 and 2003 were closed within
three years and 96% were closed within six years. Studdert et al. (2006) provide similar results.
33I.e., the provision of a too low quality compared to the needed one if insufficient and the provision of
a too high quality does not add extra value. See Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006).
34See Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006). In case of medical treatment, the patient might be cured and
have received overtreatment, the standard level of care or even a substandard level of care (but is now
well due to luck).
35Self-regulation plays a role on trying to reduce all these problems. See Garoupa (2004), Faure and
Verhulsdonck (2004) and Olsen (2000).
36See for instance Farber and White (1991). In 2009, Weiss refers to the possibility that lawyers are
becoming more selective as one possible explanation for an apparent recent reduction in claims frequency.
37We will see in the next chapter why this does not hold for Spain, at least during the period that we
examined.
38See Weiler et al. (1993), p. 75.
39See Brennan et al. (1996).
40Baker starts by questioning this result when a comparison with the HMPS is made: "For the reasons
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In spite of these results, the majority of the empirical studies that arise after the
mid 90’s do not lend support to such a bleak view of the tort system. In fact, empirical
studies provide evidence that negligence matters to predict outcomes of claims and
that, in global terms, the system eliminates frivolous cases.41 The problem seems to be
the incapacity of the tort system to compensate negligently injured patients. Moreover,
the existence of a high degree of medical negligence is problematic as well. Therefore,
some research was executed regarding the option of a change to a no-fault system of
compensation for medical injuries and on how to improve patients’ safety.42 The Utah-
Colorado Medical Practice Study (hereinafter UCMPS)43 started with the initial idea
of checking for a support of a no-fault liability system of compensation for medical
injuries, that the authors considered to be a superior alternative to the tort regime.
Nevertheless, Studdert, Brennan and Thomas claim that "[t]he policy focus had clearly
shifted to the uninsured and consumer protection issues in managed care". According to
this population-based study that uses a quite similar methodology to the HMPS,44 up-
weightening the adverse events (AEs) results to the state populations, the estimates
are a rate of 2.9% of AEs in both states. The proportion of negligence in those AEs is
32.6% in Utah and 27.5% in Colorado. After matching patients from the medical record
review who filed malpractice claims during or after 1992, only 18 malpractice claims
arise from the records, 8 in Utah and 10 in Colorado. Probably even more surprising is
the fact that from the 18 matches, only 4 involved identifiable instances of negligence.45
One outcome that is in line with the findings of the HMPS was that "slightly more
than one-half of all negligent adverse events in both studies [HMPS and UCMPS] occurred
just explored, this characterization of the results of the earlier study is questionable". See Baker (2005b) for
the main limitations of this study.
41See Rosenblatt and Hurst (1989), Cheney et al. (1989), Farber and White (1991), Sloan and Hsieh
(1990), Taragin et al. (1992), Sloan et al. (1993), Farber and White (1994). The presentation of the main
results and limitations of these studies and the HMPS can be found in Baker (2005b) and Studdert and
Mello (2007).
42For some examples of successful changes in aviation and nuclear power plants and possible applica-
tions to medicine, see Liang (1999).
43See Thomas et al. (1999), Studdert, Thomas, Burstin, Zbar, Orav and Brennan (2000), Thomas, Stud-
dert, Burstin et al. (2000) and Studdert, Brennan and Thomas (2000). We will refer essentially to Stud-
dert, Brennan and Thomas (2000) since this is the publication that presents more detailed explanations
and descriptions of the study.
44The physicians’ review process suffered some changes. To start with, only two investigators, Dr.
Thomas and Dr. Brennan, trained the physician-reviewers. Regarding "outlier" physicians, their charts
would be re-reviewed. 500 records randomly sampled were re-reviewed, which showed an agreement of
84% among reviewers.
45According to the authors, the "reviewers had not even flagged the occurrence of an adverse event in ten
of them".
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in the emergency department, and a very high proportion of all adverse events attributed
to emergency physicians were judged to be due to negligence (70.4% in New York and
52.6% in Utah and Colorado)".46 This result can be helpful in improving patient’s safety,
although it can be considered in some way expected,47 given that physicians must re-
act quickly, frequently without any previous contact with the patient and sometimes
working with sleep deprivation. Furthermore, a multivariate analysis was undertaken
in order to compare the main different socio-demographic characteristics between the
groups of patients that suffered an adverse negligent event and sued and a patient that
suffered the same type of harm but did not present a claim.48
In November 1999, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) published the report "To Err
is Human - building a safer health system", the starting point for the full impact of the
HMPS to be felt49 and for the safety of the health care to become one main variable in
the debate. The authors use the results from the HMPS and the UCMPS50 to extrapo-
late to the admissions in American hospitals, concluding that "Deaths due to preventable
adverse events exceed the deaths attributable to motor vehicle accidents (43,458), breast
cancer (42,297) or AIDS (16,516)". Having these impressive estimates in mind, sev-
eral policy recommendations were made with the aim of improving patients’ safety,
which can also be seen as a mechanism to prevent negligence. Emphasis was put on
a reporting program of adverse events linked to accountability systems. If these new
recommendations are properly designed, then, together with the tort system, should
result in lower negligent adverse events.
1.2.4 Do Claims’ Outcomes Match Claims’ Merit?
The empirical literature published after 2000 on the American case presents some in-
teresting results on the ability of the tort system to provide correct decisions in medical
malpractice cases. While predicting if the plaintiff drops the case or if the case is set-
tled, Spurr and Howze (2001) came out with the result that the defendant’s fault is the
46See Studdert, Brennan and Thomas (2000).
47See Cohen et al. (2009).
48See Studdert, Brennan and Thomas (2000), Table 3. The results suggest that the elderly and the poor
are less likely to present a claim, although caution must be taken given the small sample size.
49"Despite the considerable weight of its findings, the full impact of the HMPS was not felt until the release
of the Institute of Medicine (IOM) report, To Err is Human", Baker (2004a). The author adds the interest
of other countries for similar studies as another impact of the HMPS. See for instance Thomas, Studdert,
Runciman et al. (2000), Runciman et al. (2000) and Vincent et al. (2001).
50Notice that although the Utah and Colorado study was published in 2000, its results were available
before and therefore the authors of "To Err is Human" could use them for their estimations.
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only significant variable. The authors also conclude that the initial reserve51 is not a
predictor of the settlement payment and that the quality of care has a greater effect on
the settlement than on the mediation award. This gives support to the importance of
the discovery process in gathering information about the defendant’s fault.
In 2002, Peeples, Harris and Metzloff presented a study where they found a strong
connection between standard of care and settlement.52 Besides, this connection is
stronger than the one between causation and settlement. Therefore, the standard of
care is the most important variable for the insurer to determine if a settlement will be
proposed or not, decided mainly according to the reviewers’ evaluation. Also in this
study, reviewers’ opinions53 have an important role: the insurer’s decision of making a
settlement offer highly relied on it.
Phillips et al. (2004) conducted a study focusing on negligent and adverse events in
primary care.54 In negligent adverse events’ claims, payment was made in 86% of cases.
Regarding those claims considered as not involving negligence, payment was made in
only 7%, and the majority involved the highest harm levels. The article provides several
interesting findings that can also be used in order to improve patients’ safety, namely
that problems with records is a contributing factor for 7% of the claims.
Studdert et al. published an article in 2006 in a medicine journal in which a random
sample of 1,452 malpractice claims closed from 1984 to 2004 were studied. From the
reviewed claim files, 97% involved injury, of which negligence was found in 63% of
the cases. In turn, payment was made in 73% of these cases. Regarding cases involv-
ing injury but where no error was involved, payment was made in 28% of them.55 This
means that "[o]verall, 73 percent (1054 of 1441) of all claims for which determinations of
merit were made had outcomes concordant with their merit".56 Several interesting results
51"The initial reserve represents the risk manager’s estimate of the amount that will ultimately be paid to
satisfy the claim", in Spurr and Howze (2001), p. 497.
52The reviewed files on which conclusions are based were not a randomly selected sample, given that
the criterion for selection was the existence of a court order directing the case to mediation prior to trial.
For this reason, the authors state that "This criterion probably resulted in an oversampling of "durable" cases
- i.e., lawsuits that had progressed at least beyond complaint and answer. Thus, our sample may not reflect
accurately the number of "nuisance" or purely speculative malpractice cases filed in the trial courts", p. 881.
53Insurance companies often use outside reviewers as expert witnesses. See Peeples et al. (2002) for a
description of the insurer action in medical malpractice cases (in the U.S.).
54Providers of primary care in the U.S. are family physicians and general practice doctors (FP/GPs),
general internists and pediatricians.
55Additionally, for the 3% of the reviewed files that did not involve injury, payment was made in 16% of
them. See Studdert et al. (2006), Figure 1.
56At p. 2028.
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were also presented concerning cases that involved injury:57 the most frequently sued
physicians58 in the sample were obstetrician-gynecologists (19%) followed by general
surgeons (17%) and primary care physicians (16%); 80% of the claims involved in-
juries that caused significant disability, major disability or death; the average time span
between the occurrence of the injury and the closure of the claim was five years; a small
percentage of cases arrived in court, and in these plaintiffs rarely won damages.
Two of the researchers of the previous study, Studdert and Mello, published an ar-
ticle in 2007 using the same database but taking a different approach: this time, they
analyzed the characteristics of the cases with discordant outcomes, i.e., cases in which
the reviewer’s judgment disagreed with the case outcome.59 First a bivariate analysis
was done, in which the results point to the fact that payments in non error claims are
more common if they involve infants, nurse defendants, major injuries, obstetrics in-
juries or institutional codefendants. It was furthermore less likely to receive a payment
in nonerror claims if they involved elderly plaintiffs, orthopedic surgeons, emotional
injuries, allegations of missed or delayed diagnosis, and claims that reached a trial ver-
dict.60 Cases that arrived to court and involved error had more than twice the rate of
nonpayment as those decided out of court. Subsequently, a multivariate analysis was
performed, where many of the results found in the bivariate analysis were corrobo-
rated. The main finding of the study was that approximately one in every four cases
presented discordance between outcome and merit. Although the authors found sev-
eral differences in terms of discordant outcomes regarding payment of nonerror claims
and unpaid error claims, resolution by trial verdict was the only significant predictor
57The authors eliminated claims that had no evidence of an injury, those that disputed informed consent
issues exclusively and two claims in which the reviewers did not record a determination of error, which
resulted in a sample of 1,404 claims.
58Some studies try to address the most problematic specialties, i.e., those that have higher rates of
adverse events and that therefore must pay higher premiums. Brennan et al. (1991a) found that neu-
rosurgery, cardiac and thoracic surgery, and vascular surgery had higher rates of adverse events but not
higher rates of negligence and that "variations among specialties in rates of litigation do not reflect differing
levels of competence, but rather differences in the kinds of patients and diseases for which the specialist cares",
p. 374. Using the Florida Closed Claims Medical Malpractice dataset, Klick and Stratmann (2007) identify
10 specialties exhibiting the highest average medical malpractice awards per doctor: neurological surgery,
thoracic surgery, obstetrics and gynecology, general practice, emergency room, plastic surgery, radiology,
anesthesiology, general surgery, and cardiovascular disease.
59As far as we know, this is the first study analyzing predictors of discordant outcomes.
60There are differences among liability insurers in the discordance percentage of paid nonerror claims
and unpaid error claims. Additionally, the likelihood of discordance in both discordant outcomes increases
when there are close-calls involved, but they are less likely when the reviewer is more confident about the
presence of error or not.
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present in both types of discordant outcomes.61 One implication of this discovery is that
it does not support the view that juries are too generous to plaintiffs when a medical
malpractice case arrives in court.62
In addition to studies that analyze several specialties, others have focused on one
specialty only. Obstetrics is among the clinical specialties that attracts more attention,
eventually because substandard care can cause severe injury to a newborn (many cases
involve birth-related neurological damage), and high damages63 are normally awarded
in these cases (which might have a subsequent effect on obstetricians’ insurance pre-
mia). In 2009, a new study was published focusing on cases of obstetric anesthesia.64
By looking at cases that involved newborn death/permanent brain damage during 1990
or later, the researchers find that65 there was a significant association between payment
by the anesthesiologist and possible anesthesia contribution to the newborn injury - and
not the severity of the injury.
1.2.5 Studies Outside the U.S.
In spite of the fact that empirical analysis of medical malpractice has been a much more
current practice for the American case, the results from the HMPS and the UCMPS
raised curiosity among scholars from other countries. Using the same methodology
of the two studies cited above, new research on adverse events in hospitals has been
published, using other jurisdictions as case-studies. Nevertheless, these studies are
more focused on the quality of care and preventability of those events than on the
61This means that not only "[t]he odds of error claims not receiving payment were four times higher when
the claim was resolved by verdict rather than by settlement" but also that "verdicts were less prone to paying
nonerror claims" Studdert and Mello (2007), p. S65.
62Some of the defenders of this view are doctors, insurers and scholars. But empirical evidence does not
seem to support it. See Vidmar (1995), and Danzon and Lillard (1983) for evidence regarding medical
malpractice cases in trial. For general cases that arrive to court and possible problems with their selection,
see Gertner (1993) and Priest and Klein (1984).
63Freeman and Freeman (1989) claim that although 60% of malpractice premiums paid by obstetricians
are used to cover suits for alleged birth-related cerebral palsy, substantially less than that money is given
to the victims and less than 10% of children with cerebral palsy receive some kind of compensation from
tort suits.
64See Davies et al. (2009). Several changes were performed in the practice of obstetric anesthesia, what
might have led to changes in the liability profiles. Closed claims from the American Society of Anesthesi-
ologists Closed Claims database were analyzed by a practicing anesthesiologist at the professional liability
insurance company.
65Delays in anesthesia care and poor communication between the obstetrician and the anesthesiologist
were found to be some of the potentially avoidable causes of newborn injury.
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correctness of the tort system, at least as far as we are aware.66 Table 1.1 presents
some of the studies and their main findings.67 As the table shows, the percentage of
patients suffering adverse events ranges from 6% to 16.6%, of which from 30% to 64%
were preventable. But how close should these results be so that we can consider them as
similar, or how accurate it is to make comparisons among them? Caution is needed if we
want to make a comparative analysis, due to several reasons. Even though they highly
rely on the methods and procedures of the HMPS and the UCMPS, many differences can
be found. Differences in the sample size, type of hospitals involved (teaching hospitals,
different specialties), the threshold for an event to be considered adverse can vary, the
time at which the study was taken (from 1992 to 2004 new discoveries implied changes
in medical procedures) are some of the particularities that make us reluctant in making
that kind of analysis. Actually, it should not be surprising that comparative analysis is
not so developed in empirical medical malpractice.
Although most of these studies do not demonstrate that the tort system is able to
deliver correct results or to compensate victims, it would be interesting to "match" the
standard of negligence that each country has with the compensation that the system
attributes. For example, Schwartz (1992) reports that the standard of duty of care is
high in Japan. Hagihara et al. (2003) estimate that from a total of 421 court decisions,
31.8% were decided in favor of the patient. While studying the case of the U.S., Stud-
dert et al. (2006) came out with the result that only a small percentage of cases arrived
in court and, in these, plaintiffs rarely won damages. Previously, Vidmar (1992) had
presented a win rate of 20% for plaintiffs in North Carolina from 1984 to 1987 and
a win rate of 16% from 1987 to 1990. Therefore, it would be interesting to study if
there is evidence that courts attribute compensation to patients differently, depending
on whether they are in a more ’flexible’ or a more ’rigid’ jurisdiction, i.e., a jurisdiction
that makes it more difficult or easier to obtain compensation or to take physicians to
court.
66The exception is the work of Hagihara et al. (2003) on Japan, where some predictors of payments are
presented. The conclusions on the effectiveness of medical malpractice litigation in improving the quality
of medical care in Japan should be taken with caution though, since a causal link between a decrease in
the number of medical malpractice cases and the incentive to avoid negligence due to a high financial
penalty is difficult to prove. Other factors might also play a role.
67Notice that these studies use essentially the same methods that the HMPS and the UCMPS. Therefore,
we do not present their main limitations here.
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1.3 Costs
Over the last two decades there have been several attempts to estimate the costs of
medical malpractice. The main questions are: ’How much does the actual medical mal-
practice system cost?’, ’How much do negligent adverse events cost?’, ’How much does
it cost to defend a medical malpractice case?’, ’From each dollar spent on compensation
how much goes to administrative expenses’ or ’How much would the same care and
adverse events cost in case a different liability regime was adopted?’.68 Several stud-
ies regarding the costs of medical malpractice have been executed, but it is often the
case that they answer different questions, which reduces the possibility of comparisons
among them. Additionally, and in case we are actually able to find studies that have the
same underlying question, it is hard to find comparable databases or definitions.69
The design of costs related studies is quite demanding, due to the requirement of
several items that need to be calculated:70 the premium doctors pay to the insurance
companies, the cost of filing a claim (administrative costs, lawyers expenses, experts
witnesses expenses, physicians’ emotional costs for facing a lawsuit), costs to the pa-
tients that suffered harm (physical, emotional, future health care costs, for the patients
and for their families). Besides, estimating the full costs inherent to the health care
system or clinical negligence involves making several assumptions, namely on infla-
tion rate, injured patient’s life expectancy, duration of the injury, lost income and lost
household production.
Advocates of tort reform claim that the current system is too costly and that it
reaches only a small proportion of the negligently injured patients. The main arguments
are the following: the actual system is very slow, which implies that negligently injured
patients must wait years to receive compensation; even if frivolous cases do not receive
payments, there are defense costs involved, which are very high; some patients receive
compensation even if there was no negligence in the care provided by the physician;
juries are attributing higher amounts of compensation, some of them exorbitant. As a
result, they claim, insurance premiums are having a spiral increase and some doctors
are not able to find insurance. Eventually, physicians are moving to other states or are
retiring earlier. Moreover, doctors might be so afraid of facing a lawsuit that they incur
68We are not focusing on the insurance side in this work.
69We have in mind, for instance, the case of defense costs, where some authors include insurers´ indirect
costs (such as marketing and administration) in their calculations and others do not.
70Studdert, Brennan and Thomas (2000) refer essentially to two ways of identifying the costs of medical
injuries: by surveying the injured patients or by asking experts to estimate them.
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in defensive medicine,71 which also raises costs without bringing any positive effect to
the patient.
Although it seems clear that the current medical liability regime based on fault
in several countries is not perfect,72 empirical evidence does not lend support to the
main arguments presented above (see Table 1.2). The Utah-Colorado Medical Practice
Study (UCMPS) extrapolated its finding about Utah and Colorado to all discharges from
American hospitals in 1992, which resulted in an annual cost of AEs of near $38 billion.
If preventable AEs have been avoided, this would mean a reduction in health care costs
of approximately $20 billion, which was near 4% of national health expenditures in
1996.73
When analyzing closed claims in Florida, Vidmar et al. (2005) came out with sev-
eral interesting results. To start with, paid claims frequency increased from 1990 to
2003, but when adjusting for the number of doctors and total population those figures
remained stable. There was a considerable increase in the mean and median of pay-
ments since 1991, but it was accompanied by an enlargement in the severity of the
injury involved.74 If we focus on cases that involved at least $1 million payment, we
can see that, from 1990 to 2003, 19.2% of the paid claims refer to permanent grave dis-
ability and that "almost 93% of million-dollar payments to claimants were settled rather
than adjudicated". From 1990 to 1997, the mean transaction costs75 for paid ($39,719)
and non-paid ($22,205) claims remained stable, with the costs of the later being about
1.7 times greater than the former. Although there was an increase in the mean cost of
paid claims in 2003 (to $44,407), it is not sufficient to state that mean transaction costs
have increased (the mean of paid claims for the period 1990-1993 was $40,853 and for
2000-2003 was $39,158).
Black et al. (2005) examine medical malpractice claims in Texas, and they are quite
71See the next section for more on defensive medicine.
72We have in mind some of the variables presented already in the previous section, such as the lag
between filing a claim and receiving compensation or the incapacity of providing compensation to negli-
gently injured patients only. With respect to the capacity of the system to induce physicians to exercise
due care, see Arlen and MacLeod (2003). As the authors mention, in medicine it is impossible to drop the
physician´s probability of error to zero, even if the physician invests a lot in expertise.
73See also Kohn et al. (2000).
74In 2003, claims referring to permanent major disability, permanent grave disability and death ac-
counted for 45.4% of paid claims. The same type of claims accounted for 32.8% in 1990. See Vidmar
et al. (2005).
75These involve all costs of defending the claim, such as with lawyers and experts.
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skeptical in accepting the existence of a crisis.76 Some of their main findings are:77
there is a high frequency of claims closed with zero payment; it is common to find
multiple defendants; adjusting for population growth, the total of closed claims from
1990 to 2002 was stable; for the same period and adjusting for the number of physicians
or growth in real health care spending, the total number of paid claims and large paid
claims declined; physician’s risk of facing a claim is much higher than the risk of facing
a payout; total payouts to patients were roughly constant over time (and near $515
million in 2002); total costs (payout and defense costs) per large paid claim rose from
0.8 to 1.2% per year; defense costs rose gradually and their absolute size relative to
payouts is small.
While considering defense costs arising from closed claims from five malpractice
insurance companies in four U.S. regions, Studdert et al. (2006) reach some differ-
ent results. Their main conclusion regarding costs is that administrative expenses in
medical malpractice cases are exorbitant comparing to the indemnity payment to the
negligently injured patient. Basically 54% of the compensation is for defense costs and
contingency fees. The authors defend that changes should be made in the system, but
that the main worry should regard cases involving error instead of frivolous cases.78
Notice that although these results might seem contradictory with the ones presented
by Black et al. (2005), this is not necessarily the case. In fact, when studying the case
of Texas, the authors had access only to defense costs for claims involving a payment
higher than $10,000, and their analysis is on defense costs incurred by insurers. There-
fore, they do not estimate plaintiffs’ defense costs. Additionally, Black et al. (2008)79
tried to make the results for the defense costs comparable, and obtain that in the study
of Studdert et al. (2006), "for paid claims, legal fees and expenses were 11 percent of
the sum of payouts plus defense costs".80 And comparing on the same basis for Vidmar
et al. (2005), legal fees and expenses in paid claims in Florida were 14% of the sum
76Given the time lag between initial claim and payout the authors state that, theoretically, it is possible
that "the spike in insurance premiums was driven by a spike in number of new claims or expected cost per
claim that is not yet reflected in the closed claims that we study. But the more likely explanation is that much
of the rise in premiums reflects insurance market dynamics, not litigation dynamics", at p. 210.
77See Table 1.3 for more detailed results.
78Frivolous cases account for nearly 20% of the costs, and therefore a change in these cases only would
have a limited effect on total costs only.
79The authors actually use the same database that they used previously in Black et al. (2005), but they
extended it until 2004. Some results for bodily injury claims in other commercial insurance areas than
medical malpractice are also presented.
80Black et al. (2008), p. 190.
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of payouts and defense costs.81 When referring to cases involving positive payouts,
Black et al. (2008) find that the mean and median defense costs per large paid claim
is $43,000 and $27,000, respectively, in 1988 dollars. The authors convert the results
given by Studdert et al. (2006) to 1988 dollars, and obtain a comparable result of a
mean defense cost for cases with positive payout equal to $36,000.
Black et al. (2008) came out with several interesting results. In order to have
an idea of how expensive the tort system can be, authors found that "it costs a bit
over a dollar in legal fees and expenses for the plaintiff to end up with $1 in his pocket".
Comparing with other areas of insurance (such as auto, general commercial, multi-
peril), medical malpractice cases are more expensive to defend. Moreover, and perhaps
the most striking part of the study, is that medical malpractice insurers fail to adjust
their reserve estimates to reflect rising defense costs. Even worse than that is the fact
that defense costs per case almost doubled during the period of study, but per case
reserves were lower at the end of the study than at the beginning. And although several
hypothetical explanations are presented,82 none can actually explain the reason why
this happens in medical malpractice insurance.83
The debate about the costs of the current compensation system in medical malprac-
tice cases has taken in several countries, where other options84 started being consid-
ered. Sweden,85 New Zealand86 and Finland87 are countries that have actually imple-
mented no-fault regimes. Having in mind the Swedish scheme that provides compen-
81The time period of each study is different.
82As Black et al. (2008) state, they would expect this to happen due to increasing hourly legal fees, rising
payouts, rising exposure (i.e., "expected payout assuming an average level of defense spending", Black et al.
(2008), p. 187) even if payouts are not rising, cases that are taking longer to close or are being solved at a
latter procedural stage, or insurers that are spending more in an attempt to win a larger fraction of cases.
83See Table 1.3 in the Appendix for additional results.
84For some studies during the 1990’s, see Fenn et al. (1994), Sloan et al. (1997), Bovbjerg et al. (1997),
Studdert et al. (1997), Danzon and Towse (1999) and references therein. Regarding other options, we
have in mind essentially offset of awards against collateral sources reimbursement or compensation re-
ceived by the injury, caps on damages attributed to plaintiffs and to attorneys, and no-fault compensation
schemes.
85See Danzon (1994b). When referring to the case of Sweden, we should bear in mind that it has one of
the most generous and comprehensive social insurance systems of the world. See Studdert et al. (1997).
Additionally, Fenn and Rickman (2001) refer to a tight criteria for offering compensation and low awards
under the Swedish scheme. See also Dute et al. (2004).
86See Miller (1992). When referring to the estimation of New Zealand’s low legal costs for medical
malpractice cases, Fenn and Rickman (2001) argue that "this result has been achieved by effectively ’rubber-
stamping’ claims and paying with only limited investigation. The hidden costs of this, in terms of reduced
deterrence and increased costs, is unknown".
87See Brahams (1988).
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sation based on the preventability of the event, Studdert et al. (1997) estimate what
would be the costs for Utah and Colorado in case a similar scheme were adopted. Us-
ing a prerequisite of an eight week disability period, the Swedish scheme would cost88
$76.79 million to Utah and $100 million to Colorado. The costs of the current medical
malpractice systems are respectively $25-30 million and $45-50 million. Additionally,
it would be possible to compensate 889 injured patients in Utah, compared with esti-
mates of 210-240 of successful claimants today, and 973 injured patients in Colorado,
compared to 270-300 of current successful claimants. The authors defend that the
adoption of a Swedish scheme would be affordable and would allow more patients to
be compensated. Nevertheless, they also argue that "the applicability of the overseas ex-
perience to the U.S. health care system is a concern. Specifically, differences in wider social
insurance arrangements, the price of medical care, and the incidence and costs of medical
injuries may well exert unique pressures on the operating costs of a no-fault system in the
United States".
Excluding the U.S., probably the country where more attempts were made regard-
ing the estimation of the costs of the actual negligence system (and a potential change
to a different regime) was the UK,89 essentially by the works of Fenn90 and his col-
leagues. In 2004, Fenn, Gray and Rickman published an article that estimated the
costs that the UK would incur in case the no-fault Swedish scheme or a small claims
scheme as proposed by the Department of Health91 were adopted. Estimations show
that more patients can be compensated but, regarding the costs, the results are: the
Swedish no-fault compensation scheme would imply a cost six times higher than the
actual system, due to an increase in the number of claimants; using the proposal of the
DoH of a £30,000 ceiling, the ’small claim’ scheme would imply an additional annual
costs of approximately £42 million.92 Therefore, it seems that the reduction in admin-
88The estimates change considerably if there is a reduction in the disability period, if a cap on pain and
suffering is imposed, or if no household production is allowed. See Studdert et al. (1997), Table 3.
89There were some legal changes in the UK in the 1990’s: since hospitals are better suited than physi-
cians to institute risk management policies, after 1990 the NHS assumed responsibility for physician’s
negligence. The hospital must solve the principal-agent problem that arises from this change. This also
brought difficulties in estimating the costs of the NHS in the UK. See Fenn and Rickman (2001), Fenn et al.
(2004) and Danzon and Towse (1999) for changes in the UK.
90See Fenn et al. (1994), Fenn et al. (2000), Fenn and Rickman (2001), Fenn (2002), Fenn et al. (2004).
See also Danzon and Towse (1999).
91The proposal of the DoH is that "cases valued below a given threshold are offered speedy access to com-
pensation based on the administrative assessment of fault, while larger ones pursue the traditional tort route",
see Fenn et al. (2004). In 2001, the National Audit Office figured out that "for settlements up to £50,000
the costs of reaching the settlement are greater than the damages awarded in over 65 per cent of the cases".
92This estimation does not include additional costs of a no-fault system for birth-related injuries. Other
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istrative costs is more than offset by the increase of patients that are expected to seek
compensation in these proposed schemes.
The impossibility of reaching a perfect system, able to deter negligent care and to
compensate negligently injured victims, by making a correct balance between the costs
and benefits of additional care, is not new. There are naturally a lot of costs involved
in case of medical practice, for the physician and for the injured patient but also for
society. Several studies have tried to estimate the actual costs of medical malpractice
and to eventually predict what would be the costs if another system were in practice. As
we can see from the above, this is very demanding work, but it should be done before
moving to other systems, that also have their flaws.
1.4 Defensive Medicine
The practice of defensive medicine is one of the arguments most frequently cited by pro-
ponents of tort reform. The main claim is that the fear of being sued leads doctors to
change their practice patterns to more defensive ones, namely by asking for extra diag-
nostic exams93 that do not bring any benefit to the patient but imply very high medical
bills. Moreover, these procedures start to be viewed as standard care and therefore will
be largely implemented by physicians, leading to a change in the level of due care, only
because physicians are afraid. But what is defensive medicine after all? We can think
about defensive medicine as denoting actions taken by the physicians that are used
"primarily as a protection against potential medical malpractice claims".94 Two distinct
types of behavior can be found: when physicians perform tests or procedures primarily
to reduce exposure to liability, they are practicing positive defensive medicine; when they
avoid certain patients or procedures, they are practicing negative defensive medicine.95
Being able to make a quantification of defensive medicine is quite complicated due to
the fact that it is necessary to distinguish "between the good, injury-prevention effects of
malpractice lawsuits and the bad, wasteful effects. Drawing that line turns out to be very
difficult".96 However, as noted by Sloan and Shadle (2009), for law and economics
it is the care for which expected costs exceed expected benefits that is excessive and
defensive.
results are achieved by using a different ceiling.
93Baicker et al. (2007) found that the threat of tort, measured by the growth in medical malpractice
payments in a state, was highly related to increasing in imaging.
94See Baker (2005a), p. 119.
95See Klingman et al. (1996), p. 189.
96See Baker (2005a), p. 119.
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Having all this in mind, the next step is to measure defensive medicine. One of the
most common procedures that attempt to quantify defensive medicine are surveys made
to physicians. Obviously, this approach has some drawbacks:97 physicians might act
defensively but in an unconscious way; they can see the survey as a test to their knowl-
edge; or they can see the survey as an opportunity to achieve political goals. Moreover,
it is unfeasible to create an inquiry in which all possible scenarios are presented and it
is also likely that physicians respond in one way but would react differently in practice.
Other options include studying the effects of law reforms or linking malpractice claims
to physicians’ behavior. It is quite unlikely to infer causation from this. In addition,
Baker (2005a) discusses another approach, based on a comparative analysis of hospital
records, that aims at measuring defensive medicine directly, by using hospital records
to see what doctors are doing and by comparing it afterwards with the risk of medical
malpractice faced in different areas and hospitals. Although this approach provides "a
more reliable measure of what doctors actually do", the truth is that it "cannot tell us
whether the doctors’ efforts are beneficial or wasteful" and "measuring the extent of defen-
sive medicine in one area of medical practice may not tell us very much about the extent of
defensive medicine in another area".98
The results of the studies on defensive medicine have provided mixed results so
far, as for example the case of obstetric care. Obstetrics-gynecology has been analyzed
in several studies concerning defensive medicine, mainly because it is believed that
defensive behavior is common among physicians in this specialty. Many studies relate
the effect of malpractice risk99 to the probability of a cesarean section or a natural
delivery.100 However, the studies present diverse results: Kim (2007), Sloan et al.
(1997) and Baldwin et al. (1995) found no link between an exposure to liability and the
type of delivery; Currie and MacLeod (2008) and Tussing and Wojtowycz (1992) found
a negative relationship between fear of litigation and cesarean section rates; Dubay
et al. (2001) found a positive relationship between malpractice fears and section rates.
A more recent study from Dranove and Wanabe (2010) finds short-lived and small
effects in different periods of time: the first effect is felt when after an injury a hospital
receives a request for medical records, and there is a "very small and short-lived hospital-
wide increase in the cesarean section rate" (which might reflect temporary defensive
medicine measures taken by the hospital); the second effect is felt approximately nine
97See Klingman et al. (1996).
98Baker (2005a), p. 126.
99See each study to check how they take into account malpractice risk or fear of litigation, since there
are different approaches.
100Practicing a cesarean section is believed to be more likely when the risk of liability is higher.
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months later, and "there is a larger increase in the cesarean section rate for the responsible
physician" (which might reflect an effort from the obstetrician to "lobby" new patients
in favor of cesareans).101
The extent of defensive medicine among cardiologists, obstetricians and gynecolo-
gists, and surgeons was assessed by Klingman et al. (1996)102 using clinical scenario
surveys. The scenarios were chosen by the panels of experts in each specialty and in-
cluded, among others, hypothetical situations in which a minor condition had a small
chance of being serious or fatal for the patient. Given that not every possible scenario
could be included, the authors adopted a strategy that would allow them to get an
upper bound to the frequency of the defensive medicine. There was also a "control"
version of each case scenario that would provide more information to the physicians
and would increase "the clinical appropriateness of specific interventions", meaning a re-
duction of the importance of malpractice concerns. Notice that a "critical limitation
of clinical scenario surveys is that their results cannot be generalized beyond the specific
situations described"103 and those situations are limited. Some of the most interesting
results were the difference in answers when comparing close-ended questionnaires with
open-ended questionnaires, the lower evidence of practice of defensive medicine and
the variability of practices across clinical situations. Regarding the first, in the open-
ended104 questionnaires there was a lower percentage of respondents citing malpractice
concerns as "the primary reason for choosing a given action" when comparing to answers
in closed-ended surveys. Klingman et al. (1996) estimate the percentage of procedures
that were performed primarily because of malpractice concerns, and they obtain an
upper bound estimate of 8%.105 Therefore, although the results cannot be generalized
to all clinical situations, there seems to be evidence of positive defensive medicine, but
to a lower level than anecdotal evidence suggests. Baker (2005a) commented these
results, by writing: "What was the OTA researchers’ bottom line? Despite the fact that
doctors say in opinion surveys that malpractice lawsuits affect how they practice, defensive
medicine is not likely to explain very much of the huge growth in health-care expenses over
the past quarter century".
Kessler and McClellan (1996)106 compare health care expenditures and adverse
101See Dranove and Wanabe (2010), p. 92.
102This study is also cited in the literature as the OTA (1996) study, since it was the U.S. Congress that
asked the Office of Technology and Assessment to measure the extent of defensive medicine in the early
1990’s. See Baker (2005a), pp. 118-119.
103Klingman et al. (1996), p. 192.
104See Table 3, p. 200 for the comparison among different scenarios.
105See Appendix D, pp. 213-217 for the results for each clinical action.
106The authors also describe some of the problems present in earlier studies that tried to assess physicians’
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health events in some states that adopted tort law changes (that can be direct or indi-
rect107 reforms) and states that did not adopt any kind of reform. If a state adopts a
tort law change that leads to less malpractice pressure (i.e., to less benefits to plaintiffs
and/or lower costs to physicians) and the results are a reduction in health expenditures
without an increase in adverse events,108 then there is evidence that physicians were
practicing defensive medicine before the reform. For that purpose, they analyze elderly
cardiac disease patients hospitalized due to a new AMI (acute myocardial infarction -
heart attack) or a new IHD (ischemic heart disease) that suffered cardiac complications
or death within one year of the initial event. By confronting Medicare payments for hos-
pital care in states adopting direct reforms with those made in states adopting indirect
reforms - for patients in the clinical situation described above - it was possible to find a
decline from 5 to 9% in medical expenditures, and this reduction was equal to 1.8% in
states adopting indirect reforms. This expenses’ reduction had no consequential effects
for the patients, meaning that defensive medicine seems to have been present in those
treatments. Given the specific type of health problems studied and also the population,
we think caution is needed when extrapolations to the total cost of defensive medicine
are made. In 2002, Kessler and McClellan expand their dataset by including an extra
year of data (1994) and study the effect of tort reforms and managed care (the authors
do confirm that doctors practice defensive medicine in the sample they analyze). By in-
teracting the adoption of tort reforms (direct and indirect) and levels of managed care
(high or low), the main conclusions of this study are the following: direct reforms had
a long-run reduction effect in medical expenditures for AMI and IHD patients, with-
out substantial implications for patients’ health (i.e., direct reforms reduce defensive
medicine behaviors in areas with low and high levels of managed care); the estimated
long-run independent effect of reforms on health expenditures for AMI is smaller in
high managed-care environments (-3.1%) but is not statistically different from the in-
behavioral response to malpractice pressure, such as selection bias.
107Direct reforms are those that directly reduce malpractice awards, i.e., those that truncate the upper
tail of the distribution of payments per claim. Examples include caps on damages and collateral source
rule reforms (the collateral source rule, that "prohibits presentation to the jury of evidence of compensation
payable to the tort plaintiff from sources other than the defendant", has been modified or abandoned in
medical malpractice suits in some U.S. states, as described in Danzon (1982), p. 40.). Indirect reforms are
those that reduce malpractice awards indirectly, such as the imposition of mandatory periodic payments
and statute of limitations’ reductions.
108Remember that, following the economics definition of defensive medicine, the care provided in that
case should be of zero or low marginal benefit. The effect on the increase of AEs can be seen as a proxy for
this, although it is not possible to quantify, as in an ideal setting, the amount of marginal care that exceeds
marginal benefit.
Defensive Medicine 24
dependent effect in low managed-care environments (-3.8%), which means that these
policies are not substitutes nor complementary; as for IHD patients, the estimated long-
run effect of direct reforms on health expenditures is -7.1% for high managed-care
levels and approximately -2.9% for low managed care levels, which seems to show
that these policies are substitutes (in other words, the reduction of defensive medicine
practices due to high managed care is lower in case direct reforms are in effect already).
In a recent article, Sloan and Shadle (2009) reassess the evidence provided by the
study published by Kessler and McClellan (1996), but with some differences.109 The
authors evaluate the effects of direct or indirect tort reforms on total inflation-adjusted
Medicare payments, for the first year after one of the following five situations: a hos-
pital admission110 of any diagnosis, primary diagnoses of AMI, stroke, breast cancer,
and diabetes. The probability of survival for one year following the date of the index
event is also assessed, in order to check the benefit to patients. Contrarily to the results
obtained by Kessler and McClellan (1996), Sloan and Shadle (2009) conclude that di-
rect reforms did not significantly reduce one year Medicare payments in any setting.
Regarding indirect reforms, the only statistical significant coefficient is the one for "Any
hospitalization", with a parameter estimate implying a reduction in total payment of
9.4%. The probability of survival one year after the index event is not affected by di-
rect or indirect reforms, meaning that there were no consequences for beneficiaries’
health. Just like stated by the authors, one striking conclusion is that there seems to be
evidence that liability is not able to deter medical injuries.
Instead of focusing on one specialty only as many studies, Studdert et al. (2005)
analyze the practice of defensive medicine among six high risk specialists111 in Penn-
sylvania. Although we cannot generalize the results to other specialties or states, the
respondents of the survey provided several interesting answers. To start with, 9 out
of each 10 respondents mentioned that they had engaged in at least one form of de-
fensive medicine presented in the survey. Regarding assurance behavior, 59% of the
physicians answered that they "often ordered more diagnostic tests than were medically
indicated"112 but the proportion was higher for emergency physicians. With respect
to avoidance behavior, 39% "reported that they ’definitely will/already decided to’ avoid
caring for high-risk patients",113 with this response being less likely among emergency
109See Sloan and Shadle (2009) pp. 483-484 for the description of the differences.
110The authors were able to control for health prior admission and demographic factors of the patients.
111The six specialties are emergency medicine, general surgery, obstetrics/gynecology, orthopedic surgery
and radiology.
112P. 2612.
113P. 2613.
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physicians. Specialist physicians’ confidence in the adequacy of their liability coverage
and their perceptions of premium burdens were the strongest predictors across all types
of defensive practice. However, the authors are not able to confirm whether the results
are exaggerated and, if so, in which direction. Moreover, Studdert et al. (2005) men-
tion that since there are defensive procedures that can actually pose some risk of harm
and that "obstetrics and breast cancer detection are high-liability fields, women´s health
may be particularly affected".114
The existence and practice of defensive medicine is being regarded as one main
argument to implement malpractice reforms, given the high costs it imposes and the
eventual harm to patients. However, the empirical results are mixed and can vary
considerably across specialties. Nevertheless, it seems that even if positive defensive
medicine does exist115 - as it seems to be supported by some studies-, it is not to such a
high extent as it is frequently claimed.
1.5 Conclusions
While it seems quite acceptable that most of the patients who suffered negligent harm
do not sue, the discussion about the merit and outcomes of the claims is more con-
tentious. Several variables should be taken into account if we want to draw conclusions
about the capacity of the tort system to deliver correct outcomes. First of all, and due
to a great extent to data restrictions, there is no perfect study design. Each design has
limitations and authors are normally aware of the problems. Besides, even physicians
disagree among themselves when having to decide if the care provided was according to
the standard and if the harm that the patient suffered could have been avoided. While
trying to find an answer to the question ’How often do juries "get it right" with respect
to their verdicts on liability?’, Vidmar (1995) replies that "It should be clear by now that
there can be no definitive answer to this question because, in the end, legal negligence is a
matter of human judgment".116
Due to the specificity of the studies’ design, there is the danger of generalizing
the results to other jurisdictions, which can lead to misleading conclusions and result
in inappropriate policy changes. Health care has so many specificities which make
it difficult to judge, and no jurisdiction is able to deliver correct decisions only. An
114P. 2617.
115Some studies find no evidence of negative defensive medicine. See, for example, Dranove and Gron
(2005) and Baicker and Chandra (2005).
116The author was obviously excluding cases under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor, such as operating the
wrong site, for instance.
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additional obstacle is the differences among specialties, that require diverse treatments.
Judgments regarding the existence of negligence should be made by physicians within
the same specialty. As we saw, the high costs normally involved in these kinds of studies
can be a major obstacle.
The time span between the injury, filing a claim and the outcome of the claim can
also give rise to biased results, since the consequences of an injury or claim today will
be only reflected after some years in the closed or settled claims. Additionally, there
is variation across specialties,117 types of hospitals, time, region, jurisdictions, among
others, that require caution when drawing conclusions, especially if these imply policy
changes. This can as well explain partially the differences of the estimations found by
the studies.
Estimating the costs of the medical malpractice system is highly difficult, and cal-
culations must rely on several assumptions. Although imprecisions are unavoidable
in studies that estimate the costs of medical negligence, it does not seem reasonable to
move to other kind of schemes without trying to estimate the potential costs involved in
a new regime. There is no perfect scheme: when considering the Swedish option, pol-
icymakers must bear in mind the fact that Sweden has a very generous social security
system; and with respect to New Zealand, "the leading proponent of no-fault accident
compensation among the developed nations",118 if the system was working so well, it
would not have been necessary to reject its own no-fault approach by restricting the
cases that can receive compensation. Although we can expect a no-fault system to pro-
vide compensation to a higher number of patients, it is also recognized that injurers
should face at least part of the costs in order to provide incentives to take care. But
just like Fenn et al. (2004) state, "[i]n the health care sector, this issue is complicated by
the fact that patients may be injured due to the interaction of multiple factors leading to
organizational, rather than individual, failures".119 Therefore, hospital managers should
be provided "with incentives to take responsibility for identifying system failures and im-
plementing risk management procedures". Additionally, it is possible to design a no-fault
scheme that is able to reduce the costs of defending claims and the costs for the health
care system. It is more difficult to create a system that will certainly reduce societal
117For instance, one common problem related to anesthesia is awake paralysis. Domino et al. (1999)
analyzed which were the most common causes for it and when it was more likely to happen. Cheney
(1999) also writes on the effort made by the American Society of Anesthesiologists Closed Claims Project,
as a way to improve patient safety given the possibility of obtaining more information via closed claim
data on anesthesiology.
118See Miller (1992), p. 16.
119Fenn et al. (2004), p. F278.
27 Review of the literature
costs.
Baker (2005a) states that "[o]f all the parts of the medical malpractice myth, claims
about defensive medicine are the most difficult to pin down. Part of the problem lies in
defining ’defensive medicine’."120 Even after surmounting that barrier, the approaches
available to measure it have some flaws. Defensive medicine is viewed by many as
an enormous waste of resources that does not imply a benefit to patients. However,
the results of empirical studies in this area do not lend support to such a strong claim,
since the results are mixed regarding not only the existence of defensive medicine but
also its extent. There is some evidence that defensive medicine exists, but to a much
lower extent than argued and it varies considerably per specialty. Defensive medicine
does not seem to be able to explain the growth in health care costs, as it is frequently
claimed by supporters of malpractice reform.
120P. 118.
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1.6 Appendix
Figure 1.1: General Review Process
Trained nurse-reviewers
check for injuries from
medical treatment
If no evidence, review
stops
If evidence of injury, physi-
cian reviewers search for
evidence of AE
If no evidence, review
stops
If evidence of AE, physi-
cian reviewers search for
evidence of negligence
If no evidence, review gen-
erally stops
If evidence, attribute a
score about confidence in
the existence of AE and
negligence. Eventually, as-
sess the degree of harm.
Re-review part of the sam-
ple to test the general re-
liability of the review pro-
cess
Note: This figure aims at helping to understand the common practice in the review process. It
does not mean that every study exactly followed these rules.
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Table 1.1: Studies on the incidence of (preventable) AEs outside the U.S.
Study Sample
%Patients with AE
/%Preventable AEs
Wilson et al. (1995),
Australia121
14,179 admissions to 28 hos-
pitals in 1992
16.6% /51%
Thomas et al. (2000),
Update for Australia122
14,179 admissions to 28 hos-
pitals in 1992
10.6% / NA123
Baker et al. (2004),
Canada
3,745 eligible admissions of
20 hospitals in 2000
7.5% / 36.9%
Schioler et al. (2001),
Denmark
1,097 admissions in 17 acute
care hospitals
9% / 40.4%
Michel et al. (2004),124
France
778 patients in 7 hospitals 14.5%(RM)-15.4%(PM)
/40%(RM)-64%(PM)
Davis et al. (2002 and
2003), New Zealand125
6,579 medical records from 13
generalist hospitals in 1998
12.9% / 37%
Aranaz-Andres et al.
(2008), Spain
5,624 medical records from 24
hospitals, patients discharged
between 4 and 10 June 2005
9.3% (8.4% if we
consider hospital care
only) / 42.8%
Continued on next page. . .
121Wilson et al. (1995), p. 467, also estimated the AEs ratio using the HMPS definition. The authors find
an estimate of approximately 13% of AEs ratio, which is still much higher than the HMPS ratio of 3.7%.
122This update study used the methods of the UCMPS, in order to make comparisons possible. The
authors state that differences between the Quality in Australian Health Care Study (QAHCS) and the
UCMPS are "consistent with the contrasting goals of each study", p. 376.
123The authors present five methodological differences that might explain the discrepancy of the results
when comparing with Utah and Colorado. See also Runciman et al. (2000) for a "qualitative analysis using
a specially developed classification for incidents and AEs", and for an examination of the distribution of AEs
with respect to severity.
124Michel et al. (2004) estimate the proportions of AEs and preventable AEs using three different meth-
ods: cross sectional, prospective and retrospective. In this table we refer to these last two methods as PM
and RM respectively. The results from the cross sectional method is not presented since the other methods
are preferred. For France see also Michel et al. (2005), but for serious AEs only.
125See Davis et al. (2001) and Davis et al. (2001b) for a regional study in Auckland.
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Study Sample
%Patients with AE
/%Preventable AEs
Zegers et al. (2005),
The Netherlands
332 cases from 3 hospitals, pa-
tients discharged between Oc-
tober and November 2003
6% or 2%, depending
on reviewers’ level of
agreement
Vincent et al. (2001),
UK
1,014 randomly drawn
records from two acute hospi-
tals in the London area126
10.8% / 47%127
Sari et al. (2007),
Update for UK
Random sample of 1,006 NHS
hospital admissions between
January and May 2004
8%-10% / 30%-55%
126In site 1, there was a total of 500 records reviewed (between July and September 1999), while in site
2 there was a total of 514 records (between December 1999 and February 2000). The review included
records from general medicine (including geriatrics), general surgery, orthopedic surgery and obstetrics.
127This numbers change to 11.7%/48% if we look at the total number of AEs instead of the total number
of patients with AEs (in order to allow for multiple AEs suffered by the same patient). Extrapolation for
the total of patients in England and Wales that are admitted to hospitals and that suffer an AE yields that
approximately 5% of the hospitals’ patients suffer a preventable AE each year, which in turn leads to an
additional three million bed days (this extrapolation can not be done with precision, as explained by the
authors). The total cost for the NHS of these extra beds (excluding all other costs), would be around £1bn
per year. See p. 518.
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Table 1.2: Previous Research on Merits and Outcomes of Claims
Study Sample Main results Main limitations
HMPS (1990) The HMPS started by drawing
a probability sample of more
than 31,000 hospital records,
having analyzed 30,121
records out of 31,429 from 51
hospitals in New York.
3.7% of hospitalizations in New York in 1984 re-
sulted in AEs, of which 27.6% were due to negli-
gence (or 1% of all hospital discharges).
There are 16 times as many patients who suffer an
injury from negligence as there are persons who re-
ceive compensation trough the tort system.
Small sample when only claims arising from hospi-
talization are considered.
Reviewers did not always agree on which records
contain evidence of AE and even less on which
records present evidence of negligence.128
Different classifications might have tripled the per-
centage of claims with findings of negligence.
128For a detailed description of the results, see HMPS, pp. 5-28/29. The fact that the methodology does not allow to reach consensus in identifying the same set of AEs led
to the comment that "It is troubling that such a study is so widely cited to prove that medical malpractice is common", Anderson (1996). Studdert, Thomas, Burstin, Zbar, Orav
and Brennan (2000) hypothesize that one possible explanation for the differences is the fact that the HMPS had six different directors for the record review. Anderson (1996)
goes further, and mentions that there was no apparent effort to match reviewers’ specialties to those of the medical problems at issue.
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Table 1.2 – continued from previous page
Study Sample Main results Main limitations
Brennan et al.
(1996)
This was a 10 year follow up
study of the medical malprac-
tice claims identified in the
HMPS as arising from the hos-
pitalizations.
The result of the multivariate analysis was that the
only predictor of payment to the injured patient
was the presence of a permanent disability.
Small sample; the "observer effect"; some conclu-
sions in the univariate analyses were made accord-
ing to the mean of the payments; the logistic regres-
sion129 treated the cases in which the only payment
was a "write off" of the unpaid hospital bill in the
same manner as those cases in which the plaintiff
received a large payment, treating it as a settlement
in favor of the plaintiff instead of in favor of the
defendant; some disagreement among physicians’
review.
UCMPS -
Studdert,
Thomas,
Burstin, Zbar,
Orav and
Brennan
(2000)
Nurses reviewed 4,943 of the
5,000 sampled records in Utah
which lead to 842 reviews by
physicians.
Nurses reviewed 9,757 of the
10,000 sampled records in
Colorado which lead to 1,978
reviews by physicians.
2.9% of AEs in both states. In Utah, 32.6% of the
AEs were due to negligence and in Colorado 27.5%.
After matching patients from the medical record
review who filed malpractice claims during or af-
ter 1992, only 18 malpractice claims arise from the
records, 8 in Utah and 10 in Colorado. Only 4 of the
18 involved identifiable instances of negligence.
The sample for hospitals was loaded with institu-
tions that would be expected to play key roles in the
development of a no-fault insurance plan in each
state. Although it was not the purpose of this study,
it does not present predictors of the correctness of
the medical malpractice system.
129Baker (2005b) at p. 15, footnote 99 suggests that "it would be interesting to reanalyze the Brennan [et al. (1996)] data using Probit", since it is a well-suited analysis to
dependent variables like settlement amounts in which there are a large number of $0 payments and a large spread among the other payments.
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Study Sample Main results Main limitations
Spurr and
Howze (2001)
165 closed claims (from 1987
to 1995), brought against one
hospital in Michigan. 91 of
these cases were settled, 65
abandoned by the plaintiff and
9 tried to verdict.
The defendant’s fault is the only significant variable
in predicting whether the plaintiff drops the case or
whether the case is settled.
The defendant’s care is judged by the hospital’s risk
management staff.
Small sample.
Peeples et al.
(2002)
81 closed claim files corre-
sponding to medical malprac-
tice lawsuits filed in North Car-
olina between 1991 and 1995
were reviewed.
Strong correlation between the judgment of breach
of the standard of care and insurer’s decision of
making an offer to the plaintiff. An offer was made
in 96.3% of the cases in which the insurer con-
cluded there was a breach of the standard of care,
and money was paid in 93.1% of the cases. When
the insurer concluded that there was no fault in-
volved, payment was made in only 14.8% of the
cases (for claims going to court, defendants had a
winning rate of 90% if there was no fault involved).
Finally, payment was made in 36.8% of the cases
in which there was uncertainty on the evidence of
negligence.
Small Sample.
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Study Sample Main results Main limitations
Phillips et al.
(2004)
From a total of 49,345 claims
settled between 1985 and
2000 involving primary care
physicians, 26,126 were peer
reviewed and 5,921 were as-
sessed as negligent. These last
ones are the focus of the study.
In the negligent AEs’ claims, payment was made to
86% of claims, of which 37% involved death and
19% severe injury. Regarding those claims con-
sidered as not involving negligence, payment was
made to only 7%, and the majority involved the
higher degrees of harm. The most common diag-
noses and underlying causes associated with neg-
ligent claims, contributing factors and relative risk
of negligent AE for a specific medical condition be-
coming a claim are also presented.
Focus on the claims arising from negligent events,
the "recognition bias" and the inability to calculate
standard errors or confidence intervals for the rela-
tive risk assessments due to lack of data. Studdert
et al. (2006) mention that this study relies on the
"insurer’s view of the defensibility of the claim as a
proxy for merit rather than on independent expert
judgments", p. 2029.
Studdert et al.
(2006)
Random sample of 1,452
closed malpractice claims
closed from 1984 to 2004.
The claims were obtained
from five liability insurers in
four regions of the U.S. and
related to obstetrics, surgery,
missed or delayed diagnosis,
and medication.
The most frequently sued physicians in the sample
were obstetrician-gynecologists (19%) followed by
general surgeons (17%) and primary care physi-
cians (16%); 80% of the claims involved injuries
that caused significant disability, major disability or
death; the average time span between the occur-
rence of the injury and the closure of the claim was
five years; a small percentage of cases arrived to
courts, and in these plaintiffs rarely won damages.
Reviewers knew the result of the litigation process;
moderate agreement regarding the existence of er-
ror; "the sample was drawn from insurers and in-
volved clinical categories that are not representative
of malpractice claims nationwide", p. 2031.
35
Review
ofthe
literature
Table 1.2 – continued from previous page
Study Sample Main results Main limitations
Davies et al.
(2009)
426 claims related to obstet-
ric anesthesia during and after
1990, and 190 before 1990.
In the 91 cases that involved newborn
death/permanent brain damage during 1990
or later, there was a significant association between
payment by the anesthesiologist and possible
anesthesia contribution to the newborn injury.
Regarding the 17 (out of those 91) cases that
involved anesthesia payment, the existence of
payment was associated with a substandard level
of anesthesia care (payment was made in 9 cases
in which care was found to be substandard and
in 7 cases in which care was appropriate). From
the 63 cases that involved no payment, 3 were
regarded as involving substandard care and 52 as
appropriate.
The data does not allow risk’s estimations for spe-
cific injuries and populations as it does not con-
tain claims on all adverse anesthetic events nor the
number of anesthetics performed annually. The
authors mention hat there was "modest interob-
server agreement regarding appropriateness of care
and outcome bias in the judgment of standard of
care" (at p. 136). Small subsamples.
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Table 1.3: Previous Research on the Costs of Medical Negligence
Study Sample Main results
Studdert et al.
(1997)
Random sample of 13 hospitals in
Utah (5,000 discharges) and 15 in
Colorado (10,000 discharges) in
1992. Two types of injuries were
detected: those that would be
compensated in a no-fault regime
using Swedish compensation cri-
teria and those that would be
compensated under the current
regime based on negligence.
Using expert’s judgment, the authors estimate: lost wages and lost household production, health
care costs, consumption deduction for cases of death, social security disability benefit deduction for
injured patients that could not work for more than 12 months, non-economic costs, and costs of
injuries to newborns. Using the Swedish avoidability criteria and a prerequisite of 8 week disability
period, the Swedish scheme would cost $76.79 million to Utah and $100 million to Colorado,
where in both states more than 55% of that cost would be for household production loss. The
costs of the current medical malpractice systems are $25-30million in Utah and $45-50 million in
Colorado. Using the same 8 week disability period, it would be possible to compensate 889 injured
patients in Utah, compared to estimates of 210-240 of successful claimants today, and respectively
973 compared to 270-300 in Colorado. These estimates are dramatically reduced if a $100,000
cap on pain and suffering, a four week disability period, no household production and a 66% wage
replacement are assumed. Compensating new born injuries was estimated to cost $9.69 million in
Utah and $14.20 million in Colorado.
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Study Sample Main results
Studdert,
Thomas,
Burstin, Zbar,
Orav and
Brennan
(2000),
Thomas
et al. (1999)
UCMPS
Random sample of 13 hospitals in
Utah (5,000 discharges) and 15 in
Colorado (10,000 discharges) in
1992.
By using expert’s judgment to evaluate the costs of medical injuries due to AEs, the authors esti-
mate a total of $661.9 million or $132 per capita (for residents in both states) in 1992 in Utah
and Colorado ($348 million for health care costs and $160.9 million for lost household wages).
Preventable AEs had a cost of $308.3 million or $61 per capita (for residents in both states). Post-
operative complications and adverse drug events were the most expensive ones. Extrapolating to
all discharges from U.S. hospitals in 1992, this implies an annual cost of AEs of near $38 billion.
If preventable AEs have been avoided, this would reduce health care costs in approximately $20
billion, which was almost 4% of national health expenditures in 1996.
Fenn et al.
(2000)
All negligent claims arising from
treatment in Oxfordshire Health
Authority (data on one major hos-
pital, some general /acute hospi-
tals and specialist units).
Adjusting for hospital activity, the rate of closed cases per 1,000 finished consultant episodes in
England increased from approximately 0.46 in 1990 to 0.81 in 1998, which means a rate of increase
of 7% per annum. The specialty that registered the higher increase was obstetrics/gynecology. In
1998, the overall expenditures on clinical negligence by the NHS in England were estimated to be
£84 million,130 including legal costs (£61 million for damages and £23 million for defense costs).
130Fenn (2002) mentions that this was an underestimate, since there was a small number of very large claims in the sample (at p. 233).
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Study Sample Main results
Fenn et al.
(2004)
Sample size of 8,206 interviews,
by means of a population study.
The aim is to estimate the costs
that the UK would have in case
it would change to the Swedish
scheme or to the small claims pro-
posal.
34% of the inquired said that the remedy they were searching for was an apology or explanation,
and only 11% repplied that financial compensation would be the most suited response. The authors
estimate an increase of 80% on the number of patients that seek compensation if faster access was
provided by the new system. The costs of a Swedish no-fault system in the UK are estimated to have
total annual costs near to £2.1b, which is over six times the costs of the current system. The total
costs of the small claims scheme proposed by the DoH range from £498m to £533m, depending on
the ceiling value for small claims. By using the suggested ceiling of £30,000, the total costs would
be £517.5m (£116.4m for the small claims and £401.1m for those that would use the tort system).
The authors mention that the estimates are sensitive to a change in some of the parameters.
Vidmar et al.
(2005)
31,521 reported closed claims
from 1990 through 2003, in
Florida.
From 1990 to 1997, the mean transaction costs for paid ($39,719) and non-paid ($22,205) claims
remained stable, with the costs of the latter being about 1.7 times greater than the former. Although
there was an increase in the mean cost of paid claims in 2003 (equal to $44,407), it is not sufficient
to state that mean transaction costs have increased (the mean of paid claims for the period 1990-
1993 was $40,853 and for 2000-2003 was $39,158).
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Study Sample Main results
Black et al.
(2005)
Closed medical malpractice claims
from the Texas Department of In-
surance (TDI) from 1988 until
2002. A total of 14,697 reports for
medical professionals without du-
plicates were found (with payout
of over $10,000 in nominal dol-
lars).
There is a high frequency of claims closed with zero payment; it is common to find multiple defen-
dants; adjusting for population growth, the total of closed claims from 1990 to 2002 was stable; for
the same period and adjusting for the number of physicians or growth in real health care spending,
the total number of paid claims and large paid claims declined; physician´s risk of facing a claim is
much higher than the risk of facing a payout; although the distribution of payouts is skewed (the
mean is much greater than the median), total payouts to patients were roughly constant over time
(and near $515 million in 2002); defense costs rose gradually (from 4.2 to 4.5% per year and per
large claim) and their absolute size relative to payouts is small; total costs (payout and defense
costs) per large paid claim rose 0.8 to 1.2% per year; small paid claims declined.
Studdert et al.
(2006)
Random sample of 1,452 malprac-
tice claims closed from 1984 to
2004 were studied. The claims
were obtained from five liability
insurers in four regions of the U.S.
and related to obstetrics, surgery,
missed or delayed diagnosis, and
medication.
The average amount of compensation was $485,348 and the median was $206,400. Plaintiffs rarely
received payment in cases that went to trial, but the awards were higher than those outside court
($799,365 mean, and $462,099 median). Administrative (overhead) costs for defending the claims
averaged $52,521 per claim (the mean for those resolved in court was $112,968 and for those
resolved out of court was $42,015). The total system costs were equal to $449 million, of which
$376 refer to indemnity payments and $204 million to administrative costs ($73 million for the
defense and $132 million for the plaintiff, on the basis of a contingency fee of 35% on indemnity
payments). The great majority of these costs refers to cases involving negligence."For every dollar
spent on compensation, 54 cents went to administrative expenses (including those involving lawyers,
experts, and courts)" (at p. 2024).
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Black et al.
(2008)
Closed medical malpractice claims
from the Texas Department of In-
surance (TDI) from 1988 until
2004. A total of 14,241 reports
for medical professionals without
duplicates were found (with pay-
out higher than $25,000 in 1988
dollars).
The mean and median defense costs per large paid claim is $43,000 and $27,000, respectively, in
1988 dollars; from the 14,241 non duplicated cases, the mean defendants per case was 2.4, the
mean (median) days the claim was open was 923 (807), and only 2.7% of the cases had a full
trial; if we compare these results with those for auto, general commercial, multi-peril and other
professional liability, medical malpractice cases present the higher mean defendants per case, the
second highest mean and mean days of open claim (after general commercial) and are, together
with auto, the type with the lowest percentage of cases with full trial. Moreover, medical malprac-
tice cases have the highest payouts, are the most expensive to defend but they present similar ratios
of defense costs to payouts as the other types of cases studied here.
From the total of claims that involve medical professional liability (77,575), 81.9% involve a $0
payout, 6.3% a payout below $25,000, and 11.8% a payout higher than $25,000 (this refers to
claims from 1995 to 2004 only). Case-level initial reserve predicts variation in actual defense costs
quite poorly (see Black et al. (2008), Table 5). Regarding expense reserves, "Med mal insurers not
only failed to raise their expense reserves over time, to correspond to rising defense costs, they reduced
them!" (at p. 216). Most of Texas medical malpractice insurers rely on outside counsel.
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Study Sample Main results
Kessler and
McClellan
(1996)
Elderly Medicare beneficiaries ad-
mitted to a U.S. hospital with a
new primary diagnosis of either
acute myocardial infarction (AMI)
or ischemic heart disease (IHD) in
1984, 1987 or 1990. The sam-
ple size consisted of more than
200,000 AMI patients and more
than 350,000 IHD patients in each
year studied.
Referring to AMI outcomes, the authors estimate an expenditure/benefit effect for a higher pres-
sure liability regime of "over $500,000 per additional one-year AMI survivor in 1991 dollars", pp.
378-379. Direct reforms had the effect of reducing AMI expenditures of approximately 4% within
two years of adoption, but the long-term effect is close to zero. The effects of both direct and
indirect reforms on mortality and readmissions with complications for AMI cases are trivial and
not significant. As for IHD, direct reforms are associated with a 7.1% reduction in expenditures
by two years after adoption and 8.9% reduction by five years after. There were no significant
differences in mortality between states adopting direct or indirect reforms. The pattern is similar
to that present for the AMI outcomes, which means that direct reforms have larger effects on
expenditures. Direct malpractice reforms resulted in reductions in hospital expenditures with no
consequential effect on mortality, or on significant cardiac complications.
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Klingman
et al. (1996)
- OTA Study
From a population of 11,541 car-
diologists, there were 352 respon-
dents from a 622 sample; from a
population of 20,832 obstetricians
/gynecologists, there were 1,230
respondents from a 1,983 sample;
from a population of 12,972 gen-
eral surgeons and 1,384 neuro-
surgeons, there were 1,793 and
503 respondents from a sample of
3,004 and 859 respectively.
In the case scenarios results, the lower and higher percentages of doctors in each scenario that
cited malpractice concerns as the main reason for choosing one or more clinical actions were 4.9
and 29. But the most cited reason for executing a procedure was medical indication. Additionally,
most doctors that cited medical malpractice concerns cited it for only one procedure.
An important result of the surveys was the difference in answers when comparing close-ended
questionnaires with open-closed questionnaires: in the open-ended questionnaires there was a
lower percentage of respondents citing malpractice concerns as "the primary reason for choosing
a given action".
8% is the simple median of those procedures that were performed primarily because of malprac-
tice concerns. Nevertheless, the authors refer that the "true percentage" is certainly less than that.
Studdert
et al. (2005)
824 Pennsylvania physicians com-
pleted the survey. The physi-
cians were from 6 specialties
identified as being "especially af-
fected by high and rising lia-
bility costs", which are: emer-
gency medicine, general surgery,
obstetrics/gynecology, orthopedic
surgery and radiology.
93% of the respondents stated that they had engaged in at least one form of defensive medicine
presented in the survey. Regarding assurance behavior, 59% of the physicians stated that they
"often ordered more diagnostic tests than were medically indicated" but the proportion was higher
for emergency physicians. With respect to avoidance behavior, 39% "reported that they "definitely
will/already decided to "avoid caring for high-risk patients", with this response being less likely
among emergency physicians.
Specialist physicians’ confidence in the adequacy of their liability coverage and their perceptions
of premium burdens were the strongest predictors across all types of defensive practice.
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Sloan and
Shadle
(2009)
U.S. individuals aged over 65. The
sample for Medicare payments and
survival is (for 1985-2000), re-
spectively: 58,578 and 59,689 for
total hospitalizations; 2,643 and
2,905 for AMI; 3,166 and 3,562 for
stroke; 1,470 and 1,298 for breast
cancer; and 6,057 and 6,258 for
diabetes.131
Direct reforms did not significantly reduce 1-year Medicare payments in any setting, i.e., for any
hospitalization, for AMI, for stroke, for breast cancer or for diabetes.
Regarding indirect reforms, the only statistical significant coefficient is the one for "Any hospital-
ization", with a parameter estimate implying a reduction in total payment of 9.4%.
The probability of survival 1 year after the index event is not affected by direct or indirect reforms.
There seems to be evidence that liability is not able to deter medical injuries.
131The number of Medicare payments can be less than the number of survivals due to missing data.

Chapter 2
Appeals from Civil and
Administrative Courts: Reversal
Rates at the Spanish Supreme Court
2.1 Introduction
Different medical malpractice liability systems provide diverse incentives to physicians
when they have to deliver health care.1 Physicians’ insurance might, among other
things, distort deterrence of negligent behavior and influence the availability of com-
pensation amounts to patients suffering losses due to substandard care.2 The design of
the liability system also provides distinct incentives for patients to present a claim. The
costs of litigation, the duration3 until a decision is made and the compensation that
the patient expects to recover are some of the variables that influence the decision of
filing a claim. The level of injury is an essential variable to calculate indemnity amounts
if compensation is provided to patients. Therefore, and because malpractice litigation
involves costs and delays, presenting a claim is more appealing for patients with higher
levels of injury.4
The implications of a liability system become more blurred when two separate sub-
systems imposing different procedures to similar problems coexist within the same sys-
tem. This is actually common in some civil law tradition countries with a public national
1For a general discussion of liability law, see Cooter (1991). For medical liability, see Danzon (1991),
Trebilcock and Dewees (1992), Studdert et al. (2004), Shavell (1978).
2Zeiler et al. (2007).
3Rickman and Fenn (2001), Studdert et al. (2004) and Hyman and Silver (2006).
4See Hyman and Silver (2006) for more details regarding patient behavior when bringing claims to the
legal system.
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health system. In Spain, different jurisdictions and procedural rules apply to a medical
accident according to the place of injury. A patient5 suffering harm in a public hospital
must try his case in the administrative jurisdiction while a patient harmed in a private
hospital must go to the civil jurisdiction. Physicians injuring patients in a public hospital
will be subject to different regulations and procedural rules than their colleagues caus-
ing the same injury in a private hospital. A strict liability rule seems to apply to public
hospitals under tort law, while a general standard of liability based on fault is applied
to medical accidents occurring in private health care hospitals.6 However, what case
law shows is that courts apply a liability rule based on fault independently of the type
of institution where the accident took place. Therefore, two similar cases should not
have a different outcome if the only difference between them is the type of hospital.7
Strict pre-determined procedural rules in Spain are essential in determining the du-
ration of the process, leaving less space for lawyers or judges to intervene. Although
the Spanish Constitution refers to the right of a trial without unreasonable delays,8
practice shows that cases can take several years to be decided. Additionally, the appli-
cation of different procedural rules can have an impact on the litigation process when
parties have an a priori idea about an eventual patient or defendant bias, differences in
compensation amounts and duration.
In this study we analyze Supreme Court decisions to assess differences between ad-
ministrative and civil jurisdictions in medical malpractice cases in Spain. We construct
a unique dataset with detailed information on patient’s characteristics, medical treat-
ment and legal procedure. The dataset includes decisions from 2006 to 2009. As far
as we are aware, this is the most complete and detailed dataset on medical malpractice
court decisions in a civil law tradition country.
Two important legal reforms9 took place in 1998 and 1999 with implications for
cases judged by the Supreme Court (some of which are included in our dataset). Until
1999 injured patients in a public hospital could chose between the civil and administra-
tive jurisdiction. From 1999 onwards, the administrative jurisdiction became the only
one that can try a case of injury in public hospitals. The main motivation claimed by
the legislator to implement such reforms was the extraordinary increase in litigation
5In this study the plaintiff is the patient; the defendant can be a doctor, hospital or the State (this last
one in case of administrative suits). Having several defendants in the same lawsuit is also possible.
6A more detailed explanation on the legal system for medical malpractice cases is presented in Section
2.8.
7We refer to outcome only because it is based on the same liability rule. Other differences can be
expected given the procedural differences, namely with respect to duration.
8Spanish Constitution of 1978, Art. 24.2
9Law 29/1998 of July 13 and Law 4/1999 of January 13.
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between citizens and the State that brought delays to the judicial system.10 But can we
exclude the possibility of a stronger preference for having cases of litigation against the
State being tried by administrative courts only? The practical result of those reforms is
that they eliminate, in cases of litigation against the State, the option of choosing the
jurisdiction that citizens might prefer. Some arguments favor the existence of adminis-
trative courts such as judges’ training as specialist in administrative law, although these
arguments are hardly applicable to medical malpractice cases. If administrative courts
have more expertise and can provide better decisions when the State is involved, this
could be a reason to support the legal reform held in Spain. Additionally, the legislator
might argue that even if a potential bias in favor of the State exists, this reform intro-
duces higher speed in court decisions. Hence, and according to this view, the legislator
might claim that this reform allows citizens to have a faster trial, when in reality this
change favors the State.
The separation between administrative and civil courts has the drawback of making
capture by the State or by special interests easier, given that in this setting the "marginal
cost for the judge of deciding against the state is much higher in administrative than in or-
dinary judicial courts".11 One of the reasons is that administrative judges have a special
knowledge of administrative law which is a "specific asset in human capital for the judges
and therefore they are more dependent on (or more easily constrained by) the government
(state officials)".12 This represents a cost for the system. Unless there are other incen-
tives for administrative judges to decide a case without fearing the consequences of
going against the State, such as providing decisions that will not be reversed by higher
courts in the future, we can expect to find more administrative decisions in which the
State prevails,13 ceteris paribus. Were this to be confirmed, patients could refrain from
presenting a claim against the State in administrative courts, given the suspicion of a
10This is actually the main motivation published in the new laws. Nevertheless, Mir (1999) refers that
Law 4/1999 was introduced given that the previous one regulating administrative procedure suffered from
several ambiguities. Law 29/1998 of July 13 presents many arguments to favor citizens in litigation with
the State, namely the possibility of appeal when the State is inactive in providing an answer (i.e., when it
takes too much time to make a decision). Law 4/1999 of January 13 refers to the exoneration of citizens
from bureaucratic duties, in order to ensure judicial security more intensively.
11Dari-Mattiacci et al. (2010), p. 28.
12Dari-Mattiacci et al. (2010), p. 28.
13When looking at a sample of 2006 Spanish Supreme Court cases, Dari-Mattiacci et al. (2010) find
that in tort decisions the plaintiff prevailed in 69% of the decisions by the Civil Chamber; while in State
liability cases the plaintiff prevailed in 35% of the decisions by the Administrative Chamber. The authors
draw attention to the fact that caution is needed given that many factors may be at play. Still, this is a
large discrepancy.
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pro-defendant bias. Arguments for a pro-plaintiff bias14 can also be offered in medical
malpractice cases. Judges might feel empathy for the victim and awarding damages
will not make a big difference in hospitals’ deep-pockets. In our study, this last argu-
ment does not apply in the vast majority of cases: health care is provided essentially by
public hospitals that have no deep-pockets because they are State owned. But judges
might feel empathy for the victim for other reasons: for instance, the judge might think
that public hospitals, paid by tax payers, are not providing good quality health care.
Therefore, it is not clear if a bias exists and, if so, in which direction it goes.
Patients filing a medical malpractice lawsuit start by presenting a first claim and can
appeal15 all the way to the Supreme Court.16 Appeals to the Spanish Supreme Court are
in points of law only, formally similar to what happens in the American Supreme Court.
However, the Spanish Supreme Court looks again at the facts when making a decision
(it can correct gross mistakes of fact if properly asked to). Furthermore, the Supreme
Court has no control over its docket given that admission is based on legal grounds and
a decision must always be made. For this reason, the argument that there is a strong
selection bias when analyzing Supreme Court decisions becomes less problematic. The
impediment of the State of taking part in settlements goes in that direction as well.
Additionally, the costs involved in litigation are much lower in Spain than in the U.S.
The costs17 of appealing to the Supreme Court represent a small fraction of the entire
costs of the litigation process.18 Moreover, the Supreme Court might decide to set a
maximum amount19 for the transferable legal costs, i.e., the legal costs incurred by one
party that can be transferred to the other party in case the latter loses the case.
We are conscious that Supreme Court judgments are not representative of medical
malpractice lawsuits in Spain, in the same way that they are not representative in any
other country. There is already a selection bias when we refer to cases that reach
lower courts,20 which means that this bias is even greater when studying appeals to the
14See Clermont and Eisenberg (1999).
15See Herzog and Karlen (1982).
16The appeal process in Spain presents differences between civil and administrative jurisdictions in
medical malpractice cases. See Appendix for more details. For a matter of simplification we will refer to
the trial court as the court making the last judgment before the appeal to the Supreme Court, although it
is not the same court for civil and administrative claims.
17See Appendix for a detailed description of the main costs of bringing a claim to courts in Spain.
18The fact that appeals in general imply a low cost after going to trial is not specific to the Spanish case.
19In our dataset, the highest amount set by the Supreme Court was €1,500. These costs include lawyer
and bailiff’s fees (Art. 241.1, Ley Enjuiciamento Civil, January 7, 2000).
20See Vidmar (1992), Danzon and Lillard (1983) for evidence regarding medical malpractice cases in
trial. For general cases that arrive to court and possible problems with their selection, see Gertner (1993)
and Priest and Klein (1984), Clermont and Eisenberg (1998), Hylton and Lin (2010).
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Supreme Court. The first problem of analyzing medical courts decisions to assess the
problem of medical harm relies on the fact that only a small proportion of negligently
harmed patients decide to present any sort of claim21 against a medical professional or
institution. However, this is not a problem in this study because our main objective is
to make a comparison between civil and administrative appeals to the Supreme Court,
rather than explaining suits in medical malpractice.
Supreme Courts present differences among countries. Nevertheless, common char-
acteristics remain that make Supreme Courts’ decisions important, such as by making
new law, clarifying the law, producing precedents, harmonizing conflicting lower court
decisions, benefiting many parties in the future and allowing for error correction.22 In
civil law countries, parties’ right to appeal to the Supreme Court makes the number of
appeals high and the majority of appeals might actually fail.23 These reasons make the
study of Supreme Court decisions particularly interesting in civil law countries.
The main results of this study with respect to medical malpractice judgments at the
Spanish Supreme Court from 2006 to 2009 are the following:
• The proportion of reversed cases by the Administrative Chamber (28.2%) is higher
than that for the Civil Chamber (12%) and this difference is statistically signifi-
cant. Reversal rates by appellant party are higher when the patient appeals24(31.6%)
and the difference in proportion with respect to civil decisions (14.4%) is statis-
tically significant.
• The odds that the Supreme Court reverses previous decisions at the Administra-
tive Chamber is approximately twice as large than having a decision reversed by
the Civil Chamber (2.1 < [OR] < 2.4), which is robust across different specifica-
tions. This seems to point to a pro-State bias from lower administrative courts.
• The type of hospital (public vs. private), the type of defendant (individual, an
institution or both), physicians’ specialties and patient’s gender, have no impact
on reversal rates. Were a pro-State bias at the Supreme Court level to exist,
we should observe the type of hospital being an important variable. Therefore,
this result makes us more confident that indeed there is no pro-State bias at the
Supreme Court level.
21Hughes and Snyder (1989) show why caution is needed while interpreting claims data.
22Shavell (2010).
23Shavell (2010).
24Notice that when the patient appeals and the Supreme Court overturns the previous decision this is a
pro-plaintiff outcome.
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This chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 reviews previous empirical studies
on medical malpractice claims with a focus on appeals; Section 2.3 briefly describes
the medical malpractice liability system in Spain and the Supreme Court; Section 2.4
describes the dataset, data limitations and empirical approach; Section 2.5 presents the
main results that are then discussed in Section 2.6; conclusions follow in Section 2.7.
2.2 Past Research on Medical Malpractice Litigation
The empirical literature on medical malpractice claims is quite extensive by now. Some
examples refer to the frequency and merits of medical claims, patient’s characteristics
that predict damages, whether it is the patient or physician that tends to prevail, and
litigation costs. This literature draws essentially on the U.S. experience and the majority
of the studies are focused on medical malpractice claims at the insurance level. We are
not aware of any empirical study that analyzes differences between administrative and
civil claims in courts. The only paper that we know focusing on Supreme Court claims
in a civil law country is that by Grembi and Garoupa (2010), which studies duration in
criminal and civil claims.
2.2.1 Who presents a claim?
Empirical work on American cases point out that the incidence of medical malpractice
claims is very low:25 although it was conducted several years ago, the Harvard Medical
Practice Study (1990) estimated that only a reduced number of injured patients pre-
sented a claim and that the number of patients receiving compensation was even lower.
Danzon (1985) estimates that, for patients admitted to hospitals in California in 1974,
approximately 1 in 126 suffered a negligent adverse event and of these at most one in
10 presented a claim. The existence of a permanent injury increases the likelihood of
filing a claim, followed by a temporary injury and finally by death. Studdert, Thomas,
Burstin, Zbar, Orav and Brennan (2000) suggest that the elderly and the poor are less
likely to present a claim, although caution must be taken given the small sample size
they study.
The yearly frequency of malpractice claims in Spain is not known, although it would
be interesting to be acquainted with the proportion of claims arriving to courts and to
the Supreme Court. The same holds with respect to the total number of claims until
a final decision was made. Health care typically involves a high degree of asymmetric
25Please see Chapter 1 for a detailed description of the results provided by these studies.
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information, in which the doctor is much better informed about the quality of the care
provided to the patient given her expertise.26 For this reason, patients might need to
file a claim to gather more information about the care that has been provided to them.
After getting more information, they can choose to drop the case27 if they believe that
harm was suffered but it was not due to negligent care. Due to these problems we will
not attempt to draw any inference on medical malpractice claims being filed in Spain:
we focus on Supreme Court judgments only.
2.2.2 Who goes to trial and who wins?
The decision to proceed with a claim is not the end of the story: parties might settle or
they might go to trial. If the cases that end up in court are not representative of the legal
disputes, relying on court results to analyze how courts decide might be dangerous. It is
crucial to understand which cases end up going to trial if we want to interpret correctly
trial outcomes, and this holds for all types of litigation.28 In case courts receive a
random selection of claims, we can exploit courts’ results to assess how courts decide
in general. Normally we do not expect this to hold. Therefore, when we analyze trial
judgments and realize that courts decide in favor of the defendant in 90% of the cases,
can we say that there is a pro-defendant bias? No, unless we are sure that cases arriving
to courts29 are a random sample of all cases. If the cases that go to court are essentially
those in which there is no evidence of negligence,30 then having decisions favoring the
defendant is a signal that courts are making correct decisions, and not that they exhibit
26Self regulation is important to mitigate this problem. See for instance Garoupa (2010), Faure and
Verhulsdonck (2004) and Olsen (2000).
27Other reasons might also lead the patient to remove the claim, such as the cost of litigation or delays.
See Hyman and Silver (2006).
28For a review of trial selection theory, see Hylton and Lin (2009). The authors also describe models of
settlement, which we do not present here as they are not the focus of our work.
29This is where trial selection theory comes in, by trying to explain which characteristics distinguish
cases that are settled from cases that go to trial and the implications of this process, namely on the rate of
plaintiff victory. Hylton and Lin (2009) "use the term "trial selection theory" to refer to models that attempt
to explain or predict the characteristics that distinguish cases that are litigated to judgment from those that
settle, and the implications of those characteristics for the development of legal doctrine and for important
trial outcome parameters, such as the plaintiff win rate", p. 1. They also provide a review of trial selection
theory.
30In order for the plaintiff to prove liability, three things must be proven: i) the plaintiff was injured
(harm); ii) due to acts or omissions of the defendant (causation); and iii) the defendant’s acts or omis-
sions failed to meet a standard of care maintained by reasonably competent health care providers in the
community (negligence). If courts decide correctly, compensation should be attributed only to patients
that were negligently injured. See Sloan and Hsieh (1990).
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a pro-defendant bias.
Studies on trial rates and plaintiff win rates show some similarities for medical
malpractice cases, which are often different from other types of litigation.31 Trial rates
were found to be from approximately 10% up to 15% and the defendant tends to prevail
in court (at a higher rate than in settlements). These studies do not support the claim
that juries or judges have a pro-plaintiff bias.
Danzon (1985) points to a trial rate of less than 10% for California. The defendant
prevailed in 3 out of 4 cases that reached courts, which is a higher rate than the one
verified in settlement out of court. Vidmar (1992) studies malpractice suits filed in
North Carolina and finds a trial rate of 10%. Trial outcomes show that the defendant
prevailed in 4 out of 5 cases. Sloan and Hsieh (1990) came out with the result that from
6,612 closed claims in Florida, only 11.5% were decided at verdict or on appeal. The
plaintiff win rate was 22% from cases decided at verdict and that were not appealed.
When analyzing charges of medical malpractice presented after 1977 and solved
by the end of 1989 against a single hospital, Farber and White (1991) had a sample
of 252 cases. Of these, 20 started trial, but only 13 had a trial decision, which was in
favor of the defendant in all cases. Hagihara et al. (2003) estimate that from a total
of 421 court decisions made from 1986 until 1998 in Japan, 31.8% were decided in
favor of the patient. Studdert et al. (2006) came out with the result that only 15% of
the closed malpractice claims from five liability insurers went to trial. In these cases,
plaintiffs rarely won damages at trial: just in 21% of the cases, comparing to 61% of the
cases resolved out of court. Studdert and Mello (2007) study predictors of discordant
outcomes in medical malpractice cases, i.e., predictors of denying payment when there
was a medical error involved and predictors of attributing compensation when there is
no clear evidence of negligence. The authors find not only that jury verdict was a highly
significant predictor of discordant outcomes but also that it was the strongest predictor
of meritorious claims’ rejection. The probability of payment in settlements was higher
than the probability of payment at trial, and the difference could be as high as 40%,
depending on the specification.
Clermont and Eisenberg (1992) use data from federal courts to study some inter-
esting differences between judge and jury trials32 from 1979 to 1989, finding that the
plaintiffs’ win rate is higher for judge trials (50%) than for jury trials (29%) in medi-
31See for instance Clermont and Eisenberg (1992) (that find some similarities for medical malpractice
and product liability) or Saks (1992).
32Differences between judge and jury trial will not be relevant for the Spanish case as there are no jury
verdicts.
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cal malpractice cases. Selection of cases to those two types of trial might explain the
differences between win rates in the sense that litigants and their attorneys tend to
misperceive how juries and judges decide medical malpractice cases. Since attorneys
believe that the jury is pro-plaintiff, they end up submitting cases to the jury with lower
chances of winning. In the end, there is a high proportion of jury trials in which the
defendant prevails.
2.2.3 Appeals: Who Appeals and who wins?
Finally, a last decision might be taken by parties that engaged in trial litigation,33 which
is the decision of appealing the trial decision. We can expect plaintiffs to appeal if they
are not happy with the judgment: compensation was refused and the plaintiff appeals
expecting the decision to be reversed, or the compensation amount was too low and
the plaintiff tries to get a more favorable outcome (taking the risk that the appeal
court might reverse the previous decision and refuse any type of compensation). We
can expect defendants to appeal in case the lower court awarded compensation to the
patient. In order to assess correctly how appellate courts decide we would need to
know which cases are appealed. Having a random sample of cases arriving to appellate
courts would allow us to analyze how those courts decide in general, but usually we
do not have such a sample. The conclusion to take from here is not that the analysis
of trial or appealed decisions is irrelevant, but instead that we must be careful with
extrapolations to the general case. Therefore, we cannot make a judgment about the
legal system based on such decisions.
The study of supreme court judgments is indeed of much relevance for several rea-
sons. Supreme court34 decisions35 clarify the law and establish doctrine that will be
followed by trial courts; harmonize conflicting lower court decisions; benefit many par-
ties in the future; allow for error correction; dominate casebooks; are more available
for research than unappealed cases. In civil law countries, appealing to the supreme
court might be particularly attractive: after taking a case to trial verdict, "the cost and
effort in appealing must seem comparatively insignificant"36 and, moreover, appeal is "as
33This is a very simplified example as the stages of the litigation process can be much more complex and
show differences between countries and jurisdictions.
34There are obviously differences between supreme courts in civil and common law tradition countries
on which we do not focus here. See Merryman and Pérez-Perdomo (2007).
35See Shavell (2010), Shavell (1995), Merryman and Pérez-Perdomo (2007), and Eisenberg and Heise
(2009). For a review of appeal and supreme courts with a focus in the American case, see Kornhauser
(2000).
36Clermont and Eisenberg (1999), p. 6. Although the authors are not referring to civil law countries,
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of right".37
In the 1990 study by Sloan and Hsieh, plaintiff win rate on appeals of medical
malpractice cases was 44%, which is higher than the 22% plaintiff win rate for cases
decided at verdict but not appealed. Additionally, the authors find differences in plain-
tiff win rates, which tend to be higher for high severity levels of harm. Clermont and
Eisenberg (1999) compare success in appeals of civil trials by appellant party in jury
and judge trials. Defendants succeed more than plaintiffs in several types of cases, espe-
cially in appeals from jury trials. For medical malpractice, the reversal rate was 21.4%
when the defendant was the appellant party, while it was 15.9% when the plaintiff
was the appellant party. In 2009, Eisenberg and Heise study state court appeals. From
the medical malpractice state appealed cases, the reversal rate was 33.3% for trials
appealed by defendants while it was 23.9% for cases appealed by plaintiffs (the differ-
ence between these reversal rates is not statistically significant). While studying several
types of civil cases that present similar reversal rates differences between defendants
and plaintiffs, these authors rely on the attitudinal model38 as the most likely expla-
nation, preferred to the selection theory. The idea is that appeal judges perceive that
trial outcomes favor plaintiffs. Therefore, since they are aware of this innacuracy, re-
versal rates are higher when the defendant appeals. Other plausible explanations exist,
although the incompleteness of the data does not allow checking for those alternative
explanations.
2.3 Medical Malpractice in Spain
In this section we briefly introduce the medical malpractice liability system in Spain.
More detailed information is provided in the Appendix. Some particularities of the
Spanish case that make it much different from the American case are also presented.
the same argument holds.
37Shavell (2010), given that the "the right of appeal (even at supreme courts) tends to be constitutionally
guaranteed" in civil law countries, p. 93.
38"The attitudinal model represents a melding together of key concepts from legal realism, political science,
psychology, and economics. This model holds that the Supreme Court decides disputes in light of the facts of
the case and vis-à-vis the ideological attitudes and values of justices. Simply put, Rehnquist votes the way he
does because he is extremely conservative; Marshall voted the way he did because he was extremely liberal",
Segal and Spaeth (2003), p. 86.
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2.3.1 Medical Malpractice Liability System
Spain does not possess a specific law to regulate the physician-patient relationship. The
first distinction to be made in the Spanish liability system in case of medical injury
depends essentially on the type of institution responsible for the health care, i.e., if the
medical injury took place in a public or in a private health care service.39 If a patient
was harmed in a public hospital,40 and independently of the relationship or activity
that it resulted from, administrative regulation applies and patients can only present
their claims in administrative courts. Moreover, the public administration is formally
strictly liable in tort for the harm caused by the personnel. In case of harm in a private
hospital, the Civil Code is the main body of law to be applied. A general standard
of liability based on fault is applied and cases involving private health care providers
are tried by civil courts. Although apparently there are different liability rules to be
imposed according to the place of accident, case-law shows that these differences have
no effect. Courts base their decisions on the evidence of negligence,41 and even if the
injury took place in a public hospital a strict liability rule will not be applied. Although
the line that makes the distinction between civil and administrative jurisdictions seems
to be clear nowadays, it has not been the case until the legislative reforms that were
adopted in 1998 and 1999. The 1998 reform makes it clear that liability cases of public
administration can only be tried by the administrative jurisdiction, interdicting the civil
jurisdiction to judge those cases. Some months after, in 1999, new legislation was put
into force, stating that medical liability in cases involving social security’s institutions
must be tried in the administrative jurisdiction as well. Therefore, it is possible to find
civil courts’ decisions of medical injuries taking place in public hospitals if the accident
happened before that legislation entered into force. By analyzing Supreme Court’s
decisions related to medical injuries taking place before the new legislation was into
force, we expect to provide some insights about the motivation of plaintiffs to opt for
the civil jurisdiction when they were injured in a public hospital (i.e., reasons that might
have taken patients to prefer one jurisdiction to the other, when they could still do so.
We are not aiming at explaining preferences). We would expect injured patients to opt
for civil courts in case it is cheaper, takes less time to be decided, makes it more likely
to receive compensation, it is believed that administrative courts have a pro-State bias,
39See Gómez-Pomar and Sánchez Álvarez (2006) for problems arising from the Spanish liability regime.
40For state liability in general, see Dari-Mattiacci et al. (2010).
41There are several decisions from the Supreme Court arguing this. See, for instance, STS 7800/2009,
where it is claimed that a strict liability rule in medical cases will not be applied: would it be applied, the
State would become a universal insurer, even in cases where there was no evidence of negligence.
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it is perceived that civil courts have a pro-plaintiff bias or a combination of these.
2.3.2 Supreme Court
The Spanish Supreme Court is the court of last appeal on points of law only. It is possi-
ble to consider a specialization of the Supreme Court in the sense that civil decisions of
medical malpractice cases are issued by the First Section of the First (Civil) Chamber;
administrative decisions are issued by the Sixth and (recently) Forth Sections of the
Third (Administrative) Chamber. This creates problems as well, because identical med-
ical accidents can be tried in different jurisdictions and decided in different chambers
of the Supreme Court, when the only difference between them is the place of accident.
Gómez-Pomar and Sánchez Álvarez (2006) argue that the "polycentric character" of the
Spanish law of torts is responsible for several problems. As described by the authors,
it generates uncertainty because the court that will judge the case, the legal rules that
apply and, to a certain extent, the final result might depend on random factors, difficult
to predict a priori; victims might be subject to different treatments with respect to the
quantification of damages, which is against the constitutional principle of equality; and
it creates a loss of efficacy in terms of deterrence.
The Supreme Court has the power to deny the admission of the appeal, to confirm
the decision made by the lower court, to totally reverse the previous decision or to
reverse part of the previous decision, with or without remittal. As argued in several
Supreme Court’s decisions, the court is not a second court of appeal and new facts can-
not be brought in appeal. Therefore, the information about the case that arrives to the
Supreme Court is essentially the same as the information available at the lower court.
Lower courts try to follow the same interpretation of the law as the Supreme Court,
and they frequently cite its decisions.42 According to Spanish law, the amount of com-
pensation should be set by the lower court. Supreme Court’s decisions that modify the
amount of compensation from lower courts are rare, given that there must be evidence
of an unreasonable amount set by the previous court.
The Spanish Supreme Court de facto produces precedents that will be followed by
lower courts, which also hold for medical malpractice cases. Even taking into account
that there is no formal rule of stare decisis, judges are influenced by prior decisions,
especially if they come from the Supreme Court. In fact, "[e]verybody knows that civil
law courts do use precedents. Everybody knows that common law courts distinguish cases
42Obviously, lower courts can make mistakes while interpreting Supreme Court decisions, even when
using previous sentences as a guide.
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they do not want to follow, and sometimes overrule their own decisions".43
The specialization of the Supreme Court chambers in Spain in medical malpractice
lawsuits should allow for consistency and less uncertainty in terms of decisions, al-
though the legal organization of the tort system might create some problems, as stated
above. But this is not a full specialization, given that the distinction between civil
and administrative jurisdiction still holds at the Supreme Court level, where judges
assigned to the Civil Chamber decide civil claims and judges assigned to the Adminis-
trative Chamber decide administrative claims. This separation would be desirable if the
benefits from the administrative specialization outweigh the costs of capture.44 We will
try to analyze if, according to the Spanish medical malpractice liability system, there
are strong reasons to have this distinction when it comes to medical negligence cases.
2.3.3 Particularities of the Spanish case
Several additional characteristics, besides the existence of a national public health sys-
tem and the application of different procedural rules, make the Spanish case much
distinct from the American case:
- insurance for medical malpractice liability is mandatory since 2003 but only for
doctors working in private institutions;45
- contingent fees for lawyers are not used.46 For this reason, lawyers do not function
as gatekeepers47 when they have to decide whether to accept a medical malpractice
case;
- there are no jury trials in civil and administrative litigation;
- compensation is allowed for economic losses and pain and suffering, but punitive
damages do not exist;
- the vast majority of citizens do not have a health insurance, precisely because of
the National Health System (NHS) that grants universal access to the population. The
percentage of private insurance coverage depends on which type of insurance is consid-
ered:48 i) voluntary insurance, which works essentially as a supplement for services that
are not covered by the NHS or which are more difficult to access, covered up to 7.9%
43Merryman and Pérez-Perdomo (2007), p. 47.
44Dari-Mattiacci et al. (2010).
45Law 44/2003 of November 21 on Sanitary Profession.
46Currently contingent fees might be applied (especially in civil cases where lawyers can typically receive
from 20 up to 30% of the payout). This does not affect our analysis given that the present study refers to
cases taking place much earlier than this change has occurred.
47Farber and White (1991).
48Ministry of Health and Consumer Affairs (2004).
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of the Spanish population49 in 2004; (ii) employer-purchased insurance, which cov-
ered 3.8% of the Spanish population in 2004; (iii) civil servants’ mutual funds (publicly
funded). These three types of insurance overall covered up to 15% of the population in
2004.50
2.4 Dataset and Empirical Approach
This chapter adds to the empirical literature in medical malpractice by analyzing Supreme
Court’s decisions on medical negligence cases in Spain. To build this unique and rich
dataset, we started by collecting medical malpractice cases decided by the Spanish
Supreme Court from 2006 to 2009.51 The Spanish Supreme Court must publish all the
decisions, but obtaining judgments on medical malpractice (or decisions on a specific
issue in general) is not straightforward or immediate. Judgments are not grouped into
categories, so we cannot base the analysis on the search with the keywords "medical
malpractice" given that we would take the risk of excluding some decisions in which
the judge did not use that precise expression. Therefore, several searches were per-
formed using different keywords and expressions, with the intent of getting a large
sample of cases and then excluding those that were not related to medical malprac-
tice.52 We are quite confident with the sample we get: to start with, we checked with
the CENDOJ53 (the institution that manages the publication of on-line decisions) all
the different combinations of keywords that we should use. Moreover, we also looked
at academic publications that study Supreme Court decisions and at the website of the
Patients’ Association to check if the decisions they refer to were already included in our
dataset (which they were). After excluding decisions that were not related to medical
care, we inspected the court’s decisions54 in order to code them.
The next sections present the data collected, the main limitations and some descrip-
tive statistics.
49Notice that this type of insurance presents regional differences: for Barcelona and Madrid, it can be
up to 20-25% of the population (Ministry of Health and Consumer Affairs (2004)).
50Ministry of Health and Consumer Affairs (2004). See Mossialos and Thomson (2004) for voluntary
health insurance practices in several european countries.
51See Appendix for more detailed information on the construction of the dataset.
52For instance, in the broad search we could get cases in which some party was negligent (e.g., a teacher
or parents) and for that reason someone else had to receive medical treatment (for example, a student or
son).
53CENDOJ stands for Centro de Documentación Judicial.
54The Spanish Judicial council is in charge, among other competences, of ensuring the publication of
the Supreme Court’s sentences (Art. 107.10, Ley Orgánica 6/1985, de 1 de julio, del Poder Judicial). This
was the main source to build the dataset.
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2.4.1 The Spanish Supreme Court Medical Malpractice Dataset (SSCMMD)
We construct a medical malpractice dataset that includes55 decisions in which the
Supreme Court made a judgment regarding the evidence of medical negligence. For
a matter of simplicity the plaintiff in this study is considered to be the patient, although
claims could be brought by third parties on behalf of the patient, as it is the case of
claims involving death or a minor patient.56
In order to classify the level of harm suffered by the patient, we followed a 9-
point injury severity scale as presented by previous literature.57 To simplify the analysis
and presentation of the results, we grouped the 9-point injury severity scale in four
groups:58 temporary/emotional (score 1 up to 4), permanent minor (scores 5 and 6),
permanent major (scores 7 and 8) and death (score 9). Our database consists of 256
Supreme Court’s decisions that contain information on several variables of interest.
Inspection of lower courts’ decisions was sometimes needed in case some variable was
not sufficiently specified.
2.4.2 Data Limitations
The data collected present a few limitations. Some involve the availability of data that
might limit the analysis we can make. Some are related to the fact that the SSCMMD is
composed by decisions from 2006 until 2009. We expect to extend the SSCMMD in the
future. Moreover, the number of cases available by now allows us already to analyze
medical malpractice judgments by the Supreme Court.
Time Period: We have four years of data. Although the number of years is not
impressive, the number of decisions during this period is somehow remarkable. We are
basically analyzing 256 decisions made by the higher court in four years. Would the
number of decisions be similar during those years, it would imply that approximately
64 judgments were being made per year. This allows us to speculate that patients do file
medical malpractice lawsuits and do appeal to the Supreme Court in Spain. Obviously,
it is not possible to recover the proportion of patients that sue with respect to those
55See Appendix for a list of the type of cases that we excluded and a justification of why they are not
relevant for this work.
56A dummy variable equal to 1 if it was the patient himself bringing the claim and 0 if the claim was
brought by relatives was also included.
57We categorized the levels of injury severity by following the same methodology as Sloan and Hsieh
(1990), in accordance with the National Association of Insurance Commissioners. See Appendix for de-
tails.
58Studdert and Mello (2007) grouped the score into five categories, and that was our initial idea. The
reduced number of observations for lower levels of injury made us opt for four groups instead of five.
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suffering harm from the available information. Similarly, nothing can be said regarding
the proportion of patients that appeal to the Supreme Court compared to those that
filed a lawsuit in lower courts.
Open Lawsuits: The data presented here refers to judgments already made. There-
fore, we cannot exclude the possibility that some of the trends that we found can just
change in decisions being made after 2009. We consider it to be unlikely, though. There
are no reasons to believe that the number of Supreme Court’s decisions will suffer sig-
nificant changes every year.
Moreover, it was not possible to test the effect of the 1998 and 1999 reforms given
that there are only a few decisions corresponding to medical accidents taking place
after that date. It would be interesting to test if the reform had any impact in terms
of court’s decisions and plaintiffs’ incentives to file a claim, but for the time being we
cannot test its implications.
Patient’s Age: Some variables were not specified, and although we have a consid-
erable amount of information, the analysis could be improved if some of them were
better defined. We have in mind, for instance, the patient’s age at the time of the ac-
cident: it was possible to divide the age variable into three groups (newborn, child and
adult/elderly), but it was not possible to obtain the exact age of the patient for every de-
cision. Alternatively, we would like to be able to distinguish between adult and elderly
patients, which was also not feasible for a considerable number of cases (especially for
those not receiving compensation).
Medical malpractice rate: We are not trying to draw any conclusion regarding the
tort system’s capacity of making correct decisions, i.e., to attribute compensation to
negligently injured patients and to refuse compensation if there was no negligence
involved. There is no way of measuring the rate of medical negligence since it is not
possible to check whether medical negligence actually occurred. If medical encounters
that really involve substandard level of care increase, the number of lawsuits might
increase. But given the costs involved in litigation, that proportion might decrease as
well if patients are not willing to sue. Moreover, there can be different rates of medical
malpractice among public and private hospitals and even different litigation behavior
for patients suffering harm in public or private hospitals.
2.4.3 Hypothesis
As basic research strategy we compare Administrative Chamber judgments with Civil
Chamber judgments from the Supreme Court, controlling for several observable case
characteristics. A medical malpractice case being tried at the Civil Chamber should not
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have a different result from a case being tried at the Administrative Chamber if that is
the only difference between them. Before performing the empirical analysis we tested
for equality of distributions59 of civil and administrative decisions with respect to the
variables we believe to be the more relevant ones: the level of harm and patient age.
The distribution of administrative and civil decisions in terms of age and level of harm
do not show significant differences.60
One concern while performing the regression analysis is that civil decisions might
differ systematically from administrative decisions along a dimension we do not control
for. We include an extensive list of covariates namely the level of harm, patient age and
gender, physician’s specialty, type of defendant (individual vs. institution) and type of
hospital (private vs. public), to reduce that risk. We also control for previous court
decision.
After performing the regression analysis, we expect to provide useful insights with
respect to medical malpractice cases appealed to the Supreme Court. First, Supreme
Court reversal rates allow us to study how are lower courts deciding medical malprac-
tice cases. Therefore, we can say if the Supreme Court tends to agree with the previous
court decision and if there are significant differences between reversal rates of admin-
istrative and civil decisions. Additionally, we can test if there are case characteristics
that make the decision of reversing the lower court decision more likely. As we referred
above, we are controlling for important case characteristics, aiming to assess if they are
relevant to reverse cases by the Supreme Court.
Medical malpractice cases are difficult to judge, given the problem of causation.61
Therefore, unless there is strong evidence that the patient suffered a negligent treat-
ment, it is hard to know for sure if negligence occurred or not. When we study Supreme
Court decisions, we cannot say that they are "the correct" decisions. However, as it will
be discussed in more detail, there are reasons to believe that these decisions might
involve less errors than those being made by lower courts,62 especially from a legal
perspective.
We also add to the literature of Law and Economics by investigating if, according
to the information available, there are strong motives to have civil and administra-
59We performed Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests.
60Additionally, we performed the same test for those specialties that received the higher number of
claims and that are seen as more risky (obstetrics/gynecology, orthopedics and neurosurgery). There
are no significant differences between the proportion of cases involving those specialties in the Civil and
Administrative Chambers of the Supreme Court.
61See Chapter 1 for a detailed description of the problem.
62See Shavell (2010).
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tive courts judging medical malpractice cases. Dari-Mattiacci et al. (2010) argue that
"[s]pecialization between regular and administrative courts encourages specialization in
state liability" but, on the other hand, "separation makes capture by the state or by special
interests easier".63 Therefore, the authors claim that specialization of courts makes sense
when "the determination of state liability is substantively different from tort liability".64
The authors use the case of an accident with a school bus or police car owned by the
state as an example of substantial similarities (in terms of legal issues) with ordinary
tort cases, namely with respect to causation, determination of fault and estimation of
harm. This example shares similarities with medical malpractice cases. The way to ac-
cess causation, to determine fault and to estimate harm is essentially the same, whether
there is a public or a private hospital involved. Therefore, our aim in this chapter is not
to provide a design of how the legal system should be organized. Our objective is to
confront civil and administrative decisions, so that we can clarify some potential impli-
cations of having such system.
2.5 Results
In this section we present the main results with respect to the differences we find in
administrative and civil decisions. We start by describing the Supreme Court caseload in
both Administrative and Civil Chambers from 2006 to 2009. Reversal rates are studied
subsequently.
2.5.1 Supreme Court Caseload
Table 2.1 presents the total caseload of the Supreme Court for 2006, 2007, 2008 and
2009 by the Administrative and Civil Chambers, which we compare to the caseload of
those chambers in medical malpractice cases65 only. This allows us to have an idea of
the proportion of alleged medical negligence cases in the total number of decisions.
The total number of Supreme Court’s medical malpractice decisions, by chamber,
is shown in Table 2.2. A distinction is made regarding medical accidents taking place
before and after the 1998 Reform. For 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009, there was a higher
proportion of cases being tried by the administrative jurisdiction. This is not surprising:
Spain has a national public health system66 and universal access to health services
63Dari-Mattiacci et al. (2010), pp. 27-28.
64Dari-Mattiacci et al. (2010), p. 28.
65According to our dataset.
66For several years the management and administration of the public health services was made at the
national level, by the INSALUD (Health National Institute), but those functions were transferred to the
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Table 2.1: SC Total Caseload and Med Mal only
Adm. Judgments Civil Judgments
by the SC by the SC
2006 4,624 1,340
2007 4,732 1,339
2008 4,441 1,154
2009 5,132 828
Total 2006-2009 18,929 4,661
% Med Mal on Total 0.8% 2.1%
SOURCE: Spanish Judicial Council (2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009). NOTE:
Medical Malpractice Judgments are the total judgments in our database.
is granted by the Constitution.67 Currently, the majority of Spanish citizens use the
national health care system and only a reduced proportion of patients has a private
health insurance, although this proportion varies among regions.
Table 2.2: Total Number of SC decisions on Compensation for Med Mal
Pre 1998 Post All
Positive Payout
Administrative
Civil
Total
64
50
114
14
1
15
78
51
129
Zero Payout
Administrative
Civil
Total
55
45
100
23
4
27
78
49
127
Total
Administrative
Civil
Total
119
95
214
37
5
42
156
100
256
The reform68 held in 1998 can explain the yearly differences between the number of
decisions by the Administrative and Civil Chambers. We calculated the number of cases
that would have been tried by the administrative jurisdiction if the 1998 reform would
already have been in force. In other words, we calculated how many cases would have
autonomous’ regions, a process that started in 1981 and finished in 2002 (Real Decreto 840/2002, August
2). Currently there is another institution, the INGESA (National Institute of Health Management), which
is in charge of health care in Ceuta and Melilla.
67Art. 43, Spanish Constitution of 1978.
68We hope to study the impact of this reform in the future. From 2006 until 2009 the number of decisions
involving medical accidents happening after the reform has been adopted is very reduced. Therefore, it is
not possible to make this analysis for the moment.
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been decided in 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009 by the Administrative Chamber if medical
accidents taking place in public hospitals could not be tried at civil courts. We get
similar percentages for each of the four years: 74% to 80% of cases would have been
decided by the Administrative Chamber and 20% to 26% of the cases would have been
decided by the Civil Chamber every year. Overall, in 39 lawsuits the patients opted
for the civil jurisdiction when a public hospital was involved (and when they were still
allowed to do so). Within these 39 cases, both a public and private hospitals were
involved in 2 cases.
2.5.2 Reversal Rates
In our dataset, compensation was attributed in approximately 50% of cases and this rate
was similar for administrative and civil decisions. An interesting comparison that can
be made is between Supreme Court decisions and lower courts decisions with respect to
the attribution of compensation to patients. In other words, are lower courts’ decisions
generally the same as the Supreme Court decisions? If not, can we see a prevalence
of defendants or plaintiffs? Our dataset allows us to study the reversal rate of cases
arriving at the Supreme Court. When the Supreme Court does not fully agree with the
previous court decision, it can make small changes to the previous decision: it can mod-
ify the amount of compensation, revise the legal fees (for instance, say that one party
shall pay for the entire court’s costs); or it can absolve one of the defendants in cases
with multiple defendants. We look essentially at the decision of awarding damages to
the patient and the amount of compensation, if any. Therefore, to calculate reversal
rates at appeal, we considered a judgment reversed in case the lower court decided
that the patient was entitled to receive compensation and the Supreme Court decided
that he was not entitled to it (or the other way around) and if the respective amounts
of damages were altered. Thus, judgments in which the Supreme Court maintains the
decision that the patient is entitled to receive compensation but absolves one of the
defendants are not considered reversed here.69 This implies that the reversal rates that
we present70 are not an exact measure of Supreme Court reversal rates. Decisions in
which the Supreme Court absolved one of the defendants are obviously relevant for
69We are not claiming that these decisions are not important. Actually, they are in the sense that they
allow to correct erroneous decisions. For more on "The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction" see
Shavell (1995).
70We also coded reversal rates considering the entire decision. In this work the variable of interest is if
the decision of compensation was reversed or confirmed, and not the decision with respect to legal fees,
for instance.
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both defendants: the guilty defendant will now have to pay for the entire damages
while the absolved defendant is not responsible and will not have to pay anything.
From the 256 decisions (214 if we look at pre-1998 reform only) made by the
Supreme Court, there was an agreement with respect to lower court decisions in 200
cases (170 cases) (Table 2.3). Therefore, the overall reversal rate for medical mal-
practice cases decided by the Supreme Court was approximately 21.9% (20.6%). If
we separate civil and administrative cases, the reversal rate is higher for the last ones:
28.2% (26.9%) of the administrative lower court decisions are reversed by the Supreme
Court, compared to 12% (12.6%) in civil cases. Reversal rates show some differences
according to the appellant party. As we can see in Table 2.4, and considering both juris-
dictions, losing plaintiffs appealing to the Supreme Court obtain a higher reversal rate
than defendants: plaintiffs obtain a reversal rate of 25.7%, while defendants can only
get a 6.3% reversal rate.
Table 2.3: Total Number of Decisions and Reversal Rates by Jurisdiction
Adm. Civil Both Jurisdictions
Pre 1998
Reversed Decisions (N)
Total Decisions (N)
Reversal Rate (%)
32
119
26.9
12
95
12.6
44
214
20.6
Post 1998
Reversed Decisions (N)
Total Decisions (N)
Reversal Rate (%)
12
37
32.4
0
5
0.0
12
46
28.6
Pre and Post 1998
Reversed Decisions (N)
Total Decisions (N)
Reversal Rate (%)
44
156
28.2
12
100
12.0
56
256
21.9
Within cases appealed by patients, the reversal rate is higher at the Administra-
tive Chamber (31.6%) than it is at the Civil Chamber (14.5%) (Table 2.4), and this
difference is statistically significant. Therefore, the agreement rate is higher for cases
in which the lower court decided that the plaintiff should receive compensation, with
small differences between administrative and civil decisions. It seems that civil judges
"get it right" more often than administrative judges. Moreover, administrative judges
are more likely to "get it wrong" in case they absolved the State, which seems to point to
a pro-State bias. This possibility will be further investigated in the regression analysis.
We also check for reversal rates in civil decisions by type of hospital, i.e., public or
private hospital. The main objective is to check whether cases involving a public hospi-
tal can be more difficult to judge and therefore we might expect higher reversal rates.
Alternatively, we should not expect cases involving a public hospital to be more diffi-
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Table 2.4: Two-sample tests for differences in proportions of reversed decisions (Civil
vs. Adm.)
All Plaintiff Defendant
Decisions Appeals+ Appeals+
Administrative
SC Reverses (N) 44 42 2
Reversal Rate (%) (28.2) (31.6) (7.4)
Civil
SC Reverses (N) 12 10 2
Reversal Rate (%) (12.0) (14.5) (5.4)
z-stat for differences in proportions of Rev. Rates
(Adm. vs. Civil)
-3.06 -2.63 -0.84
Probability 0.002 0.008 0.401
Both Jurisdictions
Total Number of decisions(N) 256 202 64
Reversal Rate (%) (21.9) (25.7) (6.3)
+ The sum of these cases is different than 256 because in 10 of them both parties appealed to the Supreme
Court. These results are robust if we exclude cases in which both parties appealed.
NOTE: We use a two-group test on the equality of proportions as we are dealing with a dummy variable.
Would we use a t-test instead, the t-statistic would be even higher (except for cases in which the defendant
appeals, in which the difference between reversal rates at the Administrative and Civil Chamber would not
be statistically significant).
cult to judge and consequently there should not be significant differences in reversal
rates even when that type of hospital is involved. Table 2.5 shows the results for these
cases. Considering only cases tried by the civil jurisdiction in which a public hospital
was involved we can see that the reversal rate was 15.4%, and that it shows no differ-
ences between appellant parties. The reversal rate is lower (approximately 10%) for
civil cases in which a public hospital is not involved. Among these cases, no decisions
were reversed when the defendant appealed. Although it would be preferable to have
more observations to perform this test, there are no statistically significant differences
between cases having a public hospital as defendant and cases having a private hospital
as defendant in the civil jurisdiction. So far, we did not find evidence that cases of liti-
gation with the State are more difficult to judge and, because of that, we might expect
higher reversal rates.71
Another comparison we can make is between Supreme Court reversal rates in med-
ical malpractice cases and Supreme Court reversal rates for the entire civil and admin-
71Tests for the difference in proportions of reversal rates were also performed between civil and admin-
istrative jurisdictions. In this case, we consider for the civil jurisdiction only cases with a public hospital
as defendant and reversal rates are then compared to those from the administrative jurisdiction. We get
a z=-1.62, P-value=0.106. We did not rely much on this result as the number of observations is very
different: 39 for civil jurisdiction and 146 for administrative jurisdiction.
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Table 2.5: Two-sample tests of differences in proportion of reversed decisions (Civil with
Public Hospital vs. Civil without Public Hospital)
All Plaintiff Defendant
Decisions Appeals+ Appeals+
Civil Decisions with
Public Hospital
Reversed Decisions (N) 6 4 2
Total Number of decisions (N) 39 26 13
Reversal Rate (%) (15.4) (15.4) (15.4)
Civil Decisions with NO
Public Hospital
Reversed Decisions (N) 6 6 0
Total Number of decisions (N) 61 43 23
Reversal Rate (%) (9.8) (14.0) (0.0)
z-stat for diff. in proportions of Rev. Rates (Civil with Public
Hosp. vs. Civil with NO Public Hosp.)
-0.83 -0.16 -
Prob 0.4 0.87 -
Total Civil Decisions
Reversed Decisions (N) 12 10 2
Total Number of decisions (N) 100 69 37
Reversal Rate (%) (12.0) (6.9) (5.4)
+ The sum of these cases is different than 100 because in 6 of them both parties appealed to the Supreme Court. These
results are robust if we exclude cases in which both parties appealed.
istrative jurisdictions. Statistics for the overall jurisdiction are available72 according
to the appellate court (Table 2.6). Also here, decisions from civil courts have a lower
reversal rate when compared to administrative decisions,73 although it is not possible
to say anything in detail about these reversed decisions (i.e., it is impossible to know in
favor of which party was the decision reversed). What we can say when we look at the
results provided by Table 2.6 is that, using the same terminology as above, civil lower
courts "get it right" more often than administrative lower courts. In fact, for each 100
cases arriving at the Civil Chamber, only 9 to 11 have been reversed. If we do the same
calculation for administrative decisions, for each 100 cases arriving at the Administra-
tive Chamber, approximately 10 to 25 have been reversed. Moreover, Civil Chamber’s
reversal rates74 are more stable than the Administrative Chamber’s reversal rates.75
We developed a set of logistic regressions76 to further investigate the differences
72"La Justicia Dato a Dato - Estadistica Judicial", Spanish Judicial Council (Consejo General del Poder
Judicial) - (2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009).
73We are not able to provide an explanation for the high variability regarding appeals of decisions
coming from the National Court (Audiencia Nacional) as an explanation is not provided in the report.
Moreover, it is unexpected to have precisely the same rate of appeals for the Higher Court of Justice for
2008 and 2009.
74From 2006 until 2009, the difference between the minimum and maximum reversal rates is 3.1%
75From 2006 until 2009, the difference between the minimum and maximum reversal rates is 15.3%.
76In these regressions, the dependent variable is equal to one if the Supreme Court reverses the lower
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Table 2.6: Reversal rates at the Supreme Court according to Lower Court
Jurisdiction Appellate Court 2006 2007 2008 2009
Civil Provincial Courts (Audiencias Provinciales) 10.8 10.7 7.7 7.9
Adm. National Court (Audiencia Nacional) 25.2 16.5 9.9 24.9
Adm.
Regional Superior Courts of Justice
10.1 17.2 23.2 23.2
(Tribunales Superiores de Justicia)
SOURCE: Spanish Judicial Council (2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009).
between the Civil and Administrative Chambers of the Spanish Supreme Court. We
also added which party was appealing to the Supreme Court, the plaintiff or the defen-
dant.77 If the defendant appealed to the Supreme Court, it means that the lower court
attributed compensation to the patient. If the plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court,
it means one of two things: either the lower court decided that there was no evidence
of negligence and causation and therefore the patient is not entitled to receive compen-
sation (the vast majority of cases); or the patient is not happy with the compensation
amount.78 If we consider Supreme Court decisions as a proxy for correct decisions
(in the sense that they allow correcting errors from previous courts), analyzing rever-
sal rates according to the appellant party offers the possibility to check if lower courts
are making more mistakes when they decide that the patient is not entitled to receive
compensation or if they are making more mistakes when they consider the defendant
guilty.79
Table 2.7 summarizes the main results, where we present the estimated logit mod-
els, first for the overall dataset and then considering cases involving accidents before
the 1998 Reform only. As anticipated, the patient’s gender is not relevant for Supreme
Court decisions. Regarding other patient’s characteristics, and considering the results
for regressions in a simple version, we can see that the odds of having a judgment re-
versed by the Supreme Court was up to three times higher for claims involving injury
to newborns (Regression (1) and Regression (2), odds ratio80 [OR]=3.01, p=0.005;
court decisions, and is equal to zero if the Supreme Court agrees with the previous decision.
77In 10 cases both plaintiff and defendant appealed to the Supreme Court.
78As stated above, Supreme Court’s case law points to the fact that compensation amounts should be set
by lower courts.
79Just as considered above, this is just a proxy as we look at the Supreme Court’s decision of reversing
the attribution of compensation to the patient. In case the Supreme Court absolved one of the defendants
but maintained all the rest, this is not considered as reversed from the point of view of attributing or
refusing compensation.
80The odds ratio is simply the odds of one event occurring in one group divided by the odds of that same
event occurring in another group. Let us suppose that the probability of having an administrative decision
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[OR]= 2.66, p=0.024, respectively).
Having a lawsuit being tried at the Administrative Chamber seems to have an impact
on the reversal probability at the Supreme Court. The odds of having a reversal from the
Supreme Court at the Administrative Chamber is more than two times as large as the
odds of having a reversal from the Civil Chamber (2.06 < [OR] < 2.43) and this result
is robust across different specifications. Regressions (5) and (6) seem to contradict this
result, but the fact that the coefficient on Administrative is not significant owes to the
inclusion of variables characterizing the type of defendant, some of them with a very
high correlation with the Administrative variable.
Table 2.7: Regression Results
Dependent Variable: SC Reverses
(Reg. 1) (Reg. 2) (Reg. 3) (Reg. 4) (Reg. 5) (Reg. 6)
Administrative 2.427** 2.088* 2.133** 2.064* 2.789 1.642
(0.017) (0.059) (0.042) (0.068) (0.154) (0.508)
Plaintiff Appeals 4.119** 5.253*** 4.395*** 5.145** 4.240** 5.041**
(0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013)
Male 1.160 1.785
(0.647) (0.117)
Newborn 3.005*** 2.663**
(0.005) (0.024)
Child 0.430 0.796
(0.281) (0.780)
Permanent Minor 5.003 5.119 5.231 5.434
(0.130) (0.127) (0.124) (0.119)
Permanent Major 6.921* 5.723 5.403 4.582
(0.071) (0.108) (0.125) (0.175)
Death 4.106 5.846 4.975 7.231*
(0.197) (0.109) (0.150) (0.080)
Other Controls No No No No
Yes
Doctors Specialty
Defendant Type
N 255 213 255 213 255 213
Log Likelihood -120.3 -96.57 -123.0 -98.78 -119.0 -94.94
LR Chi Square 27.92 23.85 22.46 19.45 30.38 27.13
Exponentiated coefficients; p-values in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the Supreme Court reverses lower court decision and
0 if it agrees. All regressions were estimated using all decisions first and then using decisions before the 1998
Reform only.
reversed is 0.30. Suppose as well that the probability of having a civil decision reversed is 0.15. The odds
ratio is equal to (0.30/(1-0.30))/(0.15/(1-0.15))=2.4. Therefore, the odds of having an administrative
decision reversed is 2.4 times higher than the odds of having a civil decision reversed.
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The type of hospital (public vs. private) and having as defendant an individual (doc-
tor or nurse) or an institution (e.g., health care center or insurance company) does not
have any impact on the probability of having the previous decision reversed (Regres-
sions (5) and (6)). We look at physician’s specialty by considering those specialties that
received at least ten claims. Obstetrics/gynecology, neurosurgery/orthopedics, anes-
thesiology/reanimation, general surgery and emergency are the specialties considered.
We can see that physician’s specialty is not relevant.
Taking into account these results, we did not find reasons for patients to opt for
the civil jurisdiction when the injury took place in a public hospital if he is taking
into consideration Supreme Court decisions.81 There is no evidence of a possible bias
towards the State by Supreme Court’s judges when a public hospital is involved. In
fact, were this bias to exist, we should observe the type of hospital being an important
variable, which is not. Which reasons could take patients to present their claims in
the civil jurisdiction when they could still chose? To start with, if the patient does not
take into consideration the Supreme Court, then there are incentives to prefer the civil
jurisdiction given the pro-State bias that we suspect to exist at lower administrative
courts. We should add that civil decisions take longer and that indemnity amounts do
not show significant differences between civil an administrative decisions.82
2.6 Discussion of the Results
Priest and Klein (1984) suggest that appealed decisions should present near 50% suc-
cess for both defendant and plaintiff. The main reason why it should be so has to do
with case selection, which works similar to selection of cases to litigation. The idea is
that there is a selection effect: cases clearly in favour of the plaintiff or in favour of
the defendant are settled; cases involving an unclear outcome cannot be settled, and
these cases are won by the defendant and by the defendant equally. As Priest and Klein
(1984) mention, the "50 percent implication derive from the assumption of symmetric
stakes to the parties from litigation".83 As described by the the authors, medical mal-
practice cases might involve assymmetric stakes for the parties, as "[a]n adverse judg-
81Considering claims being made before the reform, when the patient could chose in which jurisdiction
to present a claim.
82The mean duration of administrative cases is lower than those tried in the civil jurisdiction, and the
difference is statistically significant. Overall, there is no evidence of differences in compensation amounts
between civil and administrative jurisdictions. See Chapter 3 for an analysis of compensation attributed
to patients by the Spanish Supreme Court.
83At p. 20.
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ment may harm the reputation of the doctor, which would meant that the doctor would
have more to lose from a defeat at trial than the dollar judgment the plaintiff gains".84 In
these cases, we could expect a plaintiff success rate at trial lower than 50%, as defen-
dants might settle cases with high probability of defeat, and litigate cases with higher
probability of victory. Other studies show different results for trial outcomes, both in
empirical85 and theoretical works. Shavell (1996) presents a formal model of trial se-
lection showing that "any frequency of plaintiff victory at trial is possible". We find that
plaintiffs prevailed in 50% of the appeals to the Supreme Court, although we could
have seen any other result, as Shavell (1996) points out.
Administrative decisions present a reversal rate of 28.2% and civil decisions 12%.
If litigants believe that civil decisions are difficult to overturn on appeal, they should
appeal strong cases only. One should expect a lower appeal rate for civil decisions and
eventually a higher reversal rate. It is not possible to compute appeal rates for medical
malpractice cases (neither for civil nor for administrative cases). From the information
gathered it does not seem to be strong evidence suggesting that civil appeal rates are
much lower than the administrative ones. Approximately 2.1% of the Supreme Court
caseload was for medical malpractice civil decisions, while it was 0.8% for adminis-
trative decisions. Moreover, if the majority of the population searches medical care
through the national public health system, the number of cases arriving at the Civil
Chamber does not seem to be so small. This conclusion still holds if we consider those
cases in which a public hospital was involved but the patient opted for the civil jurisdic-
tion. As for the reversal rate, it is actually higher for administrative decisions than it is
for civil decisions. From here we can speculate either that there is indeed a low appeal
rate for civil decisions that we cannot confirm from the data we have - which seems to
be unlikely; or that selection theory of cases that are appealed86 does not apply here,
which seems to be the most plausible option.87
84At p. 40.
85Some empirical studies are presented in Section 2.2.2.
86A final alternative explanation is that the difference in reversal rates is driven by case’s difficulty, in the
sense that the most difficult cases go to the Administrative Chamber. The results that we have showed do
not seem to support this hypothesis. In fact, and as pointed previously, there are no significant differences
in the distribution of cases arriving at the Civil and Administrative Chambers in terms of level of harm,
age of the patient, and specialties that tend to receive the higher number of claims (and that could be seen
as more risky). Besides, the easier civil cases could be settled, a possibility that is not allowed in litigation
with the State. Therefore, and would this hypothesis be true, we would expect the most difficult cases to
arrive to civil courts and cases of different difficulty levels to arrive to administrative courts.
87The alternative explanation that the difference in reversal rates is caused by a selection effect of
lawyers, according to which civil lawyers are better than administrative lawyers, does not seem to play a
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The strategic model might provide some explanations for the results we find. The
idea is that judges decide taking into account the expected reaction from the adminis-
tration and the legislator. In civil cases, there is no expected reaction unless a massive
number of cases arrives to courts and it creates a strong public opinion, which is not
what we see for Spain. As for administrative cases, we can expect two things: 1) the
judges believe that they can get some retribution from the State and therefore they
are pro-defendant; 2) the judges think that the State is incompetent, in the sense that
public health care is not provided according to the standards of care, and they are pro-
plaintiff as a way of "punishing" the State. From our data, the first explanation seems
to be the more suitable one, but the pro-State bias is from lower courts. Why do we
believe that in case there is a bias it is less likely to be at the Supreme Court level?
To start with, the "Spanish Supreme Court justices operate in a traditional civil law setup
which disfavors division, dissent and public controversy within the bench".88 Therefore,
we can expect to find a vast majority of unanimous decisions at the Supreme Court, in
which several justices vote.89 This means that it is more likely to find a legal error in
decisions made by lower judges (there is only one judge deciding), than in decisions
made at the Supreme Court level (several judges decide the same case). To corrobo-
rate this possibility, a description of how judges are appointed to the Supreme Court
can be provided: "one out of five justices are selected among career judges that possess
at least ten years of experience at the appellate courts (magistrado), and at least fifteen
years of experience as career judges. One out of the five positions is to be held by law
professors possessing renowned competence for the position and more than fifteen years of
professional experience".90 Appointment is similar for justices from the Administrative
and Civil Chamber, which means that we should not expect diverse behavior between
these judges.
Judges from administrative courts might think that if they go against the State they
may have some problems in terms of promotion in their careers.91 They are public
servants and one of the parties involved in the litigation is the State. In the end, judges
maximize "the same thing everybody else does",92 which means that income is part of the
role in this setting. To start with, and given the public national health system, we cannot say that patients
who search for health care in public hospitals have a lower possibility of paying for a good lawyer than
those patients going to a private health care provider. Moreover, the State’s lawyers (Abogados del Estado)
are highly reputed lawyers.
88Garoupa et al. (2011), p. 3.
89In the SSCMMD, dissident votes were found in 3 decisions.
90Garoupa et al. (2011), p. 8.
91See Posner (2008).
92Posner (1993).
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judges’ utility function. If judges think that deciding systematically against the State
might refrain them from being promoted and receiving a higher income, it is natural
to expect that they prefer not doing so. This becomes particular important for admin-
istrative judges because they acquire a specific asset on human capital (knowledge of
administrative law) which makes them more dependent from the State.93
Furthermore, and the reason why we point to a bias at the administrative lower
courts is because the same does not follow with Supreme Court judges, as they typi-
cally retire after being at the Supreme Court. To support this argument, Supreme Court
judges should be more concerned with the future effect of their decisions than trial
judges.94 Moreover, decisions from the Supreme Court are more easily known by the
public, simpler to attack in terms of public opinion and are generally followed by lower
courts.95 In case we would see in our data that the Supreme Court reverses more de-
cisions in which the defendant appealed, we could not explain whether it was because
lower courts were pro-plaintiff or if the Supreme Court was pro-defendant. The same
would hold if the type of hospital was important for reversal rates, which is not the
case.
With the results we get from this analysis, we can add to the Law and Economics’ de-
bate on the specialization of courts, by trying to answer to the following question: why
should both civil and administrative courts judge medical malpractice cases? As pre-
viously explained, there are no strong reasons to believe that medical accidents taking
place in public hospitals are much different from medical accidents occurring in private
hospitals (not only with respect to the case itself, but also from a legal perspective). If
we consider the results obtained in this chapter, we see that there are disadvantages
and costs if specialized administrative courts judge medical malpractice cases when the
State is involved.
Administrative judges from lower courts perceive that they might suffer some retali-
ation in terms of promotion if they decide against the State, which makes them thinking
that they have a higher cost of deciding against the State than civil judges. This might
lead them to have a pro-State bias. Although we cannot draw from here all the benefits
from the specialization of administrative courts, the cost of capture should not be disre-
garded, as apparently lower administrative judges show a higher proportion of wrong
decisions which bring a cost to the party suffering from it. This might have other impor-
93See Dari-Mattiacci et al. (2010).
94Tigar (1993).
95The Supreme Court decisions included in our dataset generally provide a transcription of parts of the
lower court decision. In all of them, there are references to previous Supreme Court decisions. However,
lower courts sometimes make mistakes when applying them.
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tant implications as well, namely in terms of a loss of deterrence when public hospitals
are involved.96 However, the full implications of this system and the way it should be
designed are beyond the scope of this chapter, as further research and data would be
needed.
2.7 Conclusions
This chapter studies evidence from lawsuits appealed to the Supreme Court in Spain,
and we add to previous literature on empirical medical malpractice studies of claims
in civil law tradition countries. The "polycentric character" of the Spanish law of torts
is responsible for several problems, namely for creating a loss of efficacy in terms of
prevention of negligent care. By analyzing Supreme Court’s decisions from 2006 to
2009 related to medical malpractice we see that reversal rates are higher for admin-
istrative decisions. When patients appeal administrative decisions, the reversal rate is
even higher. Lower courts "get it right" more often in judgments attributing compen-
sation to patients, as these are the decisions with lower reversal rate at the Supreme
Court. Lower court judges exhibit some differences as adjudicators of medical malprac-
tice cases. There is evidence of a pro-State bias from administrative lower courts which
could explain the option of some patients for the civil jurisdiction. Before 1998, pa-
tients harmed in public hospitals could use their perceptions of the differences between
civil and administrative judges to choose in which jurisdiction to file the lawsuit, but
this option is no longer available. We do not find strong reasons to have both civil and
administrative courts deciding medical malpractice cases.
96Similar to what has been argued by Gómez-Pomar and Sánchez Álvarez (2006), although the authors
refer to cases involving the State in general.
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2.8 Appendix: Spanish Medical Liability System and the SC
2.8.1 Criminal Jurisdiction
The criminal jurisdiction can also have a role in medical malpractice cases, indepen-
dently of the place of harm. If that is the case, the Criminal Code’s liability rules apply
and the final decision will make a judgment regarding the criminal and civil liabilities.
The plaintiff is able to reserve his claim of damages to a civil court, but this rarely oc-
curs.97 Martín-Casals et al. (2004) refer to the fact that the 1998 and 1999 reforms
gave rise to an "increase in penal lawsuits, which allow the victim to obtain a quick and
free preliminary investigation into the case, a swift ruling on tort liability within the crim-
inal proceeding itself and, moreover, a way out from the jurisdiction of the administrative
courts".98 The option for the criminal jurisdiction is allowed by Art. 146, Law 4/1999,
and is appealing to the plaintiff due to delays in the administrative jurisdiction and to
a possible bias towards the State.99 But would a pro-State bias be confirmed, it would
also mean two things: it is appealing for the plaintiff to opt for the civil jurisdiction,
giving that the patient is expecting to have a lower probability of prevailing over the
State in administrative courts; it is a motivation for the legal reform that voids the pos-
sibility of choosing in which jurisdiction to present a claim, precisely because all the
claims against the State will be presented at the courts that favor it the most.
2.8.2 Burden of Proof and Standard of Care
In case of allegation of medical malpractice from the plaintiff, a judgment will be made
about the evidence of fault. The general rule is that the burden of proof100 lies with the
patient, not only regarding the existence of fault but also on the proof of causation,101
although it is possible to apply a reversal of the burden of proof in exceptional cases.
Cases with a disproportional harm in comparison with the risk of the medical interven-
tion (daño desproporcionado) or cases in which the defendant is in a better position to
provide evidence (such as that the patient signed the informed consent sheet), are the
most common examples on which a reversal of the burden of proof102 can be granted.
97See Coderch et al. (2006), p. 7.
98It was possible to find Supreme Court’s decisions at the civil or administrative chambers regarding
cases that had previously been tried in the criminal jurisdiction by lower courts.
99Gómez-Pomar and Sánchez Álvarez (2006).
100See Luna Yerga (2004) for burden of proof in civil cases. For burden of proof in cases related to
pharmaceutical products (although we are not covering these cases here) see Ramos González (2004).
101See STS 11.3.1991, RJ 1991/2209 and Art. 217, Law 1/2000 on Civil Procedure, of January 7.
102For some Supreme Court’s decisions on this issue see STS 18.12.2009, STS 23.10.2007. The reversal
of the burden of proof in medical accidents is recent when compared with its application to other cases.
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The standard of care shall be met in each and every stage of medical care: (i) pre-
treatment phase of care, such as diagnosis and informed consent;103 (ii) intra-treatment
phase of care, such as performing a surgery according to the standards of care; (iii)
post-treatment phase of care, such as supervising the patient during recovery, checking
the patient’s evolution and reaction to the treatment.
The standard of care for medical care providers is set by the lex artis ad hoc cri-
terion,104 which implies that the general standard of care required for medical treat-
ment (lex artis) shall be considered according to the specificities of the case (ad hoc).
The standard of care is high in the sense that it is set considering a skilled medical
professional, taking into account the specific characteristics of the case, namely the
profession’s characteristics, the complexity of the patient’s condition, but also his fam-
ily’s condition and health organization’s circumstance.105 Medical care providers do
not have an obligation of outcome (obligación de resultados), in the sense that they
are not obliged to cure the patient from his poor health condition (which is impossible
to ensure). But medical care providers do have an obligation of means (obligación de
medios), meaning that the doctors are required to take reasonable measures while per-
forming health care treatments, taking into account the probability of some foreseeable
risks and their eventual level of harm. Some Supreme Court’s decisions might seem at
first sight to impose an obligation of outcome for medicina satisfactiva o voluntaria,106
i.e., for medical treatments that are not vital to the patient. Vasectomies, plastic surg-
eries and odontological surgeries are considered to be part of this type of medicine,
on which the patient searches for medical care on a voluntary basis and not due to an
essential need. The obligation of the physician in these cases, that is an obligation of
means, comes closer to an obligation of outcome because otherwise the patient would
not search for that medical treatment. But this does not imply that the physician is
strictly liable in case the final desired outcome is not achieved: it simply implies that
the physician must act according to the lex artis ad hoc, to inform the patient about
the risks, but additionally to inform the patient about the possibility that the treatment
might not bring the expected result.
See Gómez-Pomar (2001) and Luna (2003) - both in Spanish.
103Regulated by Law 41/2002, November 14, on Patient’s autonomy, rights and obligations regarding
clinical information and documentation. Notice that informed consent implies that the patient was in-
formed not only about the risks and procedures in case medical intervention is needed (and gives medical
authorization to the intervention) but also about the alternatives to the proposed treatment, so that he
can make a choice.
104See STS 11.3.1991, RJ 1991/2209.
105STS 11.3.1991, RJ 1991/2209.
106See STS 29.6.2007, STS 23.10.2008 or STS 30.6.2009.
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2.8.3 Damages
Patients can recover damages for economic losses and pain and suffering, and compen-
sation due to a loss of a chance107 is being applied with some frequency by Spanish
courts. There is no clear rule to calculate the amount of compensation that the pa-
tient is entitled to receive due to a medical accident, but sometimes damage schedules
for automobile accidents108 are followed by courts instead. This allows for less discre-
tion in terms of the amount set and accounts already for pain and suffering, the part
of compensation generally regarded as being the more difficult to assess. Neverthe-
less, there is no homogeneity in courts’ decisions for quantifying medical malpractice
damages:109 some decisions specify the amount for economic losses and for pain and
suffering separately, others claim that they use the scheduled damages table for acci-
dents (that includes compensation for both economic losses and pain and suffering),
and others present an overall amount without specifying the calculation of those mon-
etary amounts. This holds for lower courts but also for the Supreme Court (in case the
Supreme Court reverses the previous lower court decision of refusing compensation to
the patient; otherwise, the compensation amount is set by the lower court). Moreover,
although patients must provide some facts to the court about their injuries, they have
an incentive to exaggerate (Cooter (1991)).
2.8.4 Costs
The main costs of bringing a claim to courts are the following:
• i) Procedural fees - appealing to the Supreme Court has a fixed fee of €600
and the variable part can go up to €500 if the value of the claim is up to
€1,000,000;110
• ii) Lawyers’ fees - which are negotiable, regulated by the bar of each autonomous
region, and vary according to the type of case and litigation stage. For Barcelona,
the fees should decrease in higher stages of litigation, i.e., the fee for first instance
is higher than the fee to appeal to a higher court and to the Supreme Court as
long as the lawyer is the same;
107For a description of the introduction of the loss of a chance doctrine by the Spanish Supreme Court,
applied by the first time in 1998 by the Civil Chamber, see Luna (2005).
108Real Legislative Decree 8/2004, October 29, on civil responsibility and insurance on motor vehicles’
circulation (Responsabilidad Civil y Seguro en la Circulación de Vehículos a Motor). For a discussion of the
use of these tables, see Ramos González and Luna Yerga (2004).
109See Chapter 3.
110Art. 35, Law 53/2003 of December 30, Medidas Fiscales, Administrativas e del Orden Social.
Appendix: Spanish Medical Liability System and the SC 78
• iii) Bailiff’s fees111 - in civil litigation, a claim with a value up to €601,012 im-
plies a bailiff’s fee of €1,540. According to Spanish law, both lawyer and bailiff
are mandatory in trial112: the lawyer defends the party and the bailiff is a tech-
nical representative of the parties in court that has to deal with the various costs
incurred during the judicial proceedings;113
• iv) Legal experts’ fees.
According to a report from the European Commission (2007), the proportions of
these costs on the value of a disputed claim are: Court fees 10%-30%; Bailiff fees 5%-
20%; Lawyer fees 80%-95%; Expert fees 5%-15%.
2.8.5 Supreme Court
The Spanish Supreme Court is the court of last appeal on points of law only, for civil,
criminal, administrative, social and military jurisdictions. It is composed by five cham-
bers, one for each of the jurisdictions just mentioned.114 Decisions from the Administra-
tive Chamber of the National Court (Audiencia Nacional)115 or Superior Courts of Jus-
tice116 can be appealed to the Administrative (Third) Chamber117 of the Supreme Court
whereas decisions from the Civil Chambers of Provincial Courts (Audiencias Provin-
ciales)118 can be appealed to the Civil (First) Chamber119 of the Supreme Court. It is
possible to consider a specialization of the Supreme Court in the sense that civil deci-
sions of medical malpractice cases are issued by the First Section of the First Chamber;
administrative decisions are issued by the Sixth and (recently) Forth Sections of the
Third Chamber. This creates problems as well because, as previously described, identi-
cal medical accidents can be tried in different jurisdictions, be subject to different rules
111Real Decreto 1373/2003.
112Ley Enjuiciamento Civil, January 7, 2000.
113See European Commission - Spain (2007), p. 13.
114Therefore, the Spanish Supreme Court is composed by the First Chamber (Civil), the Second Chamber
(Criminal), the Third Chamber (Administrative), the Fourth Chamber (Social) and the Fifth Chamber (Mil-
itary). Each chamber is composed by a President and the number of judges is determined by law. Moreover,
the chamber can be organized by sections. For more detailed information, see www.poderjudicial.es (in
Spanish) - last access on September 2011.
115The National Court, which exercises jurisdiction over all Spanish territory, does not have a Civil Cham-
ber.
116The Superior Courts of Justice (Tribunales Superiores de Justicia) are composed by three chambers:
Civil and Criminal Chamber, Administrative Chamber and Social Chamber. These courts exercise jurisdic-
tion over the autonomous regions.
117Art. 86, Section III "Recurso de Casación", Law 29/1998, on Administrative Procedure, of July 13.
118The Provincial Courts exercise jurisdiction over provinces.
119Arts. 477 and 478, Chapter V "Del recurso de casación", Law 1/2000 on Civil Procedure, of January 7.
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and decided in different chambers of the Supreme Court, when the only difference
between them is the place of accident.120
2.9 Appendix: Construction of the Dataset
In order to build the dataset, we started by searching decisions made by the Spanish
Supreme Court on medical malpractice. As explained previously, several searches were
performed at the general Supreme Court dataset.121 We first got a broad list of judg-
ments and excluded those in which the main concern was not a judgment of medical
malpractice. For instance, a case in which the Supreme Court decides if the insurance
company must pay damages for the patient is not interesting for us. In this situation,
the decision being made is not related to the existence of medical malpractice: the court
is only deciding who is paying for it, since the decision on the evidence of medical mal-
practice had been previously done. We excluded decisions122 related to the following
cases:
• blood infection: we can view these cases as a defective product problem. The
reasoning of the Spanish Supreme Court is that if the blood transfusion has been
performed before the mid 90’s - as it happened in the vast majority of the de-
cisions from 2006 until 2009 - when there were no technologies to detect the
infection, the patient is not entitled to receive compensation, at least from the
tort system;
• psychiatric patients that tried suicide: these cases are not relevant for the current
study. Moreover, the problem is essentially a lack of supervision of the patient
(from nurses mainly, not doctors), and not a delayed diagnosis or wrong med-
ication. Therefore, the question being analyzed is not related to a judgment of
medical negligence;
• limitation period: the limitation period is 15 years for contracts123 and one year
for actions in tort.124 The dies a quo is the day that the victim knew the con-
120See Gómez-Pomar and Sánchez Álvarez (2006). See also Section 2.3.2.
121Available at www.poderjudicial.es., last access on September 2011.
122We would like to present the number of cases we excluded. Unfortunately, as we explain above, the
fact that the decisions are not categorized make it too much time consuming to check it, as we need to
open each decision to see what it is about. When performing a broad search, we ended up with a list of
cases that were not related to medical malpractice (e.g, a student having to receive medical care because
the teacher was negligent during a school trip).
123Art. 1964 of the Civil Code
124Art.1968.2 of the Civil Code.
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sequences of the harm instead of the day of the medical accident. Therefore,
the Court makes a distinction between "danos permanentes y continuados", i.e.,
between permanent and continuous injuries. In the first type of harm, the con-
sequences are known, and unchangeable; the second type is characterized by the
fact that there is an evolution, and the patient might have to wait a certain period
of time until the consequences are fully known. For this reason, the difference
lies in the moment at which the full consequences are recognized.125 Again, the
main discussion is not a judgment about medical malpractice as such;
• "unificacion de doctrina": we can see these cases as stare decisis. It applies to
administrative cases only and we believe these cases are not relevant for the
current study;
• and jurisdictional competence: in these cases the Supreme Court decides which is
the jurisdiction that shall pronounce a judgment about the case, not if there was
evidence of medical malpractice.
In order to classify the level of harm suffered by the patient, we followed a 9-
point injury severity scale as presented in previous literature. We categorized the levels
of injury severity by following the same methodology as Sloan and Hsieh (1990), in
accordance with the National Association of Insurance Commissioners. The levels are
the following:
• One: Emotional only-fright, no physical damage.
• Two: Temporary-insignificant-lacerations, contusions, minor scars, rash, no delay.
• Three: Temporary-minor-infections, misset fracture, fall in hospital; recovery de-
layed.
• Four: Temporary-major-burns, surgical material left, drug side effect, brain dam-
age; recovery delayed.
• Five: Permanent-minor-loss of fingers, loss or damage to organs; includes nondis-
abling injuries.
• Six: Permanent-significant-deafness, loss of limb, loss of eye, loss of one kidney
or lung.
125See for example STS 14.7.2009.
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• Seven: Permanent-major-paraplegia, blindness, loss of two limbs, brain damage.
• Eight: Permanent-grave-quadriplegia, severe brain damage, lifelong care or fatal
prognosis.
• Nine: Death.
Patients claiming medical malpractice damages due to a badly performed vasectomy
that resulted in an unwanted child were grouped in the lowest level of harm.
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2.10 Appendix: Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.8: Reversal Rates by Jurisdiction According to the Level of Harm
Temporary Permanent Permanent
Death
Emotional Minor Major
Adm.
Affirms (N) 8 42 42 20
Reverses (N) 0 17 20 7
Reversal Rate (%) (0.0) (28.8) (32.3) (25.9)
Civil
Affirms (N) 10 37 17 23
Reverses (N) 1 6 2 3
Reversal Rate (%) (9.1) (14.0) (10.5) (11.5)
Total
Affirms (N) 18 79 59 43
Reverses (N) 1 23 22 10
Reversal Rate (%) (5.3) (22.5) (27.2) (18.9)
Table 2.9: Reversal Rates by Level of Harm (Paid vs. Unpaid Decisions)
Paid Unpaid
Adm. Civil Adm. Civil
Temporary/Emotional
Affirms (N) 1 4 7 6
Reverses (N) 0 1 0 0
Reversal Rate (%) (0.0) (20.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Permanent Minor
Affirms (N) 10 18 32 19
Reverses (N) 16 4 1 2
Reversal Rate (%) (61.5) (18.2) (3.0) (9.5)
Permanent Major
Affirms (N) 20 11 22 6
Reverses (N) 20 2 0 0
Reversal Rate (%) (50.0) (15.4) (0.0) (0.0)
Death
Affirms (N) 5 8 15 15
Reverses (N) 6 3 1 0
Reversal Rate (%) (54.5) (27.3) (6.3) (0.0)
All Levels of Harm
Affirms (N) 36 41 76 46
Reverses (N) 42 10 2 2
Reversal Rate (%) (53.8) (19.6) (2.6) (4.2)
NOTE: A reversed paid decision means that the SC decided to reverse a decision in which the
lower court refused compensation.
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Chapter 3
Compensation in Medical
Malpractice Cases
3.1 Introduction
The number of patients presenting claims is lower than the number of patients suffer-
ing harm, as evidence has shown.1 Several reasons might be presented to explain this
situation, one being simply that patients are not aware that they were victims of sub-
standard care levels. In fact, as described by Sage (2003), "[e]ven fatal injuries may
not be recognized as errors because of patients’ underlying diseases".2 Another reason is
that patients do respond to incentives. Consequently, given that the malpractice system
is costly, presents delays and can be cumbersome, "it is hardly surprising that it is ap-
pealing primarily to patients with severe injuries and large damages".3 Although patients
must provide some facts about their injuries to the court, they have an incentive to
exaggerate.4
The complexity of medical malpractice cases with respect to causation is also an
important variable: for each patient we can only observe the final outcome given the
treatment received (i.e., whether the patient is cured or if harm materialized) but we
cannot go back in time, put the patient under a different treatment, see the outcome and
compare it to the previous one. Moreover, patients might need to file a claim in order
to get more information about the case. In spite of all the critics to the current liability
system, empirical literature does not support the claim that the system is performing
1See Chapter 1.
2At p. 30.
3Hyman and Silver (2006), p. 1116.
4Cooter (1991).
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very badly.5
When patients file a claim for medical malpractice in a tort liability regime based
on fault, the system should be able to provide (among other things) an outcome in due
time.6 Moreover, whenever the medical treatment is found to have caused the harm
suffered by the patient, only negligently injured patients should be compensated for
their loss. In other words, the evidence of negligence should be the only variable pre-
dicting the attribution of damages.7 Additionally, patients should be compensated for
their loss in a similar and predictable manner. This means that patients suffering sim-
ilar accidents with equivalent levels of harm should receive the same payout, and that
patients suffering a minor severity injury should receive lower compensation amounts
than patients suffering a permanent grave injury. In case there is evidence of medical
negligence, a calculation should be made for the amount of damages that the patient
shall receive.8 The quantification of damages9 is crucial for medical malpractice cases:
the compensatory goal of tort law requires making the injured patient ’whole’10 and
should deter negligent medical care. Given the importance of accuracy and fairness of
awards for non-economic damages, as argued by Bovbjerg et al. (1989), clearer signals
of likely outcomes should, among other things, "inspire greater confidence in the fairness
and predictability of the tort recovery system (thereby helping to maintain the efficient
operation of the deterrent function of tort law)".11 Therefore, the system should set com-
pensation amounts in a consistent way. In addition, patients with similar characteristics
suffering the same level of harm should receive an equivalent indemnity award.
However, the quantification of damages has been seen as randomly or to be set in
a capricious and incoherent way12 by some people. Recent decades are rich in tort
reforms that set a cap for the amount of damages that patients’ can recover in sev-
eral American states, as a way of trying to solve the skyrocketing indemnity amounts.
5See Section 1.2.
6See Zhou (2010).
7See Section 1.2.
8In this chapter our aim is to compare awards of administrative and civil cases. Therefore, we will
not assess how damages should be calculated or what is the fair compensation amount that victims shall
receive. See, for instance, Bovbjerg et al. (1989). See also Ubel and Loewenstein (2008). For the use of
QALY’s, see Karapanou and Visscher (2010). Forensic economics can provide useful contributions to this
area.
9For a survey of the literature on tort damages, see Visscher (2009) and Arlen (2000).
10Viscusi (1998) defines the ’make whole’ amount as "the level of compensation that is sufficient to restore
the accident victim to the pre-accident level of utility", p. 661. For more on this topic see, among others,
Bovbjerg et al. (1989), Friedman (1982), Viscusi (1998).
11Bovbjerg et al. (1989), p. 909.
12See Abel (2006) for a discussion of cases attributing compensation.
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Several empirical works that studied medical malpractice cases did not find support
for a rapid increase in compensation amounts, although evidence of an increase in
the proportion of cases involving higher levels of harm has been provided.13 Interest-
ingly as well is the anecdotal evidence in some European countries that patients are
under-compensated. In Spain, the debate has tried to clarify this situation, namely
by providing evidence of differences in compensation amounts between distinct juris-
dictions (e.g., civil and administrative) and by trying to assess if the use of scheduled
damages14 tends to have any impact on awards. By analyzing Spanish Supreme Court
decisions on medical malpractice from 2006 until 2009, this chapter focuses on pre-
dictors of compensation and indemnity amounts. The aim is to assess if there are case
characteristics that predict a positive payout and, among these cases, if there are differ-
ences in compensation between the Civil and Administrative Chambers of the Supreme
Court. For the sake of fairness and equity, payouts attributed by civil courts should not
present significant differences from payouts attributed by administrative courts, ceteris
paribus (i.e., after controlling for other variables, such as age and injury severity level).
Moreover, we want to investigate if the use of scheduled damages has any impact on
compensation levels.
Patients might be entitled to compensation for pain and suffering, medical expenses,
loss of income and punitive damages.15 The calculation of how much the patient shall
receive for each of these items in order to get a final amount of compensation is diffi-
cult and implies several assumptions. Judges are aware that the patient should be fully
compensated, but no guidance is normally provided on how damages should be cal-
culated.16 In medical malpractice cases, judges are essentially asked to compute com-
pensation to irreplaceable commodities,17 where health is included. Moreover, when
doctors must choose among risky procedures, there are arguments that favor an attri-
bution of damages lower than the harm suffered by the patient, as mentioned by Cooter
and Porat (2006). The main idea is that doctors’ activity has a positive externality and
should not be discouraged. In the example provided by Cooter and Porat (2006), a
13E.g., Vidmar et al. (2005).
14Mello and Kachalia (2010) present a definition for a schedule of noneconomic damages (table 4, p.
61), according to the Task Force on Noneconomic Damages (2005): a "hierarchy or tiering system is created
for purposes of categorizing medical injuries and creating a relative ranking of severity. A dollar value range
for noneconomic damages is then assigned to each severity tier. The schedule is used by juries and judges either
as an advisory document or as a binding guideline".
15Awards for punitive damages are generally not possible in the vast majority of European countries.
16This is true for several countries. For the U.S., see Bovbjerg et al. (1989); for Italy, see Chapter 4; for
Spain, more details will be provided along this section.
17"[C]ommodities for which there are no perfect market substitutes", Cook and Graham (1977), p. 143.
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doctor must decide how to deliver a baby and both procedures have a risk of harm. In
case harm materializes, the authors argue that the amount of damages should be equal
to the difference of the harm between the two procedures, instead of being equal to
the patient’s actual harm. Were courts to apply this reasoning, they would also need to
make calculations for the procedure that the doctor did not choose.
The Spanish liability system allows patients to recover damages for economic losses
and pain and suffering. Under tort law, patients should receive full compensation for
negligent harm.18 Moreover, compensation due to a loss of a chance19 is being applied
more frequently by Spanish courts. It refers to situations in which, "[f]or instance, a
doctor makes a mistake, the patient suffers harm, this harm could have materialized as
well without the mistake, but the mistake has ruined the chance of recovery. The recov-
erable losses consist of this loss of a chance. So if the patient suffers losses of 100.000
and the chance of recovery without the mistake is established at 25%, damages amount
to 25.000".20 Unlike the American case, punitive damages are not allowed. There is
no clear rule that courts should use to calculate the amount of compensation that the
patient is entitled to receive due to a medical accident. Therefore, we have a situa-
tion in which full compensation shall be awarded but damage awards may vary un-
predictably. When referring to automobile accidents, Pintos Agér (2000) argues that
the unpredictability of damage awards produced some problematic effects, such as:
inadequate compensation (that can arise from under or overestimation); "distorted de-
terrence signal sent to potential injurers"; an increase in liability system costs, especially
in litigation costs; payments that take longer and a lower number of victims receiving
compensation; and malfunctioning in the insurance market. When inspecting Supreme
Court decisions in medical malpractice it was possible to see that scheduled awards
for automobile accidents21 can be followed by courts. This should help courts quan-
tifying harm and should allow for less discretion because it accounts already for pain
and suffering, the part of compensation generally regarded as being the most difficult
to assess. Nevertheless, there is no homogeneity in courts’ decisions for quantifying
medical malpractice damages: some decisions specify the amount for economic losses
and for pain and suffering separately, others claim that they use the scheduled damage
18Arts. 1106 and 1902, Civil Code.
19For a description of the introduction of the loss of a chance doctrine by the Spanish Supreme Court,
applied by the first time in 1998 by the Civil Chamber, see Luna Yerga (2005).
20Visscher (2009), p. 177.
21Real Legislative Decree 8/2004, October 29, on civil responsibility and insurance on motor vehicles
(Responsabilidad Civil y Seguro en la Circulación de Vehículos a Motor). For a discussion of the use of these
tables, see Ramos González and Luna Yerga (2004).
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table for accidents that includes compensation for both economic losses and pain and
suffering, and others present an overall amount without specifying the calculation of
those monetary values. Additionally, it is not clear if there are differences in compen-
sation amounts due to the use of scheduled damages. In other words: does the use of
scheduled damages for the calculation of compensation have any impact in the overall
compensation amount? If so, which effect does it have?
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Gómez-Pomar and Sánchez Álvarez (2006)
argue that the "polycentric character" of the Spanish law of torts is responsible for
several problems. One of the problems that it might create is that victims might be
subject to different treatments in terms of quantification of damages, which is against
the principle of equality granted by the Constitution. According to Spanish law, the
amount of compensation should be set by the lower court. Supreme Court’s decisions
that modify the amount of compensation from lower courts are rare, given that there
must be evidence of an unreasonable amount set by the previous court.22
This chapter proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 revises some of the empirical literature
on compensation of medical malpractice cases. Section 3.3 describes the dataset. The
main findings are presented in Section 3.4, where a discussion of the main results is
provided as well. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Review of the Empirical Literature
Empirical literature on courts’ compensation for medical malpractice has been proven
useful to respond to two dominant questions: what are the predictors of a positive
award and, conditional on a positive award, which factors lead to higher amounts of
compensation?
Studdert and Mello (2007) find that payments in nonerror claims23 are more com-
mon if they involve infants, nurse defendants, major injuries, obstetrics injuries or insti-
tutional codefendants. The authors also find that it was less likely to receive a payment
in nonerror claims if they involved elderly plaintiffs, orthopedic surgeons, emotional
22The Supreme Court allows for changes only if at least one of the following situations holds: (i) the
legal bases on which the determinants of the compensation amount were grounded are wrongly applied;
(ii) there is a notorious factual error (error de hecho) when setting the amount of damages; (iii) the
case resolution was done in a "capricious, disproportional or clearly unjust way". See Azagra-Malo and
Gili Saldaña (2006).
23In this paper, the authors refer to payments in nonerror claims as being those cases in which compensa-
tion was attributed to patients but evidence of negligence has not been found. For a detailed explanation,
please see Section 1.2.
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injuries, allegations of missed or delayed diagnosis, and claims that reached a trial ver-
dict. Cases that arrived to court and involved error had more than twice the rate of
nonpayment as those decided out of court. In 2007, Studdert et al. studied closed
malpractice claims from five liability insurers. From 15% of those cases that went to
trial, two things are worth noticing: plaintiffs rarely won damages at trial (only in 21%
of the cases, compared to 61% of the cases resolved out of court); when damages are
awarded, the mean payment in court ($799,365) was almost twice the payment made
out of court ($462,099). These results are in line with those found by Danzon (1985):
using data from California from 1974 to 1976, the author finds that although defen-
dants tend to prevail in cases tried to verdict, average awards are higher at verdict. In
this sample, compensations amounts were, on average, higher for verdicts ($102,000)
than for settlements ($26,000).
Sloan and Hsieh (1990) use data from Florida closed claims and a Florida-Kansas
City jury verdict subsample to estimate which case characteristics influence the proba-
bility of payment. They find that the probability of payment is lower for minor injuries,
is higher for cases considered as "avoidable" or "maybe avoidable" (in comparison to
"unavoidable" cases), and is lower when the defendant was insured by a commercial
stock company. When analyzing compensation levels, Sloan and Hsieh (1990) found
variations in the expected payment according to the stage of disposition: $30,000 for
cases decided at pre-suit, $67,000 for cases decided at pre-verdict suit, $95,000 for
cases decided at verdict and $282,000 for cases decided on appeal. They also find
that "[p]ayments increased monotonically with injury severity level up through permanent
grave injuries. Death cases paid less than most serious injuries".24 The following results
were also found: patients that were 65 years old or more at the time of the accident
generally received less awards, holding injury severity constant; when more defendants
were involved, awards could be higher at verdict; having hospitals as defendants tended
to be associated with lower payments. Sloan and Hsieh do not support the claim that
compensation for medical malpractice is done randomly, nor that the increase in dam-
age awards has been very high. As the authors state, it is hard to make judgments on
the horizontal equity of payments, i.e., if patients with similar levels of injuries receive
similar payouts. Considerable dispersion was found in payments for the same levels of
injury, although it is hard to draw judgments from here. Several uncontrolled charac-
teristics might explain these differences. Eventually the use of a more detailed injury
severity scale would imply less dispersion in the results for awards. Generally, courts
lack objective criteria to quantify noneconomic loss and punitive damages which might
24Sloan and Hsieh (1990), p. 1008.
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create inequities with respect to awards.
While studying data for Florida, Vidmar et al. (2005) assess that there was a consid-
erable increase in the mean and median of payments since 1991: in 2003 real dollars,
the mean (median) payment was $176,603 ($48,517) in 1990, while it was $300,280
($150,000) in 2003. This increase was accompanied by an enlargement in injury sever-
ity. In 2003, claims referring to permanent major disability, permanent grave disability
and death accounted for 45,4% of paid claims. The same type of claims accounted for
32,8% in 1990. Vidmar and co-authors find 801 claims from 1990 to 2003 that involved
a payout over $1,000,000.
Black et al. (2005) examine medical malpractice claims in Texas, from 1988 until
2002. Total payouts to patients were roughly constant over time (and near $515 mil-
lion in 2002). During the 2000-2002 period the mean (median) payout was equal to
$351,000 ($134,000) per claim (considering payouts over $25,000 in real 1988 dol-
lars, covered by medical liability insurance). If the analysis focuses on large payments
only, there were 761 claims involving a payout over $1,000,000 from 1988 to 2002.
Although these claims account for only 4.9% of paid claims over $10,000 (the total
number of claims was 15,578), they represented 42.1% of dollar payments (i.e., they
involved a payout of $1,763 million, and the total payout for all claims was $4,185
million).25
Fenn et al. (2000) analyze all negligent claims arising from treatment in Oxfordshire
Health Authority (includes data on one major hospital, several general / acute hospitals,
and some specialist units) from 1974 to 1998. On average, approximately 30% of
claims had a positive payout. The mean payment of claims was highly volatile: in 1996
the mean payout was £4,000 and in 1993 it was £50,000.
Comparisons of compensation awards are difficult to make. As pointed out by some
studies, several variables might explain differences among patients. Moreover, the cases
that end up receiving a positive award might have significant different characteristics
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Still, what empirical studies have generally shown is
that there is no evidence of skyrocketing compensation amounts in medical malpractice
cases; when plaintiffs go to court or appeal, the probability of compensation is generally
lower but, in case of compensation, awards tend to be higher; compensation amounts
25When looking at a broader dataset that includes zero-payment claims, it is possible to see that approxi-
mately 81% of claims were closed with no payout. The authors mention that this result might overstate the
number of zero-payout claims because in this dataset some incidents involve several defendants. No ex-
tensive analysis is made on zero-payout claims because the Texas Department of Insurance collects limited
data on this type of claims.
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tend to increase with injury levels up to permanent grave injury (cases involving death
usually receive lower payouts than these cases). When it comes to the claim that dam-
ages quantification is random, results are not always clear. On the one hand, there
seems to be evidence that courts might not offer an indication of how to compute dam-
ages (i.e., neither when judges themselves must make a computation nor when juries
are asked to do so). On the other hand, evidence does not seem to lend support to the
argument that setting awards is entirely random. Viscusi (2004) finds that, when jurors
must set pain and suffering damages, "jurors do not simply multiply the compensatory
award by some factor, such as 1.5. The pain and suffering compensation is greater for
accidents in which there is a larger economic damages amount, but the elasticity of the
responsiveness of pain and suffering damages to the compensatory damages amount is less
than one".26
3.3 The SSCMMD for Awards
We use the Spanish Supreme Court Medical Malpractice Dataset (SSCMMD) that in-
cludes decisions from 2006 until 2009. A detailed explanation of this dataset is pro-
vided in the previous chapter. We are interested in assessing if there are case char-
acteristics that influence the probability of a positive payout (or even if there is any
variable that might be associated with a zero payout). Moreover, we also want to as-
sess if there are differences in compensation levels. As previous literature has shown,
we can expect to find a vertical inequality on compensation awards, which is plausible:
patients suffering higher severity injuries should receive higher damages (normally up
to the highest level of injury, excluding death. Cases involving death tend to receive
lower damages than cases involving a permanent serious injury, such as quadriplegia).
What we should expect, in case horizontal equity holds, is that patients with similar
characteristics and suffering similar levels of injury should receive equivalent levels of
damages.
3.3.1 Description of the Data for Compensation
The SSCMMD provides information for several variables of interest. We add in this
chapter a description of those variables that are related to compensation, but that did
not play a role for reversal rates (i.e., for the previous chapter). While inspecting
Supreme Court decisions, we included a variable that specifies how much the plain-
26Viscusi (2004), p. 12.
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tiff asked to the court for damages. A variable for the award decided by the court
was added as well. All financial variables are in 2009 real euros. A dummy variable
SCHEDULED DAMAGES accounts for the use of scheduled table damages when the court
calculated the indemnity amount.
3.3.2 Data Limitations
We face important data limitations, some of them already described in the previous
chapter. We include here some of the limitations for variables related to compensation
levels.27
Indemnity amount: In 4 cases it was not possible to recover the indemnity amount
that the patient was entitled to receive. In these cases, the Supreme Court remitted the
case to the lower court in order to set the amount of compensation. We believe that
this is not a serious problem, given the reduced number of cases in which it holds (i.e.,
4 cases out of 129 that had a positive payout).
Compensation Request: When patients go to court, they typically ask for an amount
that should compensate them for the harm suffered. In 49 cases out of 256 we could not
recover the compensation asked by the patient. The lack of this information should not
pose a problem though: the amount that patients asked for might reflect some strategic
behavior that we can not explain from the data we have.
Injury Severity Levels: Injury severity levels had to be grouped in four categories.
Although the initial idea was to have 9 different levels of harm, in some decisions it
was not possible to make a precise distinction between all the 9 levels. Therefore,
we opted for grouping them into four levels. In one case, the patient decided not to
present any evidence regarding the injury severity. The Supreme Court did not award
compensation in this case.
Calculation of Payout: In case patients are entitled to receive compensation, a final
award must be set. When the Supreme Court decision does not present a calculation
for payouts, there are two possibilities: courts did not make any calculation,28 or some
calculation was made but the decision does not show it. It would be useful to be able to
distinguish the following: whether courts made any sort of calculation or not; in case
a calculation was made, which amount corresponds to which type of damages (such
27Please see previous chapter for a description of data limitations not necessarily related to compensa-
tion awards.
28Which is possible and actually holds for some decisions. For instance, in some cases the decision refers
that the plaintiff asked a certain amount that is reasonable and therefore that amount should be granted.
No calculation is presented, but it is clear that no calculation was made.
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as damages for pain and suffering, economic losses, medical expenses). Given that we
want to assess differences in compensation amounts of cases appealed to the Supreme
Court, it would be more accurate to have a full description of these variables.
However, there are good reasons to believe that this situation is not problematic
in our case: to start with, and given the organization of the Spanish National Health
System and Social Security, cases of loss of income can be supported by social security.
Moreover, there are decisions in which the Supreme Court does not consider loss of
income because the patient did not have a permanent working contract at the time
of the accident, even though he was working at that time. With respect to medical
expenses, social security will also have a role in these cases and the National Health
System will provide treatment for the patients. Generally speaking, in the SSCMMD,
when courts set an amount for medical expenses one of the concerns is with the need
of a person to take care of the patient, in case the patient is in a situation that does not
allow him to take care of himself. Another concern is in case some changes will have
to be done at the patient’s house so that a wheelchair can be used. All these reasons
together provide a good support of the claim that the majority of damages are for pain
and suffering and not for loss of income or medical expenses. We are not arguing that
strong conclusions can be drawn as if this argument were to hold for each case, but it
seems to be reasonable.
3.3.3 Data Description
Table 3.1 provides information on the total number of cases decided by the Administra-
tive and Civil Chambers of the Spanish Supreme Court, according to the level of harm. A
total of 52% of cases arriving at the Supreme Court involved the highest levels of harm
(permanent major injuries or death). The Civil Chamber analyzed a higher proportion
of cases involving death while the Administrative Chamber decided a higher proportion
of cases involving permanent major injuries.29 In both Chambers, the proportion of
cases involving zero payouts was very similar: 50% for administrative decisions and
49% for civil decisions. Approximately 66% of the claims involving a permanent major
harm received compensation, followed by permanent minor cases with 47% and death
cases with 42%.
Descriptive statistics for non-zero payout claims are provided in Table 3.2. Claims
involving the highest levels of harm (permanent major injury and death) account for
29We performed Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for the equality of distributions with respect to the levels of
harm. No statistically significant differences on the distribution of cases decided by Administrative or Civil
Chambers were found.
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Table 3.1: SC decisions on Med Mal (Paid vs. Unpaid, by Level of Harm)
Temporary Permanent Permanent
Death Total
Emotional Minor Major
Adm.
Paid
Unpaid
Percentage Paid (%)
1
7
12.5
26
33
44.1
40
22
64.5
11
16
40.7
78
78
50
Civil
Paid
Unpaid
Percentage Paid (%)
5
6
45.5
22
21
51.2
13
6
68.4
11
15
42.3
51
49
51
NOTE: The total number of decisions at the Civil Chamber was 100. However, in one case the patient did
not provide information on the harm suffered. For that reason we only have 99 decisions when we consider
decisions by level of harm.
58% of the total number of paid claims but 82% of the total euro payout. At the
Administrative Chamber these decisions account for 65% of paid claims and 84% of
euro payout while at the Civil Chamber these values were respectively 47% and 77%.
Consistent with previous empirical results, we find that patients suffering a permanent
grave harm are those receiving the highest amount of compensation, even comparing
to cases involving death.
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics for Non-Zero Payout Decisions (2009 €)
Harm N. of % of Total % of Mean Median
Level Claims Total Payout Total Payout Payout
Adm.
Temp. Emot.
Perm. Minor
Perm. Major
Death
All Levels
1
26
40
11
78
1.3
33.3
51.3
14.1
100
18,051
2,628,498
11,707,146
2,054,213
16,407,908
0.1
16
71.4
12.5
100
18,051
101,096
292,679
186,747
210,358
18,051
75,493
269,766
163,237
172,957
Civil
Temp. Emot.
Perm. Minor
Perm. Major
Death
All Levels
5
21
12
11
49
10.2
42.9
24.5
22.4
100
185,546
1,285,695
4,035,691
929,342
6,436,274
2.9
20
62.7
14.4
100
37,109
61,224
336,308
84,486
131,353
40,533
46,324
279,897
81,618
71,111
Before making comparisons between the two Chambers of the Supreme Court, one
variable that should be taken into consideration is the decision of awarding compen-
sation due to a loss of a chance, which necessarily implies lower awards than those
considered as full compensation. Asymmetric information models in litigation rely on
the fact that the amount of damages is actually known by both parties but the doctor
has more information with respect to the evidence of negligence. This does not hold
in case of loss of a chance: when courts award damages under the loss of a chance
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argument, the doctor is liable but the patient will receive damages corresponding to
the loss of a chance in recovery. The court will estimate the probability of recovery in
case the doctor would not have been negligent and uses it to assess the final amount
of compensation. Although this probability tends to be grounded on medical evidence,
there is more uncertainty involved with respect to the overall compensation amount,
in the sense that first a calculation must be done for the harm, and subsequently for
the probability of recovery. However, it is possible to overcome the uncertainty over
causation.30
Instead of looking at descriptive statistics per level of injury we can also group pay-
outs in different categories and see which harm levels received awards within those
categories. We can see these results in Table 3.3, that groups payouts in 5 categories:
very small payout (lower than €10,000); small payout (€10,001-25,000); medium
payout (€25,001-100,000); large payout (€100,001-250,000); and very large payout
(> €250,000). We should expect to find lower injury cases receiving smaller payouts
and no large payouts being awarded to these cases. In the same line of reasoning, cases
involving higher levels of injury and being fully compensated (i.e., excluding loss of a
chance cases) should be associated with the highest payouts levels. This means that
we should not find a temporary emotional injury receiving a high level of payout, in
the same way that we should not find cases involving death or permanent major injury
cases receiving a low payout. We find no striking results, but some remarks can be
made. For instance, cases arriving at the Civil Chamber seem to be more consistent
in terms of attribution of awards, in the sense that, in general, higher levels of com-
pensation were granted to cases involving permanent major injuries or death. High
payouts were not attributed to cases involving minor injuries, and there were no pay-
outs below €10,000. At the Administrative Chamber there was one permanent minor
case receiving more than€250,000 as payout, and a permanent major case getting less
than €25,000. We shall consider that these differences can be a reflexion of the way
injuries are categorized.31
Figure 3.1 allows getting a better idea of compensation amounts in cases arriving
at the Administrative and Civil Chambers of the Spanish Supreme Court.32 We should
30See Visscher (2009), 6.15, p. 176. For uncertainty over causation see, for instance, Ben-Shahar
(2009), 3.7.
31For instance, the permanent minor injury case that received more than €250,000 was a case in which
a woman lost the possibility of having children due to negligence. The court decided that a high level
of damages for pain and suffering should be awarded: this woman never had a child and, because of a
negligent medical treatment, she lost her capacity to conceive a child.
32This box-plot allows us to see the following summary statistics for the four groups of injury severity (by
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Table 3.3: Payout Levels by Injury Severity (Excludes Loss of a Chance)
<10,000€ 10,001-25,000€ 25,001-100,000€ 100,001-250,000€ >250,001€
Harm N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean
Adm.
Temp. Emot. 0 0 1 18,051 0 0 0 0 0 0
Perm. Minor 2 2,882 1 10,882 7 55,153 11 167,117 1 275,191
Perm. Major 0 0 1 24,109 3 44,305 14 173,720 20 436,322
Death 0 0 0 0 2 46,954 3 164,190 3 318,328
All Levels 2 2,882 3 17,680 12 51,074 28 170,105 24 414,859
Civil
Temp. Emot. 0 0 2 17,561 3 50,141 0 0 0 0
Perm. Minor 0 0 1 23,161 12 54,034 3 143,335 0 0
Perm. Major 0 0 0 0 2 72,381 4 158,483 6 542,833
Death 0 0 0 0 5 67,280 4 119,284 0 0
All Levels 0 0 3 19,428 22 58,182 11 140,098 6 542,833
NOTE: When we include loss of chance cases, we have the following differences with respect to this table: for <€10,000
payouts, 3 Administrative cases with mean 4,921€; for €10,001-25,000 payouts, 5 cases with mean €17,738 for
Administrative; for €25,001-100,000, 15 Administrative cases with mean €52,158 and 26 Civil cases with mean
€56,067 ; for €100,001-250,000 payouts, 29 Administrative cases with mean €168,233 and 12 Civil cases with mean
€138,440; for >€250,001, 26 Administrative decisions with mean €409,359.
not forget that we are looking at payouts by harm level, but several other variables
do play a role when awarding compensation. Nevertheless, some comparisons can be
made although at this stage these are only crude comparisons. For both chambers,
the highest dispersion33 is present for cases involving a permanent major injury. Ex-
cluding cases of loss of a chance, awards could be as low as €24,109 and as high
as €704,756 at the Administrative Chamber; and as low as €57,904 and as high as
€1,017,263 at the Civil Chamber.34 The remaining injury levels have higher volatility
if reaching Administrative courts.35 Moreover, it seems that appealed cases involving
death receive lower payouts in the civil jurisdiction: the median payout at the Ad-
ministrative Chamber (€171,618) is higher than the maximum at the Civil Chamber
(€143,679).36 The biggest differences between Chambers seem to be for cases in-
volving permanent minor injuries (22 administrative decisions and 18 civil decisions
excluding loss of a chance cases) and death (8 administrative decisions and 9 civil de-
chamber): the minimum (left-hand whisker), the lower quartile (left line of the box), the median (central
line of the box), the upper quartile (right line of the box), and the maximum (right-hand whisker).
33I.e., the difference between the maximum and minimum values.
34This is the maximum payout awarded in the SSCMMD. It was a case involving serious negligence
during a delivery of a baby, who suffered severe brain damage.
35We are excluding loss of a chance cases. Temporary/emotional cases are excluded from these con-
siderations as well, given that only one case of this type received a positive payout at the Administrative
Chamber.
36This difference also holds if we consider the mean payout at the Administrative Chamber for cases
involving death, which was €192,683.
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cisions excluding loss of a chance cases): for the first type of injury, the mean (median)
was €114,372 (€108,641) at the Administrative Chamber and €61,308 (€49,830)
at the Civil Chamber; for the later injury type, the mean (median) was respectively
€192,683 (€171,618) and €90,393 (€81,618). Excluding cases involving temporary
/ emotional injury (given that they are only 6 in total), we can see that mean and
median payouts were higher for permanent minor and death cases at the Administra-
tive Chamber. Cases involving permanent major injuries have higher mean and median
payouts at the Civil Chamber.37
Figure 3.1: Payouts per Harm Level
NOTE: Excludes loss of a chance and one case with payout higher than €1,000,000 (Civil Chamber, permanent
major injury case).
While inspecting Supreme Court’s decisions from 2006 until 2009, we did not find
a clear and homogeneous rule for calculating the amount of damages that patients
were entitled to receive. We found different ways of attributing payouts, which could
be in one of the following ways: (i) scheduled damages were followed to quantify
awards, although only a final award appears in the decision; (ii) scheduled damages
were followed to quantify awards, and each level of harm was clearly translated into
points according to the table; (iii) courts set an overall award without providing an
explanation or set a total amount presenting as motivation that "it is believed to be a
reasonable amount given the situation"; (iv) courts do not use scheduled damage tables
but attribute a different value to different types of damages (e.g., pain and suffering,
costs for making changes at home because now the patient must use a wheelchair).
The heterogeneity in setting compensation amounts is true for cases appealed to the
37Remember the figure excludes loss of a chance cases and a case with payout higher than €1,000,000.
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Civil and Administrative Chambers. There is the possibility that courts might make
calculations to quantify damages but that does not appear in the decision. For this
reason, the only variable we were able to include when it comes to quantification of
damages was a dummy variable for the use of scheduled damages, since courts do
mention when they are using it or not.
The vast majority of plaintiffs going to court specified the amount of damages they
were expecting to recover from defendants. In a very limited number of cases, the
plaintiff reserved that consideration to the court. No serious analysis based on this
variable should be made given that, as previously mentioned, it might simply reflect
plaintiffs’ strategic behavior. Still, it is worth noticing how plaintiffs are performing
when setting their own payout. Plaintiffs tend to ask higher amounts of compensation
than those awarded by courts.38 On average, plaintiffs tend to make more accurate
award predictions for cases involving higher injury levels. Notice that courts do not
award higher damages than those requested by the plaintiff. For this reason, plaintiffs
might have a tendency to exaggerate in the amounts they request.39
3.4 Empirical Strategy and Results
In this section we present various regression analyses which aim to assess if there are
any case characteristics that might have an impact on the probability of receiving com-
pensation.40 Subsequently, we analyze awards received by plaintiffs. If compensation
awards are fairly set, there should be horizontal equity in payments with respect to
the level of harm. In other words, patients suffering similar injuries should receive
comparable payouts (some case specific characteristics might have a role, which makes
very unlikely to find exactly equal compensation amounts). Therefore, being a male vs.
being a female, going to civil courts vs. going to administrative courts, coming from
poorer regions vs. coming from richer regions should have no impact on compensation
38This is true even if we exclude cases in which the award was exactly the same as the requested amount,
given that these cases drive the statistics up. A total of 14 administrative decisions received a payout equal
to the requested amount, whereas there were 10 civil decisions of this type.
39Although our aim is not to explain how plaintiffs set compensation requests and how do courts react,
we might anticipate that the best strategy is for plaintiffs to make a reasonable calculation. They might
receive lower awards in case they set a too low request (because courts do not exceed requests), but the
same might happen in case the plaintiff asks for an outrageous and unreasonable award, considering that
courts can react by setting lower payouts.
40No claim will be made with respect to courts’ ability of making correct or incorrect decisions. As stated
previously, it is impossible to have such a variable in our dataset. See the previous chapter for reasons to
rely on Supreme Court decisions as the closest to a correct decision.
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Table 3.4: Differences between Compensation Requests and Payouts (Paid Claims only, Ex-
cludes Loss of a Chance)
Harm Type of Claims Request/Payout Request/Payout Request–Payout Request–Payout
Level Mean % Median % Mean € Median €
Adm.
Temp. Emot. All Claims . . . .
(Request6=Payout) . . . .
Perm. Minor All Claims 47.4 37.5 -165,212 -152,355
(Request6=Payout) (33.4) (30.0) (-209,268) (-215,93)
Perm. Major All Claims 52.8 40.8 -398,51 -289,669
(Request6=Payout) (39.3) (34.7) (-512,37) (-446,051)
Death All Claims 61.7 67.4 -151,51 -159,237
(Request6=Payout) (49.0) (55.0) (-202,013) (-239,143)
All Levels All Claims 52.3 41.6 -296,785 -221,464
(Request6=Payout) (38.7) (33.3) (-381,581) (-275,345)
Civil
Temp. Emot. All Claims 55.2 53.7 -31,221 -32,648
(Request6=Payout) (44.0) (46.9) (-39,026) (-37,418)
Perm. Minor All Claims 61.9 68.6 -61,999 -31,847
(Request6=Payout) (46.6) (39.8) (-86,799) (-60,542)
Perm. Major All Claims 62.8 67.3 -333,005 -142,997
(Request6=Payout) (50.3) (50.3) (-444,007) (-159,237)
Death All Claims 64.8 57.3 -78,93 -67,267
(Request6=Payout) (47.2) (50.8) (-118,394) (-77,072)
All Levels All Claims 61.9 60.5 -122,181 -50,148
(Request6=Payout) (47.2) (47.2) (-169,173) (-77,603)
NOTE: Request/Payout is the percentage of damages that the plaintiff recovered with respect to the damages requested.
Request-Payout is the amount of damages requested by the plaintiff minus the amount of payout. We present results
for all claims excluding loss of a chance and for claims in which the requested damages were equal to the payout.
amounts. However, the tort system should provide vertical inequity: patients suffer-
ing higher levels of injury should receive higher damages than patients suffering lower
injury levels.
3.4.1 Methodology
The "Zeroes Problem" is commonly found in award data, which is typically composed by
a substantial fraction of zero observations and a skewed positive outcome.41 Our aim
is to detect predictors of a positive award and to investigate, within those cases that
received a payout, how compensation levels are set. We will use two methodologies
(Two-Part model and Heckman model) and compare the results they provide.
We start by estimating a Two-Part model, as reported in equations (1.a) and (1.b).
The fist part (selection equation (1.a)) models the probability of receiving compensation
as a binary outcome. The second part (outcome equation (1.b)) models the amount of
41See Eisenberg et al. (2009).
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compensation for those cases in which a payout has been awarded.42 Let CPSC43 denote
compensation amount, our dependent variable. Define the binary indicator CP such that
CP=1 if CPSC>0 (positive payout) and CP=0 if CPSC=0 (no payout). When CPSC=0,
we can only observe Pr(CP=0). For those cases with CPSC>0, let f(CPSC|CP=1) be
the conditional density of CPSC. The outcome equation is a linear regression of the
logarithm of CPSC on the set of explanatory variables, for those observations with CP
equal to one. The explanatory variables are: plaintiff ’s characteristics (level of harm
suffered, age at the time of the accident, gender); defendant’s characteristics (individual
practitioner or institution, type of hospital (public or private), doctor’s specialty); case
characteristics (administrative or civil, time of the accident, lower court decision’s date,
before or after 1998 reform, loss of a chance doctrine, use of scheduled damages);
economic variables (logarithm of regional GDP per capita).44 The Two-Part model for
compensation can be written in the following way:
f (C PSC |X ) =
 Pr(CP = 0|X ) if C PSC = 0 (1.a)Pr(CP = 1|X ) f (C PSC |CP = 1, X ) if C PSC > 0 (1.b)
A critical assumption of the Two-Part model is the independence of the two equa-
tions ((1.a) and (1.b)) which implies that, after controlling for covariates, those cases
with an award are randomly selected from the population of cases. If this assump-
tion does not hold, the results from the second-stage regression (provided by equation
(1.b)) suffer from selection bias. Therefore, the second methodology consists in using
the Heckman selection model45 that allows for possible dependence in the two stages.
According to this model, which is close in spirit to the Two-Part model, a selection re-
gression is performed first (for the probability of receiving an award) followed by the
outcome equation (for the amount of compensation). For more robust identification
we should impose a valid exclusion restriction. In other words, we should have a valid
instrument in the sense that it is relevant in the selection equation but it should not
influence the outcome variable. In our problem, the variable DEFENDANT APPEAL can
42As widely recognized in the literature, this departure from the classical Tobit approach has the strength
of allowing two different precesses: determining the decision of awarding compensation and determin-
ing its magnitude. Moreover, the Two-Part model is preferable to the Tobit since the homoskedasticity
and normality hypotheses are not necessary conditions for consistency of the estimator (see for example
Cameron and Trivedi 2005).
43Which stands for "Compensation Supreme Court".
44All financial variables are in 2009 prices.
45See Heckman (1979).
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have an impact on the probability of compensation but it does not affect payout levels
directly. The reasoning underlying is that when the defendant appeals to the Supreme
Court, it means that the lower court decided that the defendant was negligent and the
patient should be compensated. Although there are decisions reversed by the Supreme
Court, the majority of these decisions were not reversed.46 Thus, having the defendant
appealing to the Supreme Court increases the probability of receiving compensation
(because in general the Supreme Court agrees with the previous court decision which
was, in this case, to attribute compensation) but this variable does not have any impact
on the amount of compensation that plaintiffs receive. We obtain the same results in
case we use the variable PLAINTIFF APPEAL instead, although the coefficient is negative.47
3.4.2 Results
Table 3.5 reports the estimated coefficients for 2 different specifications for the Two-Part
and for the Heckman models.48 Under both specifications, having a defendant appeal-
ing the case or suffering a permanent major level of harm increases in a statistically
significant way the probability of receiving compensation. When the defendant appeals
(DEFENDANT APPEAL =1), the probability of receiving compensation is between 78% and
83% higher than when the plaintiff appeals. Notice that this makes our exclusion re-
striction in the Heckman model robust since DEFENDANT APPEAL is a strong predictor of
receiving an award (but it does not influence the amount of compensation).49 Patients
suffering a PERMANENT MAJOR level of harm have a higher probability of receiving com-
pensation with respect to patients suffering TEMPORARY/EMOTIONAL injury (36% to 38%
higher). DEATH cases seem to increase the probability of compensation in 28% but only
under specification 2 and at a low significance level.
The value of λ for specifications 1 and 2 is statistically significant, even though
at a low level of significance (p-values are respectively 0.094 and 0.072). This means
we cannot reject the possibility that selection bias might be present. Therefore, we
should rely more on the results given by the Heckman model although, as we can see
46We found in the previous chapter that the agreement rate was 72% for administrative decisions and
88% for civil decisions.
47The coefficients are not symmetric because in 10 cases both the defendant and plaintiff appealed.
In case we use as instrument PLAINTIFF APPEAL, ONLY PLAINTIFF APPEAL or ONLY DEFENDANT APPEAL, the
regression results are similar.
48The results for Heckman´s selection equation are omitted because they are essentially the same as
those obtained with the Two-Part model.
49In the Appendix we present other regressions that show that DEFENDANT APPEAL does not have an
impact on the amount of compensation.
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Table 3.5: Regression Results
Specification 1 Specification 2
Two-Part Heckman Two-Part Heckman
Dependent Variable CP LN(CPSC) LN(CPSC) CP LN(CPSC) LN(CPSC)
Administrative 0.184* 0.511** 0.588** -0.026 -0.111 0.123
(0.099) (0.242) (0.236) (0.212) (0.558) (0.530)
Def. Appeal 0.782*** 0.833***
(0.111) (0.120)
Male 0.051 -0.071 -0.108 0.070 -0.059 -0.087
(0.072) (0.176) (0.170) (0.077) (0.182) (0.169)
Permanent Minor 0.220 0.690 0.633 0.252 0.518 0.448
(0.155) (0.443) (0.425) (0.161) (0.463) (0.428)
Permanent Major 0.360** 2.101*** 1.925*** 0.382** 1.962*** 1.794***
(0.159) (0.442) (0.435) (0.165) (0.455) (0.430)
Death 0.225 1.408*** 1.387*** 0.281* 1.201** 1.171***
(0.162) (0.469) (0.448) (0.170) (0.494) (0.455)
y2007 0.049 0.345 0.321
(0.100) (0.240) (0.223)
y2008 -0.003 0.064 0.019
(0.129) (0.302) (0.281)
y2009 -0.049 0.698** 0.740**
(0.139) (0.331) (0.308)
Pre-98 Reform 0.215* 0.314 0.145
(0.127) (0.357) (0.341)
Duration LowerCourt-SC -0.104* -0.156 -0.088
(0.057) (0.147) (0.141)
Duration Injury-SC -0.006 0.010 0.004
(0.014) (0.026) (0.025)
Loss Of Chance -0.782*** -0.732*** -0.762** -0.694**
(0.294) (0.277) (0.308) (0.279)
Other Controls
Hospital Type Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Defendant Type No No No Yes Yes Yes
Scheduled Damages No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Ln(GDPpc) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mills λ -0.365* -0.390*
(0.218) (0.217)
Observations 254 123 249 251 122 247
R-squared 0.420 0.468
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions included a constant.
Regressions (1) and (4) present coefficients in marginal effects.
Empirical Strategy and Results 104
from Table 3.5, there are no strong differences between the Two-Part model and Heck-
man. Cases arriving at the Administrative Chamber of the Spanish Supreme Court seem
to have a higher level of compensation according to Specification 1, but this result is
not robust. Cases involving permanent major injury and death receive much higher
amounts of compensation with respect to temporary/emotional injuries. Suffering a
permanent major injury increases the compensation award between 180% and 193%
if we consider the Heckman results. If we consider the Two-Part Model instead, suf-
fering a permanent major injury increases the compensation award between 196% and
210%. For cases involving death, the awards are also higher than those for patients
suffering temporary/emotional injuries, but lower than those for patients suffering per-
manent major injuries. The increase can range from 117% to 141%, depending on the
specification we consider and the methodology we use.
When courts consider that patients should be compensated under the loss of chance
doctrine, the levels of awards are considerably lower with respect to cases being fully
compensated. The reductions of payouts due to loss of a chance range from 69% to
78%. Using scheduled damages to quantify awards does not have a statistically signifi-
cant impact on payouts (the coefficient is positive).
3.4.3 Discussion of the Results
Predictors of Compensation
The regression results show that suffering a permanent major level of harm is a strong
predictor of receiving compensation. Critics of the medical malpractice liability system
argue that courts are awarding compensation to patients when there is no evidence of
negligence and that this happens mainly in those cases involving a permanent disability.
Recent empirical literature has shown that, even if the tort system is not perfect in
matching merit of claims and outcomes, negligence matters to predict outcomes and the
system is able to eliminate frivolous claims.50 Although we found that higher levels of
harm are strong predictors of receiving payouts, we cannot claim anything with respect
to the correctness of the Spanish Supreme Court in judging medical malpractice cases.
In fact, we do not have any variable that allows checking for negligence. However, we
can add that from those cases involving a permanent major level of harm, the Spanish
Supreme Court refused compensation in approximately one third of cases: from the 62
50Rosenblatt and Hurst (1989), Cheney et al. (1989), Farber and White (1991), Sloan and Hsieh (1990),
Taragin et al. (1992), Sloan et al. (1993), Farber and White (1994), Baker (2005b) and Studdert and Mello
(2007).
105 Compensation in Medical Malpractice Cases
(19) cases arriving at the Administrative (Civil) Chamber, compensation was refused to
22 (6) cases. As for cases involving death, from the 27 (26) Administrative (Civil) cases,
compensation was denied in 16 (15) of them. Therefore, suffering a high severity injury
is not a sufficient condition to receive compensation. As we can see from the above, not
all cases involving permanent major harm or death are compensated.
Cases in which the defendant appeals seem to have a higher probability of receiving
compensation. The reason why this is happening is because the Supreme Court tends to
agree with previous courts decisions. In fact, as we saw in Chapter 2, the overall agree-
ment rate at the Supreme Court was 78%. Having the defendant appealing the case
means that the previous court decided that the defendant acted wrongfully and should
pay damages. Since the agreement rate is high, DEFENDANT APPEAL is a strong positive
predictor of receiving compensation. Notice that the same happens when we include
PLAINTIFF APPEAL instead, although this is a strong negative predictor of receiving com-
pensation. The reasoning is that when the plaintiff appeals, it means that the previous
court refused compensation. And again, since overall the Supreme Court tends to agree
with previous decisions, having the plaintiff appealing to the Supreme Court decreases
the probability of receiving a payout.
After controlling for several covariates we found that having cases being judged at
the Administrative Chamber of the Supreme Court does not influence the probability of
receiving compensation. The same holds for the type of hospital (private or public) and
type of defendant (individual or institution).
Amount of Compensation
When studying levels of awards we did not find evidence of significant differences
between the Administrative and Civil Chambers (the only statistically significant results
were not robust to different specifications). Therefore, generally speaking, we cannot
claim that administrative and civil courts tend to award different compensation levels
to victims of medical negligence, controlling for case characteristics.
We find that, consistent with previous literature, patients suffering a permanent ma-
jor level of harm are those receiving higher payouts, even comparing to cases involving
death. Suffering a permanent major harm implies that, on average, the level of dam-
ages can be up to 62% higher than those cases involving death.51 Therefore, a vertical
inequity in payments according to the level of harm is present in our data, but this is
51These results are from regression analysis in which the baseline group was DEATH instead of
TEMP/EMOTIONAL.
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reasonable: patients suffering more serious injuries should be those receiving higher
awards.
Loss of a chance decreases the amount of compensation, as expected. On average,
patients might receive less than 70% of the correspondent full level of compensation.
If this assessment is correct, patients involved in loss of a chance cases had a recovery
chance of 30%, on average.
One interesting question is if the use of scheduled damages has any effect on the
level of payouts. Moreover, in case any impact is found, in which direction does it
go: does it increase or reduce compensation levels, in comparison with those cases
in which courts do not use scheduled damages. Although we did not have any prior
guess for the coefficient on scheduled damages, we do find that this variable is not
important. Therefore, from our data we cannot claim that the use of scheduled damages
can decrease or increase the amount of compensation received by plaintiffs. Generally
speaking, the use of scheduled damages has the advantage of setting compensation
levels in a more consistent and predictable way, leaving less discretion for courts when
they must come up with a calculation. When courts award compensation to patients,
one natural concern is in terms of fairness and prediction of awards. The essential
idea is that patients suffering the same level of harm should receive similar amounts
of compensation, i.e., we should find an horizontal equity in payments according to
the level of harm. When looking at Supreme Court decisions (which generally include
references to the lower court’s decision on the same case) we did not find a consistent
and systematic way of setting awards by courts. This can be problematic in the sense
that patients cannot predict how much they can recover in terms of compensation, not
even by looking at similar cases. This unpredictability might also result in a loss of
deterrence52 if defendants believe that they might have to pay less for the harm they
caused. Nevertheless, it is hard to make judgments in terms of horizontal equity of
awards. Although Figure 3.1 seems to point to a high dispersion of payouts by harm
level, regression results do not support it. Several other variables might play a role.
Besides, we have an injury severity scale with 4 levels, which means that we could
eventually obtain a lower dispersion with a more detailed scale.
According to the Spanish legal system, the amount of compensation is generally set
by lower courts. The Supreme Court might change the amount of compensation only
if there are reasons to believe that the amount was clearly unreasonable.53 Therefore,
52It would be interesting to assess the effect on deterrence, although we cannot study it with the data
we have.
53This happened in a total of 7 cases: 3 corresponding to a permanent minor injury, 2 to a permanent
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when we study Supreme Court’s decisions in terms of compensation, there is a strong
component which is related to the way lower courts set the amount of compensation.
For instance, if the lower court decided that the patient was entitled to receive com-
pensation, then the lower court must set the amount of damages. Therefore, if this
case is appealed to the Supreme Court and there is an agreement with the previous
decision, the Supreme Court tends to agree as well with the award that was previously
set. In case the lower court denied compensation to the patient and this decision is re-
versed by the Supreme Court, then the amount of damages will have to be calculated.
This happened in a total of 44 cases: 35 by the Administrative Chamber and 9 by the
Civil Chamber. When setting the level of awards for these cases, the Supreme Court
did not refer to scheduled damages in any decision. Therefore, at least with respect to
the use/no use of scheduled damages, consistency can be found at the Supreme Court
level. However, there is a reduced number of decisions in which this happened, which
means that we cannot draw strong conclusions from here.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we studied predictors of compensation for medical malpractice cases
arriving at the Spanish Supreme Court. The level of harm is an important predictor,
but no confrontation can be made with the evidence of negligence. Additionally, we
investigate levels of compensation for the subset of cases in which a positive payout
was awarded. Patients suffering a permanent major injury are those receiving higher
awards, even when comparing to those cases involving death. Therefore, we found
vertical inequality of awards by level of harm, as it should be. However, it is harder
to draw conclusions with respect to horizontal equity of payments, which should be
found if courts attribute fair compensation to patients. From our regression analysis, we
find some consistent results, namely the following: there is no statistically significant
difference between Administrative and Civil decisions; coming from poorer or richer
regions of Spain is not relevant; patient’s gender is not relevant neither.
The quantification of damages for physical injury and death is a difficult task. When
a patient has been negligently injured and the tort system delivers a correct outcome
by forcing the defendant to compensate for the harm caused, a calculation must nec-
essarily be made. Having a consistent way of quantifying damages is important, but
compensating patients properly is important as well. We find that, generally speaking,
major injury, and 2 to cases involving death. All of them were appealed to the Administrative Chamber
and all payouts were increased.
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Spanish lower courts do not seem to be consistent in setting awards. At the Supreme
Court, the consistency we find is that scheduled damages are not used to calculate pay-
outs. Overall, when patients suffer a medical accident, courts use different forms to
quantify damages.
Chapter 4
Monitoring Medical Malpractice
Claims1
4.1 Introduction
Patient safety is currently in the agenda of several national governments.2 In the last
years, some initiatives have been taken at the international level3 as well, with the aim
of preventing harm to patients during treatment and care. A negligently injured patient
might present a claim against the health care provider with the aim of being compen-
sated for the economic loss, pain and suffering,4 and hoping eventually that the claim
will have some deterrent effect. In several European countries, health care is mainly
provided by a public national health system5 which means that if a patient harmed in
a public hospital succeeds in a claim against the hospital, national health expenditures
increase because the State takes part in the litigation process.6 This poses a problem in
a context of increasing national health expenditures and public debt, which is the case
1Significant parts of this chapter are from Amaral-Garcia and Grembi (2011b).
2The report "To Err is Human" by the Institute of Medicine (Kohn et al. (2000)) might have helped
governments to become aware of the problem. According to the estimates, there are more people dying in
the U.S. due to medical errors than from breast cancer, motor vehicle accidents or AIDS.
3Namely by the World Health Organization or the European Commission. On May 24, 2006 a Recom-
mendation Rec (2006) 7 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on "management of patient safety
and prevention of adverse events in health care" has been done. It provides general guidelines for state
members on those matters.
4Punitive damages are also an important variable especially in the American context. They are not
allowed in Italy. See Scarso (2009) for a description of the type of damages that can be awarded in Italy.
5For instance, Italy, Spain, France and Portugal, to name only a few. In these countries, private health
care providers can co-exist with the public health care providers, but public providers supply the majority
of health care. We will present a more detailed explanation about the Italian case.
6We can think of several costs: extra medical care due to the harm suffered; costs of compensation;
legal costs in case the patient decides to file a lawsuit.
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in Italy.7 The Italian government must deal with rising health expectancy,8 higher costs
of medical care given new technologies,9 but also the costs of medical negligence.10
Insurance plays a crucial role in this setting, although the impact on behavior is not
straightforward: on the one hand, insured physicians might have distorted incentives11
to provide standard care which can be translated in higher costs for the hospital if pa-
tients present a claim and prevail; on the other hand, insured physicians might not
feel so compelled to engage in defensive medicine behaviors, avoiding costs with un-
necessary tests and treatments. This might be relevant in the Italian context, where
physicians face the highest number of criminal proceedings for medical malpractice
among European countries.12
Medical liability insurance involves several risks13 and its consequences are hard to
predict. Over time, medical technology and practice evolve, and the medical legal sys-
tem can change as well. In Italy, insuring for medical liability has been seen as a prob-
lem: the government, health care units and medical practitioners refer to an increase
in the number of claims; to rising premiums especially for obstetricians/gynecologists,
surgeons, orthopedics and anesthetists; to difficulties in finding insurance; and to many
withdrawals of insurance companies.14 This list of difficulties resembles very much the
American case, widely studied in the law and economics literature.15 Still, since no
rigorous quantification for the Italian problem has been provided,16 it is hard to know
7In Italy, the national health expenditure as a percentage of gross domestic product rose from 7.3%
in 1988 to 9.5% in 2009 (OECD Health Data 2010, June 2010 - Frequently Requested Data, available
at www.oecd.org/health/healthdata). For a detailed analysis of public health expenditure in Italy, and
a description of eventual differences in OECD data with those from Istat (Italian National Institute of
Statistics), see Armeni (2010), in Italian.
8In 2007, life expectancy at birth was 78.4 years for men and 83.8 years for women (Istat). In 1999,
Italy had one of the highest percentage level of population aged more than 60 years in the world, which
was equal to 23.9% (WHO (2000), p. 158).
9For the U.S., Black et al. (2005) find that medical inflation is higher than general inflation. It was not
possible to recover such information for the Italian case.
10Although we refer especially to the Italian case, these problems are present in many other developed
countries.
11Zeiler et al. (2007).
12Traina (2009), pp. 437-438.
13Baker (2004b) groups liability insurance risk in four categories: baseline liability risk, liability devel-
opments risk, contract risk, and financing risk. Liability developments risk (i.e., "developments that change
the rate or cost of loss during the insured period") involve a high degree of uncertainty and are an important
component in medical liability insurance.
14OECD (2006).
15Recent empirical studies on the American case do not provide support of many of these claims. See,
for instance, Black et al. (2005) and Vidmar et al. (2005).
16Lack of data and information do not allow a quantitative analysis of the problem in Italy. See, for
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how serious it is in reality.
Recent decades are rich in reforms’ initiatives trying to solve the malpractice in-
surance problem. With the aim of lowering premiums and preventing an eventual
unavailability of some medical services, several American states adopted legal reforms.
Sloan (1985) classified legal reforms in three categories: i) tort modifications; ii) al-
ternatives to trial; and iii) insurance provisions. In a more recent paper, Kilgore et al.
(2006) describe some of the main reforms. Avraham (2010) provides the most detailed
dataset of tort reforms in the United States from 1980 to 2008. Most of the studies on
the impact of these reforms on insurance premiums have focused on some of the main
specialties or at the aggregated state level.
Another line of policies focuses on monitoring medical accidents. In the U.S., ini-
tiatives for monitoring and supervising medical errors were taken at the national level,
with the U.S. Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005 (Public Law 109-
41) providing a good example. With the objective of improving patient safety, this
Act creates Patient Safety Organizations (PSOs) that "create a secure environment where
clinicians and health care organizations can collect, aggregate, and analyze data, thus
identifying and reducing the risks and hazards associated with patient care and improving
quality".17 This scheme resembles somehow the American Society of Anesthesiologists
(ASA) Closed Claims Project,18 which started in 1985 by collecting information on
closed insurance claims due to anesthesia mishaps.19 After analyzing several claims
and understanding common causes of anesthesia injury, patient safety has improved
and insurance premiums have decreased.
Patients safety is also on the Italian’s government agenda. Two national policies that
aim to improve patients’ safety should come into force very soon.20 Both policies will try
to achieve their goal through monitoring: SIMES monitors medical errors, and SIMPAS
monitors insurance policies of health care providers. However, given the autonomy that
regional governments21 enjoy, some regions started to implement a monitoring system
instance, Taroni et al. (2008) - in Italian.
17Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. See http://www.pso.ahrq.gov/psos/overview.htm last
access on September 16, 2011.
18See www.asaclosedclaims.org, last access on September 16, 2011.
19Anesthesiologists were finding difficulties in obtaining insurance in some states and were paying high
premiums because they were considered a high-risk specialty, representing "only 3% of insured physicians
but 11% of total dollars paid for patient injury" (Cheney (1999), p. 552).
20We provide a more detailed description of these policies in the next section. Both of them should be
active by the beginning of 2011, but they were not.
21In Italy, the health care system went through a decentralization process and can be currently de-
fined as regionalized (although heavily centrally funded) (European Observatory on Health Care Systems,
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on medical malpractice claims.22 We use a unique dataset with financial data from
public hospitals from 2001 to 2008, in order to evaluate the effects of this monitoring
system. Although it might be too soon to judge the effectiveness of this policy, we
present data at the health care providers’ level and some preliminary evaluations.
Our study differs from previous literature in several ways: to start with, our variable
of interest is the insurance premium paid by public Italian hospitals. This is a significant
difference as most of the studies focus on insurers’ losses, which means that in those
studies the unit of analysis is the insurance company.23 Another relevant difference is
on the side that started pressuring for reforms. In the U.S., several insurance companies
pressured for liability reform laws that could limit their costs.24 In Italy, it seems that the
main concern was with patients’ safety, more than with insurers’ losses. An additional
note is worth mentioning in terms of specificities of the Italian case: although we are
assessing the impact of the changes that were implemented in an heterogeneous way
by Italian regions, tort legislation is the same for all of them. This is quite different than
what we can see in the U.S. case, for instance, where states can have different statutes
of limitations and caps for damages.
The effects of any reform can be hard to disentangle given the potential effect on a
complex set of variables which means that the interpretation of the estimation values
must be done with caution. One crucial point of our study is that the focus is to compare
regions that implemented a monitoring system on medical claims with those that did
not. Therefore, the aim is not to assess the global effect of this reform.
4.2 Impact of Reforms: Past Research
The problems found in the medical liability system have lead to several governmental
interventions in the past few decades.25 The American example is rich in examples of
tort reforms since the 1970s. In the 1980s, the most popular tort reforms held in the
U.S. limited the amount of damages awarded in cases of medical malpractice: a cap
2001). Having the provision of health care services shifted to sub-national entities took place in other NHS
countries as well, such as Spain and the UK (Fiorentini et al. (2008)).
22Until 2008, 8 regions opted for implementing a monitoring system; the remaining 13 regions did not
have such type of system.
23Other works studied the total of losses per state (as in Viscusi and Born (1995)) or premiums paid by
individual physicians (namely in specific specialties, such as those seen as the most risky and an eventual
comparison with those less risky, Sloan (1985)).
24For instance, Viscusi et al. (1993). Currently there are also several patient safety movements. See for
instance Sage (2003).
25For an overview of the insurance crisis in the U.S. see Priest (1987).
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could be set for noneconomic damages,26 punitive damages or for the overall amount
of damages.27 Several works tried to estimate the impact of legal reforms, which is
important especially if a new wave of reform is expected. Additional tort reforms have
been enacted also during the 2000s, building on the experience from previous years.28
A common and general characteristic of these reforms was the aim of reducing losses
of insurance companies, so that insurance for medical liability could be affordable and
available. As Sloan (1985) describes, "[l]egislators assumed that, if laws could reduce the
number and dollar amounts of malpractice awards, insurers would be in a better position
to predict recoveries, and therefore would maintain coverage at reasonable rates and assure
availability of malpractice insurance".29
The current literature on the impact of medical malpractice reforms is vast and
focuses on the American case. The idea is that the legislator should focus on those
reforms that are more efficient in attaining the desired outcome.30 Empirical studies
try to asses the impact of tort reforms by looking at different variables: insurers losses,
medical malpractice insurance prices, medical malpractice claims, award payments,
payouts, defensive medicine, physicians’ location and supply of health care, quality of
health care, health insurance coverage, to name a few. Recently, this literature has been
revised by a few studies.31
We focus here on the most recent or influential studies on the impact of reforms on
insurance premiums, which typically use U.S. data. The reason for doing so is because
we are not aware of studies assessing the impact of reforms of the medical monitoring
system on insurance premiums. Therefore, given that our main variable of interest is
how much hospitals are paying for insurance premiums, it seems natural to opt for
reviewing these studies. Additionally, another feature of the American case makes it
interesting for us: the heterogeneity of states in terms of policy options for medical
malpractice. As we will see in detail, there is also heterogeneity among Italian regions
with respect to the implementation of the monitoring system for medical claims.
Last, we review some studies on the impact of risk-management policies taken by
26For a discussion of the potential problems in setting a fixed upper limit on awards for pain and suffer-
ing, see Viscusi (2004).
27Viscusi and Born (1995).
28Williams and Mello (2006).
29Sloan (1985), p. 633.
30As noticed by several studies, it is hard to come up with an overall assessment of the global impact of
those reforms: the reforms might have been able to lower costs but might have resulted in lower quality
of health care, for instance. See Klick and Stratmann (2007).
31For example, Nelson III et al. (2007), US-CBO (2004). See also Mello (2006b), Figure 4, for a summary
of the main results of some studies of the impact of tort reforms.
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public national health systems. Some studies on the British NHS system are particularly
relevant for our case. The fact that the Italian NHS system was modeled on the British
NHS32 makes this analysis more significant.
4.2.1 Effect on Premiums
There have been several studies on the effect of tort reforms on insurance premiums.
Sloan (1985) estimates the effect of tort reforms in medical malpractice insurance pre-
miums during 1974-78 for three specialties: general practitioners, ophthalmologists
and orthopedic surgeons. The author finds that the reforms did not have the expected
result of lowering insurance premiums, and he presents some possible explanations,
such as the awareness of juries and potential plaintiffs of the cost consequences of mal-
practice suits and the lack of use of past experience to set future expectations on the
insurer. In 1990 the work of Sloan (1985) was extended until 1986 by Zuckerman et al.
(1990), where they find that caps on physician liability reduced short-run premiums for
general surgeons, obstetricians and general practitioners by 13%, 17% and 14% respec-
tively. The authors attribute the lack of results in Sloan (1985) to the short period of
study.
Thorpe (2004) reaches the result that states that cap noneconomic damages or
both noneconomic and economic damages have premiums 17% lower than states with-
out such caps. When the earned premiums per physician is used as dependent variable
instead, a 12% reduction in premiums is found in states with those caps. Other tort
reforms showed no impact on premiums. Danzon, Epstein and Johnson (2004) study
data on premium levels and increases by state for internists, surgeons and obstetri-
cians/gynecologists. They find that states with caps at or below $500,000 on noneco-
nomic damages had on average a 6% smaller increase in premiums than in states where
this type of cap was not imposed. Limits on total damage caps had no effect on premi-
ums, and the same holds for caps higher than $500,000 on noneconomic damages.
Extending a previous work from 1998, Viscusi and Born (2005) use the biggest
dataset until that date to study the effect of some medical malpractice reforms, espe-
cially caps on damage awards, limits on punitive damages and insurability of punitive
damages. The variables of punitive damage reform and non-insurable punitive dam-
ages33 do not have a statistically significant impact on premiums earned. On the other
hand, states not allowing punitive damages have premiums approximately 8% lower
than those states allowing punitive damages. This result is not statistically significant
32See France and Taroni (2005).
33I.e., when "punitive damages are not expressly insurable", Viscusi and Born (2005), p. 29.
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and presents a positive coefficient if the variable that accounts for the premiums in the
previous year is not included in the regression. Viscusi and Born (2005) stress the fact
that assessing the impact of these reforms on insurance premiums is hard because it
reflects the influence of both price and quantity. Moreover, insurance purchasers can
opt for different purchases, namely by changing the coverage or self-insure.34
Kilgore et al. (2006) assess the impact of the introduction of some tort law changes
on insurance premiums for three specialties, from 1991 to 2004.35 They find that
noneconomic damage caps reduced premiums for internal medicine by 17%, for obste-
tricians/gynecology by 26%, and for general surgery by 21%. They reach the result that
an increase of $100,000 in the statutory cap on noneconomic damages increased med-
ical malpractice premiums by the same exact percentage for the three specialties under
study: 3.9% increase for internal medicine, general surgery and obstetrics/gynecology.
To sum up, the majority of these studies points to a reduction in medical malpractice
premiums due to the introduction of damage caps, with caps on noneconomic damages
having generally a strong impact. The unit of analysis tends to be the state level or
individual physicians.
4.2.2 Risk Management Policies in a Public National Health System
The UK provides an interesting case-study according to which reforms were made but
the focus was not so much on legal reforms. In the UK, there was a transfer of risk from
individual physicians to NHS hospitals36 (regarding responsibility for injured patients
by NHS directly employed staff), resulting in an enterprise fault liability system. An
additional transfer of risk37 was done later in time, from NHS hospitals to a central
agency, the National Health Service Litigation Authority (NHSLA), which pools litiga-
tion risks through the Clinical Negligence Scheme for Trusts (CNST). If the CNST is able
to handle in a cost-effective way claims against hospitals and to provide risk manage-
ment guidance, the costs of medical malpractice will be reduced: the number of claims
34Viscusi and Born (2005), p. 38.
35The authors also simulate the impact of a $250,000 damage cap on noneconomic damages at the
national level.
36Fenn et al. (2004) mention that this risk transfer was motivated, among other reasons, by hospitals’
better position (in comparison with individual physicians) to institute risk management policies - at p.
F277. The authors refer to potential costs, namely because if the aim is to provide correct incentives to
deliver a standard quality of care, those causing injury should support at least some of the injury costs - p.
F278.
37Fenn et al. (2004) present two important motivations for this change: the burden for hospital man-
agement of having a decentralized system for small value claims; and because the NHSLA would be in a
better position to identify activities and procedures with a higher risk of litigation. At F278.
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will be lower and the contributions made by members are lower than the equivalent
commercial insurance premiums.38
In this ’pay-as-you-go’ scheme with unlimited cover for medical accidents suffered
by NHS patients,39 the hospitals’ level of contribution is calculated every year: a fore-
cast of the aggregate expenditures according to the expected number and value of
claims is made; subsequently, individual contributions are calculated as well, taking
into account trusts’ characteristics.40 Two additional important variables play a role
in determining member’s contribution to the scheme: claims experience and risk man-
agement standards applied by hospitals.41 If recent claims experience is considerably
different than it was expected considering the trust’s casemix, contributions can change
in a 10% range. If trusts implement certain risk management standards, discounts are
applied.42
The application of financial discounts for hospitals should provide incentives to
comply with higher levels of risk management standards, which can result in an im-
provement in patient’s safety. Fenn and colleagues (Feb 2007) assess the impact of
these financial incentives on MRSA infections,43 taking into consideration a potential
endogeneity of the risk management standards. As stated by the authors, while trying
to achieve a certain level of risk management standards, hospitals might have taken
into consideration the liability risk from this type of infection. Hospitals presenting the
highest levels of risk management standards (levels 2 and 3) showed a reduction in
hospitals’ infections, with both coefficients having negative signs. Hospitals attaining
level 3 showed the highest reduction in the infection rate (statistically significant). The
results show evidence that the financial incentives provided to hospitals to reach higher
risk management levels (especially the highest levels) can improve patients’ safety.
In 2010, the same group of scholars studied the impact of a policy shift implemented
by the NHSLA, which was the passage to a zero deductible level for all hospitals from
2002 onwards.44 This change eliminated one form of risk sharing but other forms of
38See http://www.nhsla.com/Publications/, last access on September 2011.
39See http://www.nhsla.com/Claims/, last access on September 2011.
40Several works by Fenn, Rickman, Gray and colleagues have focused on the NHSLA and CNST. For a
description of the calculation of each hospital’s contribution to the risk pool, see Fenn et. al (2007).
41See Fenn, Rickman and Gray (2007).
42There are three levels of compliance that result in three levels of discounts on CNST contributions:
level 1 (10% discount); level 2 (20% discount); and level 3 (30% discount).
43Methicillin resistant staphylococcus aureus infections.
44Before 1997 a deductible of £100,000 was compulsory; after 1997 and until 2002, hospitals would
choose their deductibles level; the deductible level was set to zero after 2002. See Fenn et al. (2010) for
further details.
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risk management were applied by the NHSLA (i.e., the financial discounts described
above). Fenn et al. (2010) study the effect of this change in hospitals’ incentives to use
diagnostic tests. The authors find that, during the period of study, the deductible level
and the higher risk management standards (levels 2 or 3) had no impact on diagnos-
tic imaging tests. Some of the possible explanations for this result might be that the
incentives provided by the NSHLA are suboptimal or that the design of the risk man-
agement standards was not properly done (additionally, if this last possibility is true, it
might show some evidence of the negative implications of having a monopoly insurer).
One important conclusion from Fenn et al. is that "certain types of patient care activity,
including the use of diagnostic tests, may be less responsive to incentives placed at the level
of the hospital by comparisons with incentives placed at the level of the clinician".45
In a 2007 study, Fenn, Rickman and Gray study the connection between deductible
levels and the use of diagnostic procedures46 in NHS hospitals before the switch to the
zero deductible level took place. Hospitals with a higher level of deductibles might face
higher expected costs from litigation which induces them to supply more diagnostic
tests. The authors reached the interesting result that hospitals with higher levels of
deductibles do not seem to react in terms of ultrasound scans and X-rays, which are
the most frequent and routine diagnostic tests. But hospitals with higher deductibles
provide more MRI scans, radio-isotopes, CT scans and fluoroscopies, which are the less
frequent diagnostic imaging tests. After controlling for activity levels and casemix, the
results suggest that hospitals with a £100,000 excess level used almost 74% more MRI
scans and more 43% CT scans than hospitals with £50,000 deductible level. The results
seem to point to the fact that hospitals do react when they expect higher litigation
costs, but additional policy implication conclusions must be drawn with caution: as the
authors state, whether additional diagnostic care leads to a better health care is beyond
the scope of their work. Still, an important message is that tort rules can be important
for improving patient’s safety, even if liability insurance exists.
45Fenn et al. (2010), p. i240.
46The authors look at frequent and routine procedures (x-rays and obstetric ultrasound scans) and to
less frequent procedures (CT scans (computerised tomography), MRI scans (magnetic resonance imaging),
radio-isotopes and fluoroscopy).
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4.3 Italian Medical Framework
4.3.1 Health Care System
The Italian National Health System47 provides universal coverage to citizens.48 Health
care is mainly provided by public entities and citizens are not allowed to opt out of the
system and search private health care only.49 The current organization and manage-
ment50 of the NHS is done at three levels: at the central level, by the national state; at
the regional level, by each region; at the local level, by population-based local health
units (LHUs)51 and public and private accredited hospitals.52
The national state defines the essential levels of services (LEAs)53 that regions are
expected to deliver to their residents and funds regional governments. The regions
are responsible, among other things, for ensuring the delivery of the health care, for
the allocation of resources to the LHUs and independent hospitals’ (IHs),54 and for the
accreditation of public and private health care. Regions are also free to deliver addi-
tional services, which might happen in the most efficient regions as they are financially
responsible for those services.55
47SSN, which stands for Servizio Sanitario Nazionale in Italian.
48Art. 32, Italian Constitution. The National Health System was enacted by Law 833/1978, pro-
viding universal coverage free of charge at the point of service. This public system is financed by
general taxation but, in addition, Local Health Units can collect funds from prescription charges.
See http://www.salute.gov.it/ministero/sezMinistero.jsp?label=principi&id=573, last access on October
2011. Scarso and Foglia (2011) describe these prescription charges as "the money which the majority of
patients are under a duty to pay for basic health services", p. 331.
49Lo Scalzo et al. (2009). Due to the existence of this universal coverage, voluntary complemen-
tary/supplementary health insurance covered 15.6% of the Italian population in 1999 (Mossialos and
Thomson (2004), p. 34). Complementary insurance covers dental care (which is included in the national
health system for specific groups only, namely children, vulnerable people or people in need for emergency
care), co-payments, non-reimbursed services, hospital per diem charge. Supplementary health insurance
allows an increased choice of providers and access to private hospitals. Health insurance purchase prac-
tices present regional differences with respect to the age of the head of the family, education, income level
and living in the north, central or eastern Italy (Lippi Bruni (2001)).
50See, for instance, France and Taroni (2005), Fiorentini et al. (2008) and Lo Scalzo et al. (2009) for a
description of the Italian health system and its evolution.
51ASL in Italian, which stand for Azienda Sanitaria Locale.
52Lo Scalzo et al. (2009), p. 17. Private health care structures might work either for the public sector or
independently. See Lo Scalzo et al. (2009), Section 4.1.2, for a detailed description. When private health
care providers meet specific requirements they can apply for accreditation in their region, which makes
them eligible for NHS reimbursements, as mentioned by Anessi Pessina et al. (2004), p. 309.
53Title V, Art. 117.m, Italian Constitution 2001’s amendment.
54AO in Italian, which stands for Azienda Ospedaliera.
55Fiorentini et al. (2008), p. 206.
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There are essentially three broad categories of public health care providers: LHUs
(Local Health Units), IHs (Independent Hospitals) and RHs (Research Hospitals). How-
ever, if a further distinction is made among IHs (between those that are teaching hospi-
tals and those that are not) we can consider four categories instead: LHUs, RHs, IHs and
THs (Teaching Hospitals).56 LHUs, IHs and THs deliver health care and enjoy financial
and decision-making autonomy. Each LHU must provide health services related to the
"prevention, care, rehabilitation and forensic medicine, ensuring health care service levels
for the entire population"57 in accordance to the levels defined by the national state.58
LHUs "provide care directly through their own facilities or through services supplied by AOs
[IHs and THs], research hospitals [RHs] and accredited private providers (acute and long-
term hospitals, diagnostic laboratories, nursing homes, outpatient specialists and GPs)".59
They operate in their geographical area and patients enroll into the health plans pro-
vided by LHUs according to their place of residence. IHs were established in 1992,60
and hospitals must comply with some requirements61 in order to acquire the statue
of IHs: they must be highly specialized and nationally relevant hospitals that deliver
highly specialized health care, hospital care and rehabilitation; moreover, and contrar-
ily to what happens with LHUs, there are no geographic constraints for patients when
they search for health care provided by an IH.62 Therefore, and contrarily to what
happens with LHUs, patients can choose to receive hospital care from a hospital that
belongs neither to their LHU area nor to their region of residence.63 IHs can also be
teaching hospitals (THs)64 if they have some link with a university. IHs and THs are
essentially structured like the British National Health System’s trusts.65 Another type of
health care providers that is also present in the Italian health system are the research
56In our work, one possibility we want to test is if there are differences between THs and other types
of hospitals, as we will explain in detail. We should have in mind that when some authors describe the
Italian national health system they might make a distinction between THs and IHs or not.
57Art. 19, Law 833/1978, December 23.
58As defined by Art. 3, Law 833/1978, December 23.
59Lo Scalzo et al. (2009), p. 75. GPs stands for general practitioners.
60Legislative Decree 502/1992, December 30.
61For instance, they must have a complete emergency department with an intensive care unit,
at least three high specialty units according to the list provided by the Ministry of Health. See
http://www.salute.gov.it/ministero/sezMinistero.jsp?label=principi&id=575, last access on September
2011.
62As described in http://www.salute.gov.it/ministero/sezMinistero.jsp?label=principi&id=575, last ac-
cess on September 2011.
63See Fabbri and Robone (2010).
64Legislative Decree 517/1999, December 21.
65Anessi Pessina et al. (2004), at p. 309.
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hospitals (RHs)66 which are essential to perform research and provide assistance with
specific pathologies.67
The current decentralized structure of the Italian Health System is the product of
several reforms that were done especially in the 1990s and beginning of the 2000s that
aimed at the introduction of internal market competition by giving more autonomy to
the regions (both in terms of political power and fiscal policy).68 Overall, the reforms
introduced managerialism,69 decentralization,70 and quasi-market mechanisms.71 As a
result of these reforms, the existing system is fragmentized with respect to the organi-
zation of the regional services and funding of providers.72 One of the concerns about
the effects of these reforms is that they might increase regional inequalities, given that
northern regions have been very assertive in exploiting their autonomy, while most of
the southern regions have been slower in changing their systems.73 Regional differ-
66IRCCS in Italian, which stands for Istituti di Ricovero e Cura a Carattere Scientifico. Legislative Decree
288/2003, October 16. Research hospitals are monitored both by the Ministry of Health and regions.
67See, for instance, CERGAS-Bocconi (2008).
68Namely Legislative Decree 502/1992 and 517/1993 on LHUs and IHs; Legislative Decree 446/1997
that introduces sources of autonomous financing and initiates the process of fiscal federalism; Law
59/1997 that regulates the transfer of powers to regions; Decree Law 229/1999, June 19, that estab-
lishes that regions and local entities should choose health care providers (both public and private) taking
into account the quality and costs; and Legislative Decree 56/2000, according to which the regions are the
main responsible for funding the health care (the National Solidarity Fund replaced the National Health
Fund. Nowadays, regions’ tax revenue comes essentially from IRAP (imposta regionale sulle attività produt-
tive), the regional tax on production, and the IRPEF (imposta sull reddito delle persone fisiche), the regional
tax on the national progressive income tax).
69IHs and LHUs are now required to meet higher performance standards, being managed by a general
manager appointed by the regional government. They share similar management structures (Art. 4,
Legislative Decree 502/1992).
70Regional governments have more autonomy, appoint the general manager, but are also expected to
cover the deficits of IHs and LHUs.
71Anessi Pessina et al. (2004) describe it in the following way: "Quasi-markets require money to ’follow
patients’. Each region sets the total amount to be spent on health care and allocates it to LHUs on a (possibly
adjusted) capitation basis. This is supposed to cover all services provided to LHU residents by the LHU itself
and by other providers, i.e. other LHUs, IHs, and accredited private providers (APPs). LHUs then reimburse
other providers for care given to their residents. Reimbursements are DRG-based for hospital discharges and
fee-for-service for out-patient services. When patients receive care outside their area of residence, the LHU
of residence will have to reimburse the entity that provided the health care. The reimbursements are made
according to Diagnosis Related Group (DRG) basis for hospitals discharges and according to a fee-for-service
for outpatient services", p. 310. See also Fattore (1999).
72Jommi et al. (2001).
73France et al. (2005), p. S188. The authors list some of the main problems, which are the shortage
of own-source resources for the regions to match their new responsibilities, large interregional differen-
tials in fiscal capacity and conflictual intergovernmental relations, especially over the adequacy of central
121 Monitoring Medical Malpractice Claims
ences are known to exist in Italy, with regions in the north being richer than regions in
the south. The north-south differences are present in health care services as well (both
in terms of quality and services provided) which results in significant cross-regional pa-
tient flows from the south to the north to receive health care, particularly in terms of
high-level care in tertiary hospitals.74 In 2001 the proportion of patients searching for
hospital care outside their LHU of residence (exit rate) was higher for southern regions,
with variation according to the type of care (higher for complex surgery).75 Inflow rates
did not show regional variation.
After the reforms described above, the number of IHs increased76 while the number
of LHUs decreased,77 as regions were trying to reshape their own health care gover-
nance.78 For example, the "increased fiscal responsibilities and deteriorating finances"79
led many regions to merge some LHUs, IHs or THs. Possible motivations for mergers
between health care providers are a cost reduction, economies of scale or spreading
the deficits over a large population.80 Regional health care systems present substan-
tial differences in terms of governance, i.e., in terms of the independence and regional
administration of LHUs and their relationship with IHs and THs.
4.3.2 Medical Liability System and Insurance
Italy does not possess a specific law to regulate the physician-patient relationship.81
Therefore, medical liability is judge-made law, similarly to what happens in the United
States. As argued by Zeno-Zencovich (2007), recent developments in the Italian med-
ical law are due to the Supreme Court.82 Although recent decades provide several
examples of a discussion on whether medical liability should be regulated by tort or
government funding for the National Health System.
74Lo Scalzo et al. (2009), p. 120.
75Fabbri and Robone (2010).
76In 1995 there were 81 IHs. The total number of IHs increased in the following years, but it suffered a
decrease to 82 in 2010. See Carbone et al. (2010) for more details - in Italian.
77In 1992, before the reforms took place, there were 659 LHUs (by that time the equivalent were USLs),
they were reduced to 228 in 1995 and further reduced to 146 in 2010. See Carbone et al. (2010) for more
details - in Italian.
78Anessi Pessina and Cantù (2004).
79Anessi Pessina et al. (2004), p. 314.
80See, for example, Anessi Pessina et al. (2004) and Carbone et al. (2010).
81Notice that the same happens in Spain.
82Corte Suprema di Cassazione in Italian. This is the highest court in the judicial system. While analyzing
decisions from the Italian Supreme Court from 1979 until 2009 Grembi and Garoupa (2010) find that,
from 397 analyzed decisions, 63% were in favor of the patient. Suffering a medical injury is not a suficient
condition to receive compensation.
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contract law, the current state of the law applies contract law83 to regulate the rela-
tionship between health care providers and patients.84 As Scarso and Foglia (2011)
describe, "two scenarios can be outlined. The patient admitted to a hospital or a clinic: (i)
enters into a contract with the medical institution, and is treated by an internal physician
who is affiliated with the medical institution; (ii) concludes a contract with a physician
practicing their professional activity within a medical institution".85 Moreover, "both the
medical institution and the physician are contractually liable towards the patient".86
We can sum up some of the main relevant characteristics of this liability system.87
In case of a medical malpractice claim, the patient (creditor) must allege that there
has been a breach of contract, but the burden of proof is on the defendant (debtor).88
The standard level of care is the one of a "buon padre di famiglia" and, in case of non-
fulfillment, specificities of the professional activity shall be considered to evaluate the
performance.89 This means that "for routine medical treatments Italian jurisprudence
considers slight negligence as being sufficient for the liability of the medical staff; for
treatments involving skills which go beyond ordinary qualifications, gross negligence is
required, unless the physician is a specialist".90 Additionally, the medical employee is not
responsible for harm if the performance implies solving technical problems of special
difficulty, unless there was criminal intent or gross negligence involved.91 Injured pa-
tients can find compensation not only through the civil justice system but also through
the criminal law system. Traina (2009) argues that several characteristics of the Italian
83Arts. 1176, 1218 and 2236 of the Civil Code. Previously, there have been several discussions by Italian
legal scholars on whether to apply contract or tort law. In fact, it was not always straightforward which
one to apply in medical malpractice cases. Moreover, there were five fundamental types of relationships
to be considered, depending on the type of physician providing the medical care: independent physician,
physician employed by the public health care institution, university physician, physician working in a
private clinic or physician with agreements with the public health care institution (Miriello (2011), p.
48). See Miriello (2011) and references herein - in Italian. As referred by the author, there has been an
harmonization in medical malpractice claims: contract law is applied instead of tort law and, moreover,
the same rules apply whether the health care institution is private or public.
84This situation presents a significant difference with respect to the Spanish case.
85Scarso and Foglia (2011), p. 341.
86Scarso and Foglia (2011), p. 342. As the authors describe, according to Italian jurisprudence, the
admission of a patient in a medical institution de facto generates a contract.
87The literature on the Italian liability system is quite vast (and tends to be written in Italian). For
more details, see for instance Franzoni (2011), Comandé and Turchetti (2004)- both in Italian, Scarso and
Foglia (2011). For a more economic view, see Grembi and Garoupa (2010).
88Art. 1218, Civil Code.
89Art. 1176, Civil Code.
90Scarso and Foglia (2011), p. 341.
91Art. 2236, Civil Code.
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legal system incentivize criminal proceedings:92 it is faster, the expenses of gathering
and prosecution are supported by the State, and in case the plaintiff prevails it is pos-
sible to receive monetary compensation and have the physician suffering a criminal
penalty at the same time. Moreover, criminal judges can decide over compensation,93
making this jurisdiction appealing to patients.94 The statute of limitations for compen-
sation due to breach of contract is ten years.95
Injured patients shall be compensated for their losses.96 In case of breach of con-
tract, Art. 1223 of the Italian Civil Code specifies that compensation shall be attributed
for the actual damage and forgone profits. Art. 1225 of the Civil Code limits compensa-
tion for losses that could have been predicted when the obligation arose, which seems to
be a restrictive condition. However, in aggregated terms, Italian courts seem to award
a high amount of damages to plaintiffs.97 Italian jurisprudence allows damages for loss
of a chance, similar to what happens in Spain. In case of permanent harm, the plaintiff
is entitled to receive damages as a life annuity.98 Nevertheless, as mentioned by Scarso
and Foglia (2011), case law constantly ignores this norm and attributes a lump-sum
award.99 Patients are entitled to receive pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses.100 Given
that setting payouts brings several difficulties to Italian courts, standard disability ta-
bles (similar to motor vehicle accidents)101 are considered by courts to set economic
damages in a more harmonized way.102
92Traina (2009), p. 438.
93I.e., the plaintiff will not have to wait for the civil decision on the compensation.
94See more details on Grembi and Garoupa (2010).
95Art. 2946 of the Civil Code. This is a longer period than in case of extra-contractual harm, which is
five years (Art. 2947, Civil Code). Moreover, it is a longer statute of limitations when compared to medical
malpractice cases in Spain. However, and similar to the Spanish case, the starting date is the date in which
the harm was suffered. The exception is when the patient needs more time for the consequences of the
medical treatment to be known ( Art. 2935, Civil Code).
96See Scarso (2009) for a description of the different types of compensation in medical malpractice
cases in Italy.
97With respect to awards for medical malpractice by courts, OECD (2006) says that "total damages
awarded by courts and paid by insurers for medical malpractice accounted for €29 million in Austria and
€350 million in France in 2003,€250 million in Germany in 2002 and £500 million (around€730 million)
in the UK and up to €2.4 billion in Italy", p. 27. However, no reference is made to the number of awards
nor to the injury severity level involved.
98Art. 2057, Civil Code.
99Scarso and Foglia (2011), p. 250.
100On this issue, the Supreme Court has decided ’twin judgments’ nos. 26972, 26973, 26974 and 26975:
Supreme Court, Joint Chambers, n. 26972, November 11, 2008.
101Insurance Code - (Codice delle assicurazione private), Legislative Decree, September 7, 2005.
102OECD (2006), p. 38. This situation shows some similarities with the Spanish case, where courts face
the same problem. However, there is still room for discretion by courts when setting compensation levels.
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Liability insurance is not mandatory for physicians and medical institutions, but
there have been recently some legal proposals in that sense.103 However, although
public health care providers (LHUs, IHs, RHs, THs, and hospitals directly managed by
LHUs) are not legally obliged to insure against medical malpractice themselves, they are
contractually bound to provide third-party liability insurance for their medical person-
nel.104 Having hospitals providing insurance for their own employees might bring some
advantages as hospitals have a higher bargaining power than individual physicians and
collective policies allow financing diverse levels of risk.105 In fact, the American ex-
perience shows that when hospitals buy insurance for doctors, "some physicians have
been able to find a stable, relative low-cost source of insurance", which can be particularly
relevant for physicians practicing in high risk specialties.106 However, moral hazard
problems107 can arise if doctors do not take appropriate levels of care because they
know that the hospital will cover their potential losses.108
According to the data released by the Italian Association of Insurance Companies
(ANIA), from 2000 until 2008 there were approximately 14 compensation requests for
each 100 physicians, with an average payout of €39,779 (2005 data). These data
shows an increasing trend in the number of claims between 1995 and 2004.109 The
ratio between lawsuits and compensation requests seems to be quite low (significantly
lower than 20%), although this index is only available for a very limited number of
regions.110 Moreover, it is not possible to infer why only a small proportion of claims
ended up in courts. In other words, it is not possible to disentangle, for instance, how
many claims were dropped and how many were settled.
Public heath care providers cannot buy liability insurance from the insurer they
See Scarso and Foglia (2011) for some examples.
103Disegno di Legge 108, senator Tomassini, June 6, 2001, on professional liability of medical employees.
For potential problems that might arise by making insurance compulsory, see Faure (2006).
104See Art. 28, Presidential Decree 761/1979, December 20. According to Art. 41.2 of the national
collective agreement for physicians of February 2005 (Accordo Collettivo Nazionale per la disciplina dei rap-
porti con i medici specialisti ambulatori interni ed altre professionalita - ai sensi del D.L.Vo 502/92 e successive
modificazione), in cases of liability against third-parties, the insurance policies can provide coverage up to:
€1,549,370.68 per medical accident; €1,032,913.80 per person.
105Taroni et al. (2008), p. 87.
106Mello (2006), p. 3.
107Taroni et al. (2008), at p. 87.
108See also Fenn et al. (2004) and Faure and Verhulsdonck (2004).
109There are no national data available on the number of paid requests. Just to have a reference -
although caution is needed when trying to make comparisons, given the significant differences in samples
and health care systems- in Texas, in 2002, the number of compensation requests was approximately 20
per 100 physicians (Black et al. (2005)).
110Amaral-Garcia and Grembi (2011a).
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want. Precisely because they are public entities, they are legally obliged to open a call
for tenders for the acquisition of professional liability coverage (public procurement
auctions).111 Insurance companies operating in the Italian market for medical mal-
practice are private companies, covering health care providers on the basis of a yearly
premium.112 Medical practitioners claim that insurance premiums have increased sub-
stantially. However, data on the cost of insurance for medical liability per policy sold are
not available. ANIA made a survey, asking insurance companies how much they were
charging for this type of insurance.113 The survey presents an estimation for the total
cost of insurance premiums for medical liability, but there are no data on the number
of policies being sold.114 This means that total costs might have risen just because the
total number of insurance policies being sold has increased over time. Besides, impor-
tant variables do not seem to be taken into account when setting insurance premiums.
For instance, no references to the number of beds, average recovery length or aver-
age number of surgeries were found. Moreover, experience rating is not considered
when setting medical liability insurance premiums.115 What seems to be more impor-
tant when setting insurance premiums is the amount of total payout that the hospital is
paying to employees. This means that hospitals with more employees or with a higher
proportion of senior physicians can be charged higher prices.116 If this is the only vari-
able that matters when insurance companies set their prices, at least two things can
be noticed: (i) physicians might not have the correct incentives when delivering health
care; (ii) hospitals with more senior and experienced physicians will pay more than
hospitals with interns and unexperienced physicians. This is quite surprising: as physi-
cians progress in their careers and acquire more expertise, we would expect a reduction
in the probability of incurring in a medical error. In case insurance companies use this
variable to set prices, we should expect a reduction in premiums, not an increase as it
seems to be the case.117
111See Legislative Decree 163/2006, April 12, for more details on the call for tenders and awarding
process.
112MdS (2006).
113Although this brief survey came out in 2004, it was not possible to find similar data for more recent
years. Moreover, we are not able to know how representative the sample of respondents is. In other words,
the ANIA made the survey and insurance companies replied to the survey. Typically, insurance companies
offering medical liability insurance are companies that operate in general insurance market. However, the
precise number of how many insurance companies offer medical liability insurance is unknown.
114The same holds for all reports that we found from ANIA.
115For a discussion of experience rating in medical malpractice insurance see Sloan (1990).
116See Taroni et al. (2008), p. 87.
117It could also be argued that interns do not practice risky procedures and this is the reason why hospitals
with senior physicians pay higher premiums. However, this does not seem to be a strong argument to
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Also in Italy, there has been a shift from occurrence-based policies - "which cover
all incidents in the policy year regardless of when the claim is filed",118 to claims-made
policies119 - "which cover only claims filed in the policy year".120 Given that the conse-
quences of medical malpractice injuries can become apparent even after several years,
there might be a "relatively long period between the time that the premiums for a medical
malpractice policy are paid and the time that losses under that policy can be known with
certainty".121 According to ANIA (2010), in 1994, a total of 95.8% of medical claims
were paid in the same year of the insurance contract. In 2008, only 9.8% of medical
accidents have been paid in the same year of the insurance contract. The statute of
limitations is an important variable in medical malpractice cases: the longer the statute
of limitations, the longer the period during which the plaintiff can bring the claim, and
the higher uncertainty it creates with respect to losses.
Buzzacchi and Gracis (2008) argue that having public health care providers buying
insurance from private insurers brings several costs, namely a sub-optimal risk diversifi-
cation, high organizational costs and submission to the market power of those firms.122
However, there are also advantages, such as solving the problem of soft budget con-
straint.123 What the situation in Italy seems to show is a lack of competition among in-
surance companies offering professional liability for medical malpractice. This situation
can be a result of two serious problems: barriers to entry to new insurers for profes-
sional liability; and asymmetric information in the call for tenders,124 in the sense that
past statistical information on the risk should be available to bidders but it is generally
lacking. This gives an advantageous position to the incumbent, which is often the only
firm possessing that information. Additionally, Comandé and Turchetti (2004) refer
that a culture of risk management in a multidisciplinary and systemic way between the
support a higher premium paid by hospitals with more senior physicians. As physicians progress in their
careers, and even if they are not senior physicians, they acquire more expertise, not less.
118Mello (2006), p. 3.
119This change is currently present in a large number of countries. When describing the claims made
medical malpractice insurance in the U.S., Baker (2005c) mentions that it is "the only kind of medical
malpractice insurance available in the individual market in most states", at p. 423.
120Mello (2006), p. 3.
121Baker (2005c), p. 395.
122Buzzacchi and Gracis (2008), p. 106.
123Buzzacchi and Turati (2008), p. 10. The idea is that Italian regions, funded by the state, do not
take the limit they have to spending in a serious way: they believe that the state will cover their losses,
as happened in the past. Therefore, the limit on spending is not considered as being credible. See also
Bordignon and Turati (2009) and references herein.
124See AGCM (1997).
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health care operators is missing in Italy.125
In this setting, two national initiatives can be relevant. One is the institution of the
SIMES,126 a system that monitors medical errors. This system shall increase patients’
safety and manage medical risk. Moreover, it is an uniform system for each and every
Italian region. The second is the creation of the SIMPAS,127 a system that monitors
insurance policies of health care providers. Given that the costs with insurance poli-
cies for medical liability are high,128 the purpose of this system is to allow health care
providers to have a profound understanding of their own clinical risks and its evolution.
By using this system, health care providers can exchange information on insurance poli-
cies with other health care providers. Moreover, it shall allow a comparison between
insurance companies operating in Italy with those operating in other countries. A good
design of this system shall allow a reduction in the problem of asymmetric information
that health care providers face.129 The implementation of these systems might bring a
positive advantage in case public hospitals do not have appropriate incentives to collect
these types of information.130 Moreover, health care providers will have more informa-
tion on their side when they need to contract out insurance for medical liability.131
Although none of these systems is currently into force in Italy, from 2001 until
2008 it is possible to find regions that implemented a monitoring system on medical
malpractice claims. For the same time period, other regions did not implement any
sort of monitoring system for medical claims. Therefore, from a total of 21 regions,
8 have a monitoring system. According to the AGENAS (2009) report, 5 regions have
the system working fully (Lombardia, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Lazio, Toscana, and Trento)
and 3 regions have a monitoring system "in progress" (Piemonte, Emilia Romagna and
Puglia). The first region to adapt such a system was Trento, in 1997. The remaining 13
125Comandé and Turchetti (2004), p. 9.
126Software that monitors medical errors (Sistema informativo per il monitoraggio degli errori in sanita),
(10A00120), Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana, Serie Generale n. 8, January 12, 2010.
127Informatics system to monitor health insurance policies (Sistema Informatizzato di monitoraggio delle
Polizze Assicurative in Sanita).
128See http://www.salute.gov.it/qualita/paginaDettaglioQualita.jsp?menu=programmi&lingua=italiano&id=1329,
last access on September 2011.
129Notice that, according to several reports already presented, namely the Ministry of Health, the problem
of asymmetric information is on the health care provider. It is counterintuitive, as generally the part
with less information is the insurance company. In this setting, insurance companies (and especially the
incumbent) tend to have more information than health care providers.
130For instance, health care providers might think that collecting this information is too time costly and
that the State will cover for their expenses.
131In the sense that they are better informed about the number and type of medical accidents taking
place in their hospitals and on how much other insurance companies are charging.
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regions never adopted this type of monitoring system until 2008 (see Table 4.1).
Table 4.1: Institutional Details
Regions 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Abruzzo
Basilicata
Bolzano
Calabria
Campania
Emilia Romagna Mon Mon Mon Mon Mon Mon
Friuli Venezia Giulia Mon Mon Mon
Lazio Mon Mon
Liguria
Lombardia Mon Mon Mon Mon Mon
Marche
Molise
Piemonte Mon
Puglia Mon Mon
Sardegna
Sicilia
Toscana Mon Mon Mon Mon
Trento Mon Mon Mon Mon Mon Mon Mon Mon
Umbria
Valle d’Aosta
Veneto
Note: Mon=Monitoring claims. Source: AGENAS (2009).
4.4 Hypothesis
The policy differentiation among Italian regions allows us to test the impact of moni-
toring medical claims on insurance premiums paid by health care providers. Before dis-
cussing possible implications of this policy, we should notice that this is not a pure risk
management system. In a sense, it deviates from typical management risk strategies:
as previously described, the most common risk management policy used in hospitals
is a monitoring system for medical errors or near misses. However, in our case, the
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system monitors medical claims, which is not necessarily the same as a medical error.
For instance, patients can make a claim because they believe that there was a medical
error in their treatment when in fact there was not.132 The information provided by this
system might be relevant in order to analyze which case characteristics make it more
likely to present a claim.133 Moreover, this system can also provide useful information
on the different stages of litigation. We have in mind, for instance, the possibility to
assess which types of cases tend to be settled, dropped or end up in courts.134 Precisely
because of its novelty, it is interesting to assess the effects of this system.
Effect on Premiums
If properly designed, monitoring medical malpractice claims can bring advantages for
regions adopting them: health care providers operating in these regions are able to
collect more information and to use it when they need to contract out insurance for
medical liability. This is particularly relevant in the Italian medical liability insurance
market, given that insurance companies tend to make an overvaluation of medical ac-
cidents135 which might lead them to set aside higher amounts of reserves than they
need.136 Therefore, the implementation of a monitoring system on medical claims
might take insurance companies to set a more accurate level of reserves.
However, other hypotheses might be available as well. For instance, let us suppose
that the asymmetric information problem that health care providers suffer from is not,
after all, that serious. Then, by implementing this system, insurance companies can
actually realize that they could charge higher premiums (for example, by comparing
the number of medical accidents occurring in other health care facilities). Therefore,
assessing the impact of this monitoring system can bring useful insights, especially if
similar programs should start operating at the national level.
Effect on Legal Expenditures
It is not clear whether a monitoring system can affect legal expenditures or how they
can be affected. Before discussing possible implications of this monitoring system on
legal expenses, we should describe what is the item "legal expenditures" appearing
132See Chapter 1.
133As described in Chapter 1, Studdert, Brennan and Thomas (2000) find that the poor and the elderly
are less likely to present a claim.
134It should be noted, however, that the possibility to analyze these issues is left for future research, as
the current data does not allow to have information on the number or type of claims.
135Taroni et al. (2008), p. 88.
136For Texas, Black et al. (2008) find that medical malpractice insurers made an undervaluation of their
initial expense reserves, even though costs were rising during the period they analyzed.
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in health care providers’ balance sheets. Legal expenditures include essentially costs
due to litigation. Wages paid to lawyers working at health care facilities,137 as well
as expenses with legal counseling, are not part of legal expenditures. Therefore, this
variable can be considered as a proxy for costs with medical malpractice claims.
The monitoring system on medical claims could have an indirect impact on legal
expenses if, for example, the quality of health care provided to patients improves and,
because of that, health care providers receive less claims. This hypothesis will be tested
in the regression analysis. There are reasons to believe that a monitoring system on
medical claims should not have a direct impact on legal expenditures (i.e., the item
legal expenditures as it appears in the balance sheet). In case health care providers
discover through the monitoring system that they have a high number of claims against
them, that should not affect legal expenditures . Legal expenditures are essentially costs
that health care providers must pay because patients decided to make a claim against
them. Although we can think about situations in which the health care provider can
directly influence legal expenditures (for example, if it is the health care provider that
decides to appeal a court decision, which implies paying legal court’s fees), these tend
to be more influenced by patients or indirectly.138 Notice that, in case legal counseling
was included in legal expenditures, there could be a direct effect of the monitoring sys-
tem on legal expenses. For instance, after implementing the monitoring system, health
care providers could realize that they had a high number of claims against them, and
they could decide to spend more on legal counseling.
Health Care Providers Type
One important hypothesis we want to test is whether insurance premiums present any
difference according to the various types of health care providers. In other words, does
the type of the health care provider matter when setting insurance premiums? On the
one hand, we might think that the type of health care provider is relevant. For exam-
ple, Teaching Hospitals can present higher risk exposure139 because they have interns.
However, Teaching Hospitals also have experienced and senior doctors that teach in-
137It is not possible to know the wage that health care providers pay to their lawyers because the financial
data provides one aggregated item on which other professionals are also included (namely engineers and
architects).
138These conclusions follow precisely because the item "legal expenditures" does not include wages paid
to lawyers or legal counseling.
139We discuss the possibility of different risk exposure and not the possibility of different moral hazard
problems among different types of health care providers. Health care practitioners face the same liability
and insurance coverage independently of the type of health care provider where they are working at.
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terns and that make a continuous investment in research. Therefore, if the type of
health care provider matters, it is not clear how it might affect insurance premiums. On
the other hand, there are also reasons to believe that the type of health care provider
is totally irrelevant when setting insurance premiums. In the end, health care is highly
regulated in Italy and, as previously described, the relevant variable when setting in-
surance premiums seems to be payout paid to health care employees.
Merged Health Care Providers
As described in Section 4.3.1, some health care providers have merged. In case merged
hospitals are able to find more advantageous conditions when contracting out their
insurance policies, a reduction in insurance premiums could be expected. This hypoth-
esis will be considered because we must make sure that, in case we find a reduction
in insurance premiums, that reduction is not due to the merger. However, one might
also suspect that only the less efficient health care providers went through a merging
process. There were only 19 mergers from 2001 until 2008 which means that, even if
being involved in a merger might be relevant, we should not expect a strong impact.
4.5 Data and Empirical Strategy
In order to create the Italian Public Health Care Providers Dataset (IPHCPD) we col-
lected data from the Ministry of Health (MdS), the Italian National Institute of Statistics
(Istat), and the Ministry of Justice (MoJ),140 from 2001 until 2008.141 The Ministry of
Health releases the annual balance sheets of each LHU, IH, RH, and TH. From this
source we obtain, among others, two crucial variables for our analysis: paid insurance
premiums and legal expenditures.
Paid insurance premiums are a proxy for medical malpractice liability premiums,
since until 2007 health care providers did not specify how much of insurance premiums
corresponds to medical liability or to something else (for instance, insurance against
burglary). However, since 2008, health care providers present not only the overall
expenses with insurance premiums, but they also make a distinction between medical
liability and other types of insurance. This change offered us the possibility to check
what is the proportion of medical liability insurance on total insurance premiums. We
find that, on average, it accounts for 84%, making us confident that it is a good proxy
140For a list of the variables collected, please see Section 4.4.1.
141In September 2011, the MdS had released financial data until 2008. This is the reason why we are
not including more recent years.
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for our dependent variable.
Legal expenditures are an aggregate measure as well, and they are available until
2007 only. We collect information on this variable because we cannot control for the
total number of medical claims against each health care provider or region. However,
if health care providers are spending considerable amounts on legal expenditures, it
might be a signal that they are involved in litigation. Including this variable allows to
control for that possibility. Naturally that this is not a perfect measure, given that legal
expenditures might include costs that are not related to medical malpractice claims.
However, it seems to be a good proxy.
We have an unbalanced panel: a few health care providers started operating later
than 2001, others stopped their activity, and others merged. For this reason, health care
providers are not exactly the same every year, as we can see from the table bellow. The
minimum number of health care providers is 263 (in 2001), and the maximum is 323
(in 2005). The majority of health care providers are LHUs, followed by IHs.
Table 4.2: Types of Health Care Providers per Year
Type 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
LHUs 183 197 197 196 196 180 171 157
IHs 52 68 65 61 63 63 63 63
THs 28 32 32 34 43 43 45 43
RHs 0 0 20 22 21 20 21 21
Total 263 297 314 313 323 306 300 284
Note: LHUs: Local Health Units; IHs: Independent Hospitals; THs: Teaching Hospitals; and RHs:
Research Hospitals. There is no data for RHs for 2001 and 2002 because they started operating,
as we know them today, in 2003 (Legislative Decree 88/2003).
The fact that some health care providers merged with other units should be consid-
ered in our analysis. To start with, when health care providers merge, is as if some units
stopped existing. In other words, let us suppose that hospital number 110 merged with
hospital 111 and they are now hospital 112. When we analyze the data, we have that
hospitals 110 and 111 are no longer in activity, although they actually are. In order
to take this situation into consideration, we coded the number of the hospital in such
a way that we can check if the hospital has been part of a merger or not. In case we
exclude health care units that were merged with other hospitals, we can see that we
have a lower number of health care providers, but the number is more stable from 2001
until 2008 (Table 4.3). Moreover, we can see the following from the table: RHs were
not involved in mergers; the number of mergers involving THs and IHs was very low;
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and LHUs are the units that typically merge with other units.142 We can also add that
mergers were performed on the majority of cases within untreated health care units.
Table 4.3: Types of Health Care Providers per Year (Excluding Mergers)
Type 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
LHUs 131 141 141 141 141 141 141 141
IHs 49 65 62 61 63 63 63 63
THs 28 32 32 33 40 40 40 40
RHs 0 0 20 22 21 20 21 21
Total 208 238 255 257 265 264 265 265
Note: LHUs: Local Health Units; IHs: Independent Hospitals; THs: Teaching Hospitals; and RHs:
Research Hospitals.There is no data for RHs for 2001 and 2002 because they started operating,
as we know them today, in 2003 (Legislative Decree 88/2003).
Table 4.4. describes the average paid premium per type of health care provider,
and its evolution over years. On average, THs are paying higher insurance premiums,
compared to LHUs, IHs and RHs. This might reflect a higher risk exposure of these
units, due to the presence of interns, for instance. However, the available data do not
allow to check for other alternative possibilities. For example, if all THs in our sample
have a higher number of medical professionals, that could be enough to explain the
difference. Moreover, if total payout is the variable that matters when setting insurance
premiums, then health care providers with a higher proportion of senior physicians are
also expected to pay higher premiums. Therefore, if THs have a higher proportion of
senior physicians, that could also explain the difference.
From 2001 until 2008, LHUs have registered a higher increase in insurance premi-
ums: in 2001, LHUs were paying, on average€853,000 while in 2008 this amount was
equal to €2,248,000 (both in 2009 euros) (Table 4.4). A similar trend is detectable for
legal expenditures (Table 4.5).
Some descriptive statistics are calculated, comparing now treated regions with un-
treated regions. As already described on Table 4.1, treated regions are those that imple-
mented a monitoring system on medical malpractice claims. In 2001, the only treated
region was Trento. In this region, there was one LHU, that is the reason why we can
see only one treated health care provider in Table 4.6. However, in 2008 the number of
treated units surpassed the number of untreated units.
142One additional note: in this section, we will typically present descriptive statistics considering the
entire sample, unless stated differently. The number of mergers is not significant and the results do not
change when we exclude health care units that were merged with other units.
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Table 4.4: Average Premium
Type 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
LHUs 853 950 1,234 1,531 1,681 1,833 1,968 2,248
IHs 1,023 1,022 1,220 1,518 1,602 1,734 1,857 1,844
THs 1,591 1,642 1,885 2,326 2,376 2,320 2,052 2,238
RHs . . 564 692 903 881 989 922
Total 967 1,041 1,255 1,561 1,708 1,819 1,889 2,059
Note: Values are in €1,000 deflated at 2009. LHUs: Local Health Units; IHs: Independent Hospitals;
THs: Teaching Hospitals; and RHs: Research Hospitals. There is no data for RHs for 2001 and 2002
because they started operating, as we know them today, in 2003 (Legislative Decree 88/2003).
Table 4.5: Average Legal Expenditures
Type 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
LHUs 143 164 255 304 440 423 428
IHs 83 122 146 284 222 185 193
THs 96 101 105 160 258 170 200
RHs . . 61 142 174 95 190
Total 126 148 205 273 358 319 334
Note: Values are in €1,000 deflated at 2009. LHU: Local Health Units; IH: Indepen-
dent Hospitals; TH: Teaching Hospitals; and RH: Research Hospitals. There is no data
for RHs for 2001 and 2002 because they started operating, as we know them today,
in 2003 (Legislative Decree 88/2003). Legal expenditures are only available until
2007.
Table 4.6: Health Care Providers (Treated vs. Non-Treated) per Year
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
All sample
Non-Treated 262 296 294 246 240 212 174 137
Treated 1 1 20 67 83 94 126 147
Total 263 297 314 313 323 306 300 284
Excluding Mergers
Non-Treated 207 237 238 191 183 171 143 128
Treated 1 1 17 66 82 93 122 137
Total 208 238 255 257 265 264 265 265
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Average premiums have increased over time, and this holds for both treated and
untreated units. Nevertheless, from 2001 until 2008, the increase in treated units was
smaller (97%) than in untreated units (142%), as shown in Table 4.7. Legal expendi-
tures increased as well from 2001 until 2007, at a faster rate for untreated units.
Table 4.7: Average Premiums and Legal Expenditures (by Groups)
Premium Legal Expenditures
Year Non-Treated Treated Non-Treated Treated
2001 810 1,090 140 115
2002 844 1,235 164 131
2003 1,011 1,493 252 159
2004 1,288 1,828 310 238
2005 1,505 1,908 481 232
2006 1,713 1,913 396 248
2007 1,765 2,003 482 195
2008 1,962 2,149 . .
Total 1,370 1,708 325 190
Note: Values are in €1,000 and 2009’s prices. Legal Expenditures
are only available until 2007.
Figure 4.1. shows the evolution of paid premiums and legal expenditures in treated
and control regions. From the graphs, it seems that treated regions had lower increase
in premiums comparing to control regions. With respect to legal expenditures, both
treated and control regions had the same evolution until 2003 (Figure 4.2). From
2003 until 2007, treated regions show a smoother pattern. Controlled regions suffered
a lower increase in legal expenses in 2006 but a higher increase in 2007. From the
graph, we cannot say that implementing a monitoring system had an impact on legal
expenditures. We can see in both graphs the total number of regions that decided to
switch to a monitoring system.
4.5.1 Data Limitations
We face some data limitations that we try to explain in a detailed way. We also provide
arguments which suggest that these data limitations are not problematic.
Time Period: We are using data from 2001 until 2008. Although the number of
health care providers is significant, which makes our sample numerous, it would be
interesting to have more years of data. Given that the financial balance sheets have
changed in 2001, it is not possible to recover that information for previous years. And
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Figure 4.1: Premiums: Treated vs. Control
NOTE: "Num. of switches to Monitoring" represents the total number of regions adopting a
monitoring system. One region, Trento, is not included as it implemented the monitoring
system in 1997.
Figure 4.2: Legal Expenditures: Treated vs. Control
NOTE: "Num. of switches to Monitoring" represents the total number of regions adopting a
monitoring system. One region, Trento, is not included as it implemented the monitoring
system in 1997. Legal expenditures are only available until 2007.
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although we are almost ending 2011, the Ministry of Health released data until 2008
only.
Type of Insurance: We cannot control for the type of insurance that health care units
are buying. Although this limitation might be relevant, it should not be of concern given
the Italian setting. The idea is that there were reforms being implemented in Italy with
respect to monitoring but there were no reforms being implemented that could have
had an impact on physicians or health care providers’ liability. For instance, in case a
tort reform had been implemented during the period of study establishing that hospitals
were not liable for the health care professionals, we could expect a decrease in premi-
ums paid by hospitals. This decrease would not be due to the impact of monitoring but
due to the fact that health care units would stop buying coverage for their health care
professionals. Reforms of this type did not took place in Italy, which makes us feel more
confident with the results we get even without detailed information on each hospital
insurance contract.
Physicians’ specialties: It would be interesting to account, for instance, for the type of
specialties working in each health care facility. However, taking into account the Italian
setting, this does not pose a limitation because we are assessing changes overtime in
malpractice premiums per health care unit, and these health care units did not change
the mix of specialties and services provided.
Level of Harm: We have no information on the severity level of claims being filed
against health care providers. If one health care provider is generally involved in lit-
igation in cases with high levels of harm (death or permanent grave injuries), that
could explain why the hospital is paying higher insurance premiums. However, we be-
lieve that, on average, there should not be huge differences with respect to harm levels
among hospitals. In other words, hospitals that have obstetricians and neurosurgeons
are expected to pay higher premiums than health care providers in which these "risky"
specialties do not work. However, that should be accounted for in the hospital fixed ef-
fect: over time, there were no significant changes in the structure of hospitals in terms
of specialties (as explained above).
Physicians’ behavior: One important effect of this reform on the monitoring system
is on physicians’ behavior. Can we expect doctors to change their behavior after this
reform has been implemented? We are looking at the impact of these reforms on insur-
ance premiums paid by hospitals on behalf of their employees. On the one hand, we
can expect nothing to change because physicians are not paying directly for the medi-
cal liability insurance anyway. On the other hand, physicians can think that they must
report errors and might adopt more defensive medicine procedures.
Insurance Market: We have no information on the Italian insurance market for med-
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ical liability. Currently it is not possible to obtain information on how many insurance
companies are offering insurance for medical liability (which is a part of general liabil-
ity insurance). However, the insurance market can be considered national (it would be
problematic in case it was a regional market). Nowadays, even foreign companies are
among the list of main providers of medical liability at least for some regions.143
4.5.2 Econometric Strategy
In order to assess the impact of the monitoring system (Monitoring) implemented by
some Italian regions, we use a Differences-in-Differences (DD) estimation. As Bertrand
et al. (2004) describe, "DD estimation consists of identifying a specific intervention or
treatment (often the passage of a law). One then compares the difference in outcomes
after and before the intervention for groups affected by the intervention to the same dif-
ference for unaffected groups".144 In this setting, the treatment is the introduction of a
monitoring system by the region. Hospitals must comply with their region’s decision of
implementing this system, which means that from the health care providers’ perspective
this is an exogenous policy. To assess the impact of this policy treatment on insurance
premiums, we shall compare changes in health care providers’ premiums in regions
adopting the monitoring system (treated) with changes in health care providers’ premi-
ums in regions that did not adopt this treatment (untreated/control group). We must
take into consideration the fact that, within treated regions, this policy was implemented
in different years.145
Let ln(Yir t) be the log of insurance premiums paid by health care provider i, op-
erating in region r, at time t (our dependent variable).146 We estimate the following
equation:
ln(Yir t) = Ai + Br + Ct +αX ir t + βZr t +δMonitoringr t + "ir t
where Ai , Br and Ct are fixed effects for health care providers, regions and years, re-
spectively. X ir t are individual controls (i.e., variables for the health care providers)
which include:
• Health care provider type: as described before, public health care providers can be
LHU (Local Health Units), TH (Teaching Hospitals), IH (Independent Hospitals)
or RH (Research Hospitals). We have created a dummy variable for each type of
143See, for instance, DGS (2010).
144At p. 249.
145As in Autor et al. (2006) and Acemoglu et al. (2011).
146In our dataset, insurance premiums are in €1,000, in 2009 prices.
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health care provider. One hypothesis is that some health care providers might pay
higher premiums than others. For instance, we should not be surprised if we find
that THs pay higher insurance premiums than other types of hospitals because of
their interns. Or even that they pay less because these units might have better
technologies or more experienced doctors.
• Wage of health care professionals: for each health care provider, we include the
amount of health care professionals wages (essentially physicians and nurses).
According to MdS (2006), insurance companies tend to set insurance premiums
as a proportion of that amount.
• Entry Rate: this index tries to control for qualitative differences, which might
affect the number of errors or the probability of patients filing claims. Hence, we
use the ratio of revenues due to medical care provided to residents from other
public health care providers within the same region (entry rate). This index is
generally associated with good quality: patients tend to perceive the quality of
the health care providers in their region, which might take them to search medical
care in those facilities they believe the quality is better.
• Legal expenditures: how much are health care units spending each year for legal
expenditures, excluding lawyers’ wages and legal counseling. As we discussed
before, we cannot control for the number of claims that hospitals receive. A good
proxy is the costs with legal issues. Naturally, this is not a perfect proxy because
we cannot assure that all legal expenditures are with medical malpractice claims.
However, it is a good proxy for these cases. In robustness checks we also include
the lag of legal expenditures as a regressor.
Zr t are relevant regional controls (i.e., variables at the regional level). The list of
these variables comprises:
• Resident population per LHU: it is calculated as the number of total residents in
one region divided by the total number of LHUs operating in that same region.
This variable should be seen as a proxy for the dimension and activity levels of
regional LHUs.
• Litigation rate: equal to regional ordinary civil proceedings filed in first-instance
courts weighted per 1,000 residents. It is important to include this variable be-
cause it can be a driver of legal expenditures and claims requests.
• Average duration of first instance cases: how long regional ordinary civil proceed-
ings filed in first-instance courts take to be decided, on average.
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• Regional GDP: the inclusion of this regressor allows to control for regional dif-
ferences at the economic level. This difference can be important at the patients’
level but also at the health care providers’ level, as these institutions are funded
by regional taxes.
One potential problem that we might have in this analysis is the one of endogeneity
with respect to the choice of the treatment. In our case, we do not have a true ex-
periment in which treatment and control groups are randomly chosen. Therefore, one
can be worried with the fact that, for example, regions with more medical malpractice
problems might self select into the treatment of monitoring medical malpractice claims
because they have higher costs. Or that only regions with modest medical malpractice
problems self select into the treatment in order to obtain better conditions when con-
tracting out liability insurance policies. Indeed, we cannot claim that Italian regions
are randomly affected by the treatment. However, there are reasons to believe that
the type of regions implementing the treatment are not of the same type. For exam-
ple, from our data there is no clear path for regions adopting this system (for instance,
there is no North/South division, nor richer/poorer division, nor more populated/less
populated division: both types are represented in treated and control groups). Due to
these concerns on the endogeneity of the intervention variable (as raised by Bertrand
et al. (2004)), we include regions fixed effects. Notice, moreover, that we use as unit of
analysis the premium that each health care provider is paying. Additionally, health care
providers practicing in treated regions must implement the monitoring system, whether
they would like to implement it or not. In a way, it is an external decision and they must
comply with it.
"ir t is an error term. The estimated impact of the intervention (the DD estimator)
is δ. Monitoringr t is always equal to zero for those regions that did not adopt the
monitoring system. However, for regions adopting the monitoring system, we have
the following: Monitoringr t is equal to zero for those years in which the monitoring
system was not in effect; Monitoringr t is equal to one for those years in which the
monitoring system was in effect. This means that if region A adopted the monitoring
system in 2002, the variable Monitoringr t is zero until 2001, but it is one from 2002
onwards (i.e., assumes value one already in 2002, the year in which the policy was in
effect).
Another possible problem that might arise is serial correlation. Therefore, we al-
ways present clustered standard errors so that we can mitigate those concerns, as
pointed out by Bertrand et al. (2004).
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4.5.3 Robustness Checks
We try different specifications in order to test the robustness of our results. Given
that the introduction of a monitoring system might have an effect that is not immedi-
ate, all regressions are run using Monitoring1 instead of Monitoring. Similarly to
Monitoring, this variable is always equal to zero for untreated regions. For regions
adopting the monitoring system, the variable Monitoring1 is zero for those years in
which the treatment was not in effect; and it assumes the value 1 starting one year after
the introduction of this policy.147 The rationale for performing this analysis is that in
case the implementation of a monitoring system has an impact on insurance premiums,
the effect might not be immediate.
The lack of information on the number of medical malpractice claims is a natural
concern in this analysis. Therefore, we also try alternative specifications: in some we
include Ln(LegalEx p)ir t and in other we add Ln(LegalEx p)ir t−1.148
In order to assess if taking part on a merger might distort the results we obtain, we
perform the regressions for a subsample of observations: excluding health care units
that took part on a merger.
Finally, we run the regressions having as dependent variable Ln(LegalEx p). If im-
plementing a monitoring system had an impact on the legal expenditures, then insur-
ance premiums can decrease afterwards. This means that the results we are obtaining
from the regressions above might be distorted because what is driving them is a reduc-
tion on medical malpractice claims. Having Ln(LegalEx p) as a dependent variable is
the best way to check for this possibility, given the available data.
4.6 Results
The results from the Differences-in-Differences model are presented in Table 4.8. The
main results are the following:
• Monitoring medical malpractice claims has a negative impact on insurance pre-
miums: hospitals operating in regions that implemented such a system paid 35%
to 36% less than hospitals in the control group. In case we opt for including
Monitoring1 instead, the results are nearly the same and range from 31% to
147Therefore, if region A adopts a monitoring system in 2003, Monitoring1 assumes value one from
2004 onwards. Remember that, in this example, Monitoring assumes the value one already in 2003.
This means that the only difference between Monitoring and Monitoring1 is on the year in which the
policy was implemented.
148See Appendix for these results.
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33%. Therefore, the introduction of this policy has the desirable effect on insur-
ance premiums, ceteris paribus. This is a robust result, that holds when standard
errors are clustered at the health care unit level.
• Hospitals involved in mergers pay higher insurance premiums compared to hos-
pitals that were never involved in mergers. Merged hospitals can pay from 72%
to 126% more than health care units that did not go through this type of change.
• The type of health care provider does not influence the level of insurance premi-
ums. In some specifications we can find a statistically significant negative coeffi-
cient on RH, for example, but it is not robust to other specifications.
• Regional GDP does not affect how much health care providers are paying for
insurance premiums. The coefficient is always negative but it is never statistically
significant.
• The more crowded LHUs are (i.e., the higher the average resident population per
LHU), the higher the insurance premium. However, this impact is no longer sta-
tistically significant when variables on the legal system are introduced. In case we
consider the specification with Monitoring1, the coefficient is only statistically
significant in one regression, and at a low level of significance.
• There is a positive and statistically significant relationship between wages of
health care professionals and how much hospitals are being charged from insur-
ance companies. A 1% increase in the total payout of health care professionals is
correlated with an increase in premiums from 0.59% to 1.1%. This result seems to
support the hypothesis that insurance companies tend to consider payouts when
setting premiums: the higher the payout, the higher the premium paid.
• Litigation rate has no effect on insurance premiums.
• An increase in the duration of first-instance civil proceedings is associated with
an increase in insurance premiums, on average.
When including Ln(LegalExpenditures) as a regressor, the results are quite similar
(Table 4.9). The impact of monitoring seems to have a slightly higher effect on insur-
ance premiums: health care providers practising in regions where a monitoring system
has been implemented pay from 32% to 41% less than health care units in control
regions.
In Table 4.10 we present the results for the regression analysis using Ln(Legal Exp)
as dependent variable. The main results that we obtain are the following:
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• Monitoring medical malpractice claims does not seem to have any impact on legal
expenditures: this variable is statistically significant in only one of the specifica-
tions. According to Reg. (2), introducing a monitoring system on medical claims
decreases legal expenditures by 19%. This result is not robust when we include
variables on the legal system, which should be relevant to the amount that health
care providers are paying.
• Teaching hospitals and independent hospitals face lower legal expenditures, on
average, than the base group (LHUs). This result holds in different specifications.
With respect to research hospitals, the results are somehow striking: initially, it
seems that being a research hospital is associated with paying lower legal expen-
ditures. However, when we include variables on the legal system and the index
Entry Rate, the coefficient changes signal. One potential explanation relies on the
fact that RHs started operating later when compared to the other types of health
care units. As Table 4.3. shows, RHs starting operating in 2003. Therefore, we
should not be surprised with the results we obtain: these health care units might
take some time to stabilize the amount they are paying for legal expenses.
• A longer duration of first-instance civil proceedings is associated with lower legal
expenditures. One possible explanation is that patients are aware of the delays,
which might refrain them from presenting a claim.
4.6.1 Discussion of the Results
The preceding results suggest that monitoring medical malpractice claims can allow
health care providers to pay less insurance premiums comparing to health care units
that did not implement such a system. Notice that we are not arguing that monitoring
medical malpractice claims are effective in reducing insurance premiums, given that
insurance premiums have risen from 2001 until 2008 in all regions. Nevertheless,
the increase for health care units adopting the monitoring system was lower than the
increase for health care units that did not adopt such a system. This result is robust in
several specifications. The following robust results were obtained as well: an increase
in wage leads to an increase in insurance premiums; the longer the duration of first
instance civil proceedings, the higher insurance premiums; and legal expenditures have
no effect on insurance premiums (not even when we consider legal expenditures paid
in (t-1), i.e., in the previous year.). Monitoring medical claims does not have an impact
on how much hospitals are paying for legal expenditures.
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p
<
0.05,*
p
<
0.1.
A
llregressions
include
region,health
care
provider
and
year
fixed
effects.
The
num
ber
of
observations
drops
from
1,885
to
1,789
in
regressions
(3)
and
(7)
because
Entry
Rate
is
not
available
for
som
e
health
care
units.
It
further
drops
to
1,660
because
data
for
duration
and
litigation
rate
is
available
until2007
only.
R
obust
standard
errors
clustered
at
the
health
care
provider
levelin
brackets.
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It is not clear if the implementation of a monitoring system will generate social im-
provements. In order to make such an analysis, we would need to have information
on other important variables that are not available. Overall, the implementation of a
monitoring system on claims should have a desirable impact in terms of costs of insur-
ance premiums for health care units, but should not distort the incentives of providing
a good quality of health care. For instance, if implementing a monitoring system on
claims allows for a reduction on insurance premiums but this reduction is more than
outweighed by the costs of the monitoring system itself or by the costs of adopting
defensive medicine procedures, this reform might not be desirable. Both positive and
negative medicine behaviors could be adopted by physicians. For instance, physicians
can react by lowering the supply of health care services. In other words, in terms of
liability, introducing a monitoring system brings no change. However, given that med-
ical claims are being monitored, physicians can fear the repercussions of this system.
We have in mind the possibility of having experience rated insurance premiums, which
would force health care providers to pay higher insurance premiums given that their
doctors are facing claims. Physicians can also fear the repercussion of this system in
terms of promotion or reputation, for instance.149 The hypothesis of adopting negative
defensive medical practices is quite unlikely because, as we explained previously, the
national state defines the minimum level of health care that must be provided to citi-
zens. Unless this minimum level is set to be too low, it is hard for medical professionals
not to provide those levels of care. We find the possibility of practicing positive defen-
sive medicine more likely, though. Doctors might feel that they are being "monitored",
which induces them to perform additional tests so that, in case some medical accident
happens, those tests can be used as a way to prove that they were not negligent. To sum
up, this system should not have a negative impact on the quantity nor on the quality of
medical services being provided to patients.
Another important point after the introduction of this monitoring system is how
will insurance companies and hospitals use this information. For instance, we could
expect more competition in the call for bids because more insurance companies obtain
information on medical accidents: the incumbent is no longer the only party that has
access to it. Hospitals might use this information as well when they need to contract out
their liability insurance. Although it seems unreasonable, health care providers were
not aware of how many medical accidents were taking place inside their facilities for a
long time. Moreover, they were not able to compare how much they were paying for
149We find this possibility quite unlikely, given the rigid structure for public employees. However, the
purpose of this discussion is to think about possible reactions, namely by physicians.
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liability insurance with how much other hospitals in other regions were paying. There-
fore, from this point of view, the implementation of this system seems to be beneficial.
However, we see one potential problem when using this information. Essentially, the
concern is with what will be considered in the end: is it the number of claims or the
number of claims in which negligence was involved? These are two totally different
situations, and only the latter should be used for insurance companies when setting
the prices of insurance premiums. The reason is simply that, as we saw in Chapter 1,
making a claim is not a sign of negligent care. Sometimes patients might need to file
a claim in order to get more information on the medical treatment they received. Pa-
tients might actually drop the claim during the process, namely after finding that it is
not clear that a negligent treatment has been provided. If insurance companies use the
information on the total number of claims instead of using the total number of claims
involving negligence, they might set a higher insurance premium than they should.
Additionally, we are not saying anything about an eventual change in patients’ in-
centives to file a claim. For example, if patients react to this policy by making more
claims even when there is no evidence of negligence, then this result is not desirable.
We believe that with respect to patient’s safety this policy can only bring advantages.
After the implementation of this monitoring system, it is possible to assess which types
of procedures are likely to result in a higher number of medical accidents and claims.
This information should be properly used in order to improve patient’s safety: it should
be investigated by the physicians why these errors are taking place, and what can be
changed in order to reduce them. Sometimes, small changes can make substantial dif-
ferences. For example, if it is found that physicians working with sleep deprivation
are more likely to incur in mistakes, rules that set how much physicians are working
on-call should be modified. Another situation is the one involving infections. Suffer-
ing an infection after a surgery due to the lack of hygienic conditions seems to be an
outrageous situation. We can currently see in health care units posters reminding doc-
tors and nurses that they must wash their hands. However, sometimes the failure is
not because the physician forgot to wash her hands: it is because the hospital did not
have soap for her to wash her hands. Of course these are only simple examples, that
have already been studied in the literature.150 For sure physicians working everyday
in hospitals have many examples to provide. Precisely because they know the situation
better than anyone else, they should take part in the process of finding solutions.
150Please see Chapter 1 on this matter.
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4.7 Conclusions
The fear of skyrocketing insurance premiums might induce governments to implement
reforms. In the U.S., many legal reforms have taken place in the past few decades,
and the main motivation claimed by reformers was precisely the need of controlling
insurance premiums. In Europe, the main motivation claimed by reformers has been
more on the patient’s safety side. The Italian case is a good example: some regions
started implementing a monitoring system on medical claims. If implemented properly,
this system may allow an improvement in patient’s safety and to control the increase of
insurance premiums. In this chapter, we only assess the impact of the implementation
of this policy on insurance premiums, given that there is currently no way to assess the
impact on patient’s safety.
The results show that implementing a monitoring system is related to lower in-
creases in insurance premiums. However, it is not clear the net effect of this policy on
public health. For example, physicians might react by adopting defensive medical prac-
tices. Additionally, it is not clear how insurance companies will use this information
when setting liability premiums: considering the total number of claims can be disad-
vantageous for health care providers, given that this is not the same as claims involving
negligence.
If the information is properly used, patients and the state might benefit from this
monitoring system. Patients might benefit if this information is translated into changes
that lead to an improvement in patient’s safety, and to a reduction in medical accidents.
The state might benefit as well: if there are less medical accidents, given that there is
a public national health system in Italy, the state will have lower expenses in treating
injured patients. Moreover, if there are less medical negligent accidents, a reduction in
legal costs due to litigation can be expected: the state will be involved in less medical
malpractice cases.
To sum up, in this chapter the impact of monitoring medical malpractice claims
on insurance premiums has been analyzed. However, in order to assess if this policy is
socially desirable, several other impacts should be taken into account. We lack informa-
tion on the impact of this reform in other variables. Moreover, some years are needed
until an evaluation can be properly done. Assessing the overall effect of this reform is
beyond the scope of this study, but monitoring medical claims should not harm patient’s
safety.
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4.8 Appendix
Figure 4.3: Paid Premium per capita (variation 2001-2008)
NOTE: Per capita paid premium variation from 2001 to 2008. Treated regions with dia-
mond symbol; control regions with circle symbol. Dotted-line is the 45 degree line.
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Table 4.11: Variables description
Variable Type Definition Source
Monitoring Dummy 1 for those regions and in those years in which a monitoring policy
on claims was active (first year of the policy implementation is
included), 0 otherwise
AGENAS
Premium Continuous (1.000€) Paid insurance premium per health care provider MdS
Legal_Exp Continuous (1.000€) Legal expenditures per health care provider MdS
GDP Continuous (€) Regional GDP Istat
Wage Continuous (1.000€) Total wages of health care personnel per health care provider MdS
LHU_Pop Continuous Regional resident population per regional LHU Health for All-Italia
Litigation Rate Continuous Ordinary civil proceedings filed in first-instance courts per 1,000
inhab. in the region (excludes cases assigned to special divisions:
labor, social security, family law and bankruptcy)
Istat (with data from
the MoJ)
DurationY Continuous Mean duration of ordinary civil proceedings filed in first instance
courts in years (estimated)
Istat (with data from
the MoJ)
LHU Dummy 1 if the health care unit is a Local Health Unit, 0 otherwise MdS
IH Dummy 1 if the health care unit is an Independent Hospital, 0 otherwise MdS
TH Dummy 1 if the health care unit is a Teaching IH, 0 otherwise MdS
RH Dummy 1 if the health care unit is a Research Hospital, 0 otherwise MdS
Entry Rate Continuous [0,1] (Revenues from public entities intra-region)/(Total revenues from
health care)
MdS
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Table
4.12:
Im
pact
on
Prem
ium
s
(Excluding
H
ospitals
that
M
erged)
D
epen
den
t
Variable:
Ln
(Prem
ia)
M
onitoring
M
onitoring1
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
M
onitoring
-0.46***
-0.43***
-0.42***
-0.44***
(-5.48)
(-5.12)
(-5.00)
(-5.05)
M
onitoring1
-0.41***
-0.38***
-0.37***
-0.37***
(-6.03)
(-5.71)
(-5.61)
(-5.50)
Ln(LegExp)
-0.03
-0.02
-0.02
-0.02
-0.02
-0.02
-0.02
-0.01
(-1.11)
(-0.99)
(-0.98)
(-0.74)
(-0.75)
(-0.65)
(-0.64)
(-0.40)
IH
14.42*
12.52*
10.56
-1.94***
15.15**
13.06*
-1.85***
-1.82***
(1.96)
(1.72)
(1.45)
(-13.08)
(2.13)
(1.86)
(-13.61)
(-12.94)
TH
12.84*
10.96
9.01
-3.47***
13.49*
11.42
-3.48***
-3.44***
(1.74)
(1.51)
(1.24)
(-21.60)
(1.90)
(1.63)
(-23.15)
(-21.62)
RH
9.17
13.58*
-1.72**
-5.41***
10.02
13.96**
0.84***
-5.00***
(1.25)
(1.87)
(-2.17)
(-10.19)
(1.41)
(1.99)
(3.84)
(-9.92)
Ln(G
D
P)
-4.34**
-3.78*
-3.20
-3.01
-4.54**
-3.92*
-3.32
-3.40
(-1.99)
(-1.76)
(-1.49)
(-1.25)
(-2.17)
(-1.89)
(-1.60)
(-1.40)
Ln(LH
U
Pop)
0.27**
0.24**
0.24**
0.17**
0.21***
0.17**
0.18**
0.13*
(2.30)
(2.32)
(2.27)
(2.21)
(2.62)
(2.47)
(2.48)
(1.92)
Ln(W
age)
0.73***
0.75***
0.69***
0.79***
0.81***
0.77***
(4.28)
(4.45)
(4.00)
(4.58)
(4.72)
(4.45)
Entry
Rate
-0.19
-0.21
-0.22
-0.24
(-1.16)
(-1.15)
(-1.37)
(-1.38)
Litigation
Rate
0.08
0.05
(1.45)
(0.95)
Ln(D
urationY)
0.92***
0.66**
(2.92)
(2.19)
O
bservations
1,559
1,559
1,491
1,362
1,559
1,559
1,491
1,362
R
-squared
0.83
0.83
0.83
0.83
0.82
0.83
0.83
0.83
A
djR
sq
0.789
0.793
0.796
0.795
0.784
0.789
0.792
0.789
N
ote:
R
obust
t-statistics
in
parentheses.
***
p
<
0.01,**
p
<
0.05,*
p
<
0.1.
A
llregressions
include
region,health
care
provider
and
year
fixed
effects.
The
num
ber
of
observations
drops
from
1,559
to
1,491
in
regressions
(3)
and
(7)
because
Entry
Rate
is
not
available
for
som
e
health
care
units.
It
further
drops
to
1,362
because
data
for
duration
and
litigation
rate
is
available
until2007
only.
A
lso
for
this
reason
the
num
ber
of
observations
is
low
er
than
the
num
ber
w
e
obtain
excluding
legalexpenses.
R
obust
standard
errors
clustered
at
the
health
care
provider
levelin
brackets.
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Table
4.14:
Im
pact
on
LegalExpenditures
(Excludes
M
ergers)
D
epen
den
t
Variable:
Ln
(LegalExp)
M
onitoring
M
onitoring1
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
M
onitoring
-0.19*
-0.21*
-0.19
-0.17
(-1.69)
(-1.80)
(-1.62)
(-1.47)
M
onitoring1
-0.04
-0.05
-0.01
0.01
(-0.33)
(-0.40)
(-0.11)
(0.08)
IH
16.96
17.69
16.11
-2.71***
16.58
17.17
15.40
-2.66***
(1.53)
(1.60)
(1.41)
(-14.50)
(1.50)
(1.55)
(1.35)
(-14.15)
TH
17.35
18.07
16.49
-2.34***
16.94
17.52
15.75
-2.31***
(1.57)
(1.63)
(1.44)
(-12.00)
(1.53)
(1.59)
(1.38)
(-11.73)
RH
17.15
17.17
3.52***
-3.21***
16.87
16.92
3.44***
-2.90***
(1.55)
(1.55)
(14.36)
(-4.58)
(1.53)
(1.53)
(13.93)
(-4.16)
Ln(G
D
P)
-5.27
-5.48*
-5.01
-4.06
-5.14
-5.31
-4.79
-4.05
(-1.61)
(-1.68)
(-1.49)
(-1.20)
(-1.57)
(-1.63)
(-1.42)
(-1.20)
Ln(LH
U
Pop)
-0.23***
-0.22**
-0.20**
-0.14
-0.27***
-0.26***
-0.24***
-0.18**
(-2.60)
(-2.35)
(-2.11)
(-1.18)
(-3.48)
(-3.37)
(-3.09)
(-1.98)
Ln(W
age)
-0.29
-0.32
-0.24
-0.22
-0.25
-0.18
(-1.39)
(-1.53)
(-1.13)
(-1.07)
(-1.23)
(-0.84)
Entry
Rate
0.18
0.24
0.16
0.21
(0.90)
(1.15)
(0.80)
(1.06)
Litigation
Rate
0.00
0.02
(0.02)
(0.19)
Ln(D
urationY)
-0.65
-0.60
(-1.17)
(-1.08)
O
bservations
1,563
1,563
1,495
1,366
1,563
1,563
1,495
1,366
R
-squared
0.73
0.73
0.73
0.73
0.73
0.73
0.73
0.73
A
djR
sq
0.669
0.669
0.669
0.672
0.667
0.667
0.668
0.671
N
ote:
R
obust
t-statistics
in
parentheses.
***
p
<
0.01,**
p
<
0.05,*
p
<
0.1.
A
llregressions
include
region,health
care
provider
and
year
fixed
effects.
The
num
ber
of
observations
drops
from
1,563
to
1,495
in
regressions
(3)
and
(7)
because
Entry
Rate
is
not
available
for
som
e
health
care
units.
It
further
drops
to
1,366
because
data
for
duration
and
litigation
rate
is
available
until2007
only.
A
lso
for
this
reason
the
num
ber
of
observations
is
low
er
than
the
num
ber
w
e
obtain
excluding
legalexpenses.
R
obust
standard
errors
clustered
at
the
health
care
provider
levelin
brackets.
Chapter 5
Conclusions
Medical mishaps bring significant costs to the society. Victims of a medical accident
may suffer injuries with devastating consequences for them and their families. More-
over, a loss of enjoyment of life might follow, or even death. Naturally, doctors are
affected by these cases: they might have to pay for the harm they caused but damage
to their reputation and emotional costs are also part of the story. Medical malpractice
can be very hard to assess due to problems of causation. We cannot go back in time,
provide a different medical treatment to the patient and see the final outcome. When
patients search for medical care, they are already sick in the first place. Therefore, the
result of the treatment could be due to the poor medical condition and not because of
negligence.
Different legal systems have diverse rules regarding medical practice, which means
that they can provide different incentives to physicians. What Law and Economics tell
us in general is that legal rules should provide incentives to invest in optimal levels of
care in order to prevent damage. Moreover, legal rules should take into consideration
that medical care provides positive externalities to the society1 and that no matter how
much doctors invest in expertise, they will never be able to eliminate the probability of
incurring in a medical error.2 Arlen (forthcoming) argues that, "in order to determine
the proper scope of liability, we need a model of malpractice that recognizes that med-
ical providers can err accidentally because they misdiagnose patients, accidentally select
the wrong treatment, or err in providing the treatment". The optimal level of care will
determine if the doctor was negligent or not.
When a doctor acts negligently, the tort system should be able to compensate pa-
tients in a consistent way. A difficult task is to compute the fair level of compensation
1Cooter and Porat (2006).
2Arlen and MacLeod (2005).
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that patients should receive, or the full level of compensation, an argument we did
not cover in the current work. However, for the sake of equity and fairness, patients
suffering similar levels of harm should receive equivalent amounts of compensation.
This is something that society should expect and request from the legal system. As we
saw in the Spanish case, medical liability rules are based on fault. If a patient receives
substandard level of care and harm materializes, he is entitled to receive compensa-
tion. Moreover, the burden of proof is, in the vast majority of cases, on the patient side
(exceptions are essentially related to uninformed consent). The organization of the
Spanish National Health Care system allows patients to search for medical treatment in
public hospitals. Moreover, the Social Security is important if a loss of income resulted
from the medical accident. As we tried to explain previously, this is a much different
setting than the American one. Moreover, and precisely because of that, we should see
less dispersion in awards that courts attribute to patients, after controlling for the level
of harm.
Empirical Law and Economics has been developing quickly during the last years,
although "the field of empirical health law (EHL) is still in its adolescence".3 Especially in
Europe, some of the topics have been much less empirically developed than in the U.S.,
and this is particularly true for the literature on medical malpractice. In this work we
have tried to fill an existing gap in this literature using as a case study two European
countries: Spain and Italy. This analysis is interesting given the heterogeneity of sys-
tems that we can find and that have not been exhaustively studied yet. In order to do
so, we built two different datasets. The Spanish Supreme Court Medical Malpractice
Dataset (SSCMMD) is a valuable one, in the sense that it provides a detailed description
on several variables of interest, generally hard to combine in one dataset. In order to
build this database, reading Supreme Court decisions (sometimes together with lower
court decisions) was needed. As unit of analysis we have the entire set of cases that
arrived to the Spanish Supreme Court from 2006 until 2009. This allows including
cases in which the medical accident took place all over the country. As explained pre-
viously, the important feature of the Spanish Supreme Court is the obligation to come
out with a decision for each and every appealed case. The Italian Public Health Care
Providers Dataset (IPHCPD) includes data for public health care units in Italy, from
2001 until 2008 (the last available year in September 2011). We can assess how much
hospitals are spending over time for insurance and legal expenditures, together with
other important financial and economic variables. This dataset is also valuable as it
puts together Italian public health care providers from the entire country, instead of
3Mello and Zeiler (2008), p. 651.
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focusing in a few regions only. As mentioned, the dataset and methodologies that we
use have some important limitations and challenges, which we explain in more detail
in the different chapters. However, these limitations are not specific to our work, and
can be a reflection of the adolescence period of Empirical Health Law and Economics.4
Given the nature of medical malpractice, the government might be called to act
due to pressures from citizens that require better health care and safety or physicians
and insurance companies that claim that the legal system is too harsh on them. In
addition, and particularly in Europe, taxpayers might exercise some pressure since they
have to pay not only for health services but also for compensation to victims of medical
malpractice in public hospitals. In order to understand the severity of this problem,
we must remember that the vast majority of patients search for medical treatment in
public hospitals (again, very different than the American case). Recent decades are
rich in tort reforms that have been implemented in several American states, with caps
on non-economic damages being the most popular one. The European Commission
recently adopted some measures concerning patient safety. Policy makers should take
into consideration possible unexpected effects of proposed or enacted laws. Empirical
works can be a powerful tool to investigate impacts of laws before enacting them. We
believe several lessons can be taken from this work, which we now try to sum up.
• We do not find strong reasons to have different courts and jurisdictions judging
similar medical mishaps when the only difference between them is the place of
the medical accident, i.e., a public or private hospital. This situation creates un-
predictability in a final outcome which is already unpredictable per se. Moreover,
if the argument that supports the existence of administrative courts is the speci-
ficity of administrative law, this argument does not hold in medical accidents.
Additionally, this separation between regular and administrative courts makes
capture by the State or special interests easier, which brings costs to the system,
as mentioned by Dari-Mattiacci et al. (2010).
• Courts should be consistent when setting damages. Medical malpractice is a very
complex problem. As we saw in Chapter 3, vertical inequity in terms of payouts
according to the level of harm should be expected, and it is reasonable to be so.
What is not reasonable is to find horizontal inequity with respect to payouts, i.e.,
similar patients that suffer identical severity injuries being compensated differ-
ently. Adding the fact that courts opt for different ways when setting awards,
brings more unpredictability.
4Mello and Zeiler (2008) refer to this problem as well while characterizing the U.S.
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• The legal system should make clear what the aim of the tort system is. Is it to
compensate everyone who suffered harm (independently of fault), or to compen-
sate victims of negligence? Is it to punish negligent doctors? This is inter-related
with the way the health system and social security function (if the health system
provides medical treatment to patients even after being injured and social security
pays to the victim the corresponding loss of income, then the tort system should
only compensate negligently injured patients). For instance, one recurrent debate
has to do with a change to a no-fault system. According to this system, injured
patients are allowed to receive compensation, independently of the evidence of
negligence.5 We are skeptical of this regime, especially if we consider, for in-
stance, the Spanish or the Italian case. In the end, this is not a substitute for the
tort system: this is essentially an administrative system with no involvement from
courts. A strong drawback of this system is that negligent doctors will not bear
any of the consequences of the harm they caused. Moreover, under this system
more patients are expected to be compensated but they will not be necessarily
better compensated: the amounts of compensation tend to be lower. Supporters
of this system frequently claim that it allows for savings because it is not nec-
essary to assess negligence and courts are not involved. However, evidence has
shown (as reported in Chapter 1) that the increase in the number of accidents
and the extra number of people searching for compensation might outweigh the
savings with litigation. Additionally, it is not true that all harmed patients are
compensated, i.e., that suffering medical harm is a necessary and sufficient con-
dition to receive compensation. In fact, when we look at the Supreme Court’s
decisions, a significant part of cases involving death or permanent major injury
did not receive compensation. Precisely because of this, it is necessary to know
the objective of the system. One argument that can be brought to the debate is
that injured patients need money for their medical expenses and income losses.
True, they do. But if there is a national health care system and social security, the
main objective of the tort system is precisely to punish the wrongdoers and try to
compensate patients negligently injured.
To sum up, we believe that the current liability system based on fault is far from
being perfect in performing its aims of deterrence and compensation. Neverthe-
less, some improvements can be made before jumping to other types of regimes
that also present evidence to be expensive, that do not provide clear evidence of
5See Shavell 1978.
159 Conclusions
giving incentives for physicians6 to provide a high quality of care and that will
probably not be able to compensate efficiently some of the patients. Physicians
should obviously be involved in the debate, given that they are the agents with
more information and in a better position to suggest improvements. Empirical
studies, even with some limitations, can be a powerful tool to enrich the debate
and can contribute to a better health care service.
• Governments should make an effort to collect more information before starting
enacting legal reforms. As literature has shown, the results are complex and
might have unintended consequences.7 Scholars do not have the ability of requir-
ing data to be collected. Moreover, given the delicate nature of the information
involved, even if the data exist already it is natural to find some resistance in
making them available, even if scholars are willing to make a compromise of not
disclosing it.
• Interdisciplinary works are particularly important to study medical malpractice.
Health practitioners with a medical background have a practical understanding
of negligent medical treatment; legal scholars are proficient in understanding the
legal system and legal rules; economists have the expertise of assessing the impact
of rules on agents’ incentives and behavior; methodologists8 master techniques
to estimate the effects of laws. All of them are important if we want to fully
understand legal medicine problems.
• Empirical health studies can benefit future patients by improving their safety.
"To err is human",9 but doctors should take into account that when they err, the
consequences can be devastating, as they have effects on human life. Precisely
because of that, it should not be surprising that "to sue is human"10 as well. As
6For example, Klick and Stratmann (2005) estimate that although some reforms increase the access
to health care, collateral source reform (that allowed "offsetting the damages owed by the tortfeasor by
any amount for which the victim has already been compensated or will be compensated for by an alternate
insurer") lead to a statistically significant increase in infant mortality rates in the black community they
studied.
7Klick and Stratmann (2007) provide a good example.
8This expression is used to refer to experts on methods used in empirical studies. Mello and Zeiler
(2008) list some of the most common methodologies (some more rigorous than others) in EHL, namely:
case studies, qualitative analysis of judicial opinions, collection of survey and interview data, univariate
analysis, bivariate analysis, and controlled observational or quasi-experimental studies using multivariate
regression techniques. See pp. 657-660.
9Kohn et al. (2000).
10Zeiler et al. (forthcoming).
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empirical evidence suggests, it seems that the main problem is not that patients
are suing too much: it seems that there are too many patients being injured, with
high severity levels of harm. Fortunately, medicine evolves and there are positive
experiences. For instance, the American Society of Anesthesiologists’ initiative11
is a good example of how to improve patient safety (moreover, with a reduction
in premiums paid by anesthesiologists).
• Eventually, having a specific law to regulate the physician-patient relationship
could bring some benefits, at least when we have in mind the case of Spain and
Italy. The current state of the art might bring several uncertainties to patients.
To start with, there is a distinction between public and private medical providers
which implies that patients should follow different procedures in case they want
to fill a claim. Moreover, the distinction between contract and tort law is not
always clear.12 For instance, in Spain, regulations point to contract law in case of
a medical accident for voluntary medicine. However, case law shows that courts
follow tort law when judging medical cases. In Italy, pursuing a criminal claim
against the doctor is free to the claimant, and "the state bears all the expense of
evidence gathering and prosecution".13 The easiness of suing doctors under crimi-
nal law makes this the European country with the highest number of physicians
subject to criminal proceedings.14
• For sure several other policies could be easily implemented. For that to be possi-
ble, expertise from those who work every day in hospitals is crucial. Therefore,
they should be involved in the process, together with legal scholars and method-
ologists.
Future Research
In this work, we add to the literature on Empirical Law and Economics, especially to
the field of medical malpractice. A lot of work is still to be done, though. Having
more data available would make the task easier. For instance, even if we focus on
Supreme Court decisions, a first obstacle is to find all the decisions available and not
a subsample of them, as it would imply a biased sample. Spanish Supreme Court’s
11The American Society of Anesthesiologists (ASA) Closed Claims Project started in 1985 by collecting
information on closed insurance claims due to anesthesia mishaps. The causes of anesthesia injury were
subsequently analyzed and changes in procedures were made in order to improve patients’ safety.
12Cristas and Garoupa (2009).
13Jourdan et al. (2000), p. 1268.
14Traina (2009), pp. 437-438.
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decisions are available to the general public, although they are not categorized by type
of case. Other countries do not make courts’ decisions public , which means that any
sort of analysis is biased, unless the decisions available are a random sample of all court
decisions (generally, they are not). Making a comparative analysis of Supreme Court
decisions in other civil law countries would be interesting.
Spain enacted a reform in 1998 / 1999 which makes it clear that plaintiffs can no
longer opt for the civil jurisdiction in case of medical accidents in public hospitals. One
main motivation for this reform had to do with delays in the legal system. It would be
important to assess if this reform brought the desired outcomes, but for that we would
need to extent the Spanish Supreme Court Dataset.
Civil law tradition countries, especially those with a national health system, show
some similarities: generally there is no law regulating the physician-patient relation-
ship; there is a distinction between administrative and civil jurisdictions that plaintiffs
should follow in case of medical harm; public hospitals tend to be vicariously liable for
their employees. Still, they present important differences. One future line of research
could be to assess the implications of the easiness of pursuing criminal claims against
doctors in Italy.
Empirical studies in the medical malpractice field are underdeveloped in Europe.
This implies that there is room for many studies. We still lack studies on:
• Costs of medical accidents: for each euro amount spent in litigation, how much
goes to patients, and how much is for administrative costs? What is the cost of
medical injuries for the public health system that must provide additional care, for
patients and their families (loss of income, pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment
of life), for doctors (reputation, emotional costs)? Are doctors adopting defensive
medicine procedures?
• Role of medical experts when they must testify in court
• Law and Medicine: Medical Malpractice in mandatory intervention (births), semi-
mandatory or high value (saving lives or curing cancer) and totally voluntary
(plastic surgery)
• Role of insurance
It seems a sick joke that so many people die or become physically impaired due to
medical mishaps nowadays. It is imperative that efforts are done in order to improve
patients’ safety. This is naturally a joint effort between medical practitioners, legal
scholars, economists, methodologists and policy makers. Empirical analysis can be a
powerful tool.
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English Summary
Medical malpractice brings several costs to society. Medical mishaps can have devastat-
ing consequences for patients and their families. Nevertheless, physicians might suffer
from the consequences of their own mistakes, e.g., psychologically or by the effects on
their reputation. Medical errors can never be fully eliminated: even the most brilliant
and studious doctors make mistakes. The victims of medical malpractice might also
react: patients and their families can make a claim, hoping to be compensated for their
losses. Therefore, "to err is human"15 but to "sue is human"16 as well. The most recent
empirical literature on medical malpractice is revised in Chapter 1.
The goal of this thesis is to investigate, in the first place, some of the consequences
of having two separate sub-systems (civil and administrative) coexisting within the
same legal system, which is common in civil law tradition countries with a public na-
tional health system. When this holds, and taking the Spanish case as an example,
civil courts decide claims involving private hospitals and administrative courts decide
claims involving public hospitals. This means that different procedures might apply
depending on the type of hospital where the injury took place. Moreover, one question
that might arise is why (or why not) both civil and administrative courts should decide
medical malpractice cases? In medical malpractice decisions, the level of compensation
attributed to patients is a crucial variable. Identical patients suffering similar medical
accidents should receive analogous compensation amounts. In order to study these is-
sues, the Spanish Supreme Court Medical Malpractice Dataset (SSCMMD) was created.
It consists of medical malpractice decisions made by the Spanish Supreme Court from
2006 until 2009. With this dataset, a comparison between administrative and civil
decisions is made in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 uses the SSCMMD to assess predictors of
compensation in medical malpractice cases and to investigate how much are patients
receiving for damages.
In the last few years, there was a general concern with patient safety, which is
currently on the agenda of numerous national governments. Some initiatives have been
taken at the international level, with the aim of preventing harm to patients during
treatment and care. In several European countries, health care is mainly provided by a
public national health system, which means that if a patient harmed in a public hospital
succeeds in a claim against the hospital, national expenditures increase because the
State takes part in the litigation process. This poses a problem in a context of increasing
15As part of the title from Kohn et al. (2000).
16As part of the title from Zeiler et. al. (forthcoming).
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national health expenditures and public debt, which is the case in several European
countries. In Italy, some regions implemented a monitoring system for medical claims.
If properly implemented, monitoring medical claims might increase patients’ safety and
allow a reduction in medical liability insurance premiums. The impact of this policy is
assessed in Chapter 4. Finally, Chapter 5 discusses our main findings, describes possible
future research and concludes.
It seems a sick joke that so many people die or become physically impaired due
to medical mishaps nowadays. It is imperative that efforts are done in order to im-
prove patients’ safety. This is naturally a joint effort between medical practitioners,
legal scholars, economists, empiricists and policy makers. Empirical analysis can be a
powerful tool.
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Een kwantitatieve analyse van medische aansprakelijkheid
Samenvatting
Medische fouten kunnen leiden tot een aantal maatschappelijke kosten. Medis-
che missers kunnen rampzalige gevolgen hebben voor zowel patiënten als hun fam-
ilieleden. Bovendien kunnen artsen lijden onder de gevolgen van hun eigen fouten,
bijvoorbeeld psychologisch of door de negatieve gevolgen voor hun reputatie. Medis-
che fouten zullen nooit helemaal voorkomen kunnen worden: zelfs de beste en meest
voorzichtige doctoren maken wel eens fouten. Slachtoffers van medische fouten kun-
nen ook reageren: patiënten en hun familieleden kunnen een schadeclaim indienen in
de hoop op compensatie voor het geleden verlies. Daarom kunnen we het volgende
stellen: "fouten maken is menselijk"17 maar ook "een schadeclaim indienen is menselijk".18
In hoofdstuk 1 volgt een overzicht van de meest recente wetenschappelijke literatuur
op het gebied van medische fouten.
Het doel van dit proefschrift is in de eerste plaats om enkele gevolgen te onderzoeken
van het hebben van twee aparte, naast elkaar bestaande systemen binnen hetzelfde
rechtssysteem, wat heel gebruikelijk is in landen met een civielrechtelijke traditie en
een nationaal publiek gezondheidszorgstelsel. In landen waar dit zo is, bijvoorbeeld in
Spanje, beslissen de civiele rechters over de schadeclaims waarbij private ziekenhuizen
betrokken zijn en bestuursrechters over schadeclaims waarbij staatsziekenhuizen be-
trokken zijn. Dit betekent dat verschillende regels van toepassing zouden kunnen zijn,
afhankelijk van het soort ziekenhuis waar de medisch fou gemaakt wordt. Dit leidt
tot de vraag waarom (of waarom niet zowe civiele rechtbanken als bestuurlijke recht-
banken uitspraken doen in rechtszaken die het gevolg zijn van medische fouten. Bij
uitspraken over medische fouten is de hoogte van de toegekende schadevergoeding een
uiterst belangrijke variabele. Vergelijkbare patiënten die hebben geleden onder vergeli-
jkbare medische fouten zouden even hoge schadevergoedingen ter compensatie dienen
te ontvangen. Om deze aspecten te kunnen bestuderen, is er in Spanje nu de Span-
ish Supreme Court Medical Malpractice Dataset (SSCMMD). Deze databank bestaat uit
alle uitspraken van het Spaanse Hooggerechtshof over zaken die betrekking hebben
op medische fouten tussen 2006 en 2009. Dankzij deze databank kan een vergelijk-
ing worden gemaakt tussen de bestuursrechtelijke en de civielrechtelijke uitspraken
in hoofdstuk 2. In hoofdstuk 3 wordt de SSCMMD gebruikt om te beoordelen of het
te voorspellen is of er compensatie word toegewezen in rechtszaken als gevolg van
17Fragment uit de titel van Kohn et. al. (2000).
18Fragment uit de titel van Zeiler et. al. (nog te verschijnen).
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medische fouten. En bovendien om te onderzoeken welk bedrag aan schadevergoeding
patiënten ontvangen.
De laatste jaren staat patiëntveiligheid hoog op de agenda van een groot aantal regerin-
gen. Op internationaal niveau is een aantal initiatieven genomen met als doel om
schade tijdens medische ingrepen of patiëntenzorg te voorkomen. In een aantal Eu-
ropese landen wordt gezondheidszorg vooral aangeboden door een nationaal openbaar
gezondheidszorgstelsel. Dit betekent dat een medische fout die in een staatszieken-
huis gemaakt is en op basis waarvan een schadeclaim wordt toegewezen, leidt tot een
toename van de overheidsuitgaven omdat de overheid onderdeel is van het aansprakeli-
jkheidsproces. Dit is een probleem gezien de steeds stijgende kosten van de gezondhei-
dszorg en de stijgende staatsschulden, wat het geval is in een aantal Europese landen.
In Italië hebben een aantal regio’s een system ingevoerd om medische claims te kunnen
monitoren. Als dit goed wordt ingevoerd, kan het monitoren van medische schade-
claims leiden tot een verbetering van de patiëntveiligheid en zorgen voor een daling van
de premies voor medische aansprakelijkheidsverzekeringen. Het effect van dit beleid
wordt behandeld in hoofdstuk 4.
Ten slotte worden in hoofdstuk 5 de belangrijkste resultaten besproken, conclusies
getrokken en suggesties gedaan voor toekomstig onderzoek.
Het lijkt een zieke grap dat zoveel mensen tegenwoordig sterven of blijvend lichamelijk
letsel ondervinden door een medische fout. Het is van groot belang dat er maatregelen
worden getroffen om de patiëntveiligheid te verbeteren. Uiteraard dient dit een geza-
menlijke inspanning te zijn van zowel medici, juridische wetenschappers, economen,
empirische onderzoekers als beleidsmakers. Empirisch onderzoek kan daarbij een krachtig
hulpmiddel zijn.

